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Until a decade or so ago, there was a consensus among most observers 
of the developing world that countries with substantial oil and gas 
reserves were privileged, and constrained in their social and economic 
transformation only by a shortage of skilled manpower. More recently 
the optimism has been tempered. The evidence from such places as Nigeria, 
Venezuela, and Gabon has not been happy and suggests that exploitation 
of petroleum brings in its train a host of problems, especially with 
respect to agriculture. '
The common manifestations of the petroleum-agriculture conflict are 
stagnating food production, rising prices, increased food imports, and 
migration of farmers and farm workers into the petroleum centers in search 
of high-paying jobs. A booming petroleum enclave develops and those lucky 
enough to find employment within it thrive. For the many left out, how­
ever, the result can be a serious deterioration in levels of living and 
the demise of much that traditionally was held to be of value.
If this seems the usual scenario, there are exceptions; and one such is 
the Mexican state of Tabasco, the site of what is probably the largest 
petroleum find of the last quarter century. Despite the manifold changes 
brought on by exploitation of this discovery, the agricultural economy of 
Tabasco has flourished. How this came about— and the lessons other petro­
leum-rich countries can draw from it— are the subjects of Sara Scherr's 
paper.
The paper is an abbreviation of Dr. Scherr's PhD dissertation, a 
monumental work whose preparation took almost four years. Fully two years 
of field work in Tabasco were involved, made possible in part by a gener­
ous grant to Cornell University from the Tinker Foundation. We are in­
debted to Governor Leandro Rovirosa Wade for the cordial reception extended 
Dr. Scherr by the state government; and to Ing. Pedro Rodriguez Sierra,
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will be apparent, they cannot be thanked by name.
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INTRODUCTION
"WITH PETROLEUM WEALTH, TO SOW JUSTICE"
Through most of its history, the small state of Tabasco on the 
Gulf coast of Mexico has been remote from the major events of world 
history and economics. A vast floodplain for the southern Sierra, its 
life has ebbed and flowed with its surface waters. During the rainy 
season, half the state is under water.
The higher lands are fertile and have for centuries supported 
an agricultural population settled along the dikes of the many 
rivers. Outsiders - Mayans, Spaniards, Aztecs - sought tribute from 
the Tabascans, or trade, but wrought only minor changes in their way 
of life. The land - and their lives - were held fast by the roots of 
jungle and plantation trees, which alone could tolerate the swollen 
water resources. In Tabasco, basic sustenance came traditionally not 
from the tortilla, but from pozol, a liquid mixture of crushed maize 
and cacao beans.
But while ribbons and sheets of water still dominate the land 
above, below Mexico's national oil company has discovered one of the 
largest deposits of oil and natural gas in the world. Since 1972, the 
entire region has undergone an extremely disruptive "petroleum boom."
Tabasco today is a place of astonishing contrasts and rapid 
change. New bridges connect what were previously islands of isolated 
settlement. Throngs of men from northern Mexico, from Mexico City, 
from the Sierra have travelled south drawn by the magnet of petroleum 
development, to mingle conspicuously with the perplexed and unsettled 
native Chontal/Maya/mestizo population. The eminently agrarian nature 
of the Tabascan landscape and settlement pattern has been radically 
altered by urban development, the erection of hundreds of oil wells, 
petrochemical processing plants, highways.
What has been the impact on rural life and on agriculture, the 
livelihood of most of the Tabascan people? The Zapata family represent 
thousands of other Tabascan farm families in their varied experience 
with the oil boom.
The Zapata's live in a small rancheria halfway between Teapa, 
Tabasco's southernmost town, and Villahermosa, the capital. Those few 
miles between city and farm, a quick trip on newly resurfaced roads, 
bring a new world. Could this tranquil land amidst the vestiges of 
rain forest really lie so close to boom-town Villahermosa and one of 
the world's great petroleum centers?
The family rises at 4:00 a.m.; the rains have not yet begun in 
earnest and most work has to be done before the mid-day heat. The 
Zapata's home is a typical one, partly of wood, partly of the tradi­
tional palm, with thatched roof. It is large and airy, and has two 
rooms, and a separate kitchen - signs of relative prosperity by 
campesino standards.
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The homestead actually Includes two other houses, occupied by 
families of Antonio and Rosa Zapata's married children. These are much 
smaller and simpler; the daughters-in-law do much of their household 
work, including cooking, with Dona Rosa.
The Zapata's is a prime example of the traditional Tabascan 
family farm, with its extended family, diversified production, 
subsistence security and cash export crop. Elsewhere in Tabasco, many 
such farms have evolved to become either more fully commercial, or 
have been sub-divided.
There are signs of new wealth everywhere - from Sra. Zapata's gas 
stove (which she used chiefly for boiling water, preferring the flavor 
of food cooked over wood) and sewing machine, to new household furniture.
All the grandchildren who are of age attend primary school. The 
range in education among the sons is extraordinary. The older two 
finished only the fourth grade, back when their village of Quintana 
Roo was far more isolated than it is today. The third finished 
primary school; the fourth finished high school; his younger brother 
was still in high school, but talked of seeking further schooling.
After a light meal of coffee and pozol, the family is off to 
work. Daniel accompanies his father to the cacao fields; Agustin 
leaves for his job as a health worker in Teapa; Jorge takes the bus to 
temporary construction sites outside of Villahermosa, where he works 
in petroleum company projects. In fact, a large number of young men 
from the rancheria are off to the buses, rather than the fields.
As Don Antonio and Daniel walk toward their cacao plantation, the 
morning is alive with vividly colored birds, including a flock of wild 
parrots. Already fishermen are out at the nearby lake. Fishing used to 
be a flourishing business here, but the water quality has gone down 
due to pollution from all the construction. Men can make a better 
living doing other things now, anyway.
They pass a large house obviously belonging to a wealthier 
rancher, and then some cacao plantations which are infested with weeds. 
Don Antonio shakes his head to see the "cacaoito" in such bad shape.
Their owner cannot get men to work on his plantation; he won't pay them 
enough. They'd rather work for the petroleum company.
How different his own plantations! Huge trees - the "mothers of 
cacao" - shade the cacao with their broad canopies. The ground below 
is nearly clear of weeds or debris, and the air feels clean and much 
cooler than the land beyond the plantation. Banana trees shade the 
edges of the plantation. This is a welcome place to work or rest. Even 
the rainbow-colored butterflies and moths fly here day and night.
The cacao trees themselves are perfectly shaped and full of shiny 
striped purple pods about a foot long. Daniel grins at his dad, takes 
out his machete to crack open a pod and passes over a handful of cacao 
seeds so the two can suck off the sweet mucilage which covers them.
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The men take out their new motor sprayer, a prized possession, 
and begin to apply insecticide. They are extremely careless with the 
chemicals, playfully spraying one another from time to time.
Taking a break for breakfast of pozol and fruit, Don Antonio and 
Daniel discuss digging a new drainage ditch on one side of the planta­
tion. For this hard, hot work they plan to hire some experts, and 
calculate the cost, which will run almost fifty per cent above the 
minimum wage. Why don't the brothers do this work?
They are too busy right now in their other jobs. But when harvest 
time comes and when they are in between other jobs, they put in a 
significant amount of work on the plantations. Don Antonio is rather 
proud of the fact that his sons help him without even expecting a 
wage. Many of his neighbors pay their sons for such work (unheard of 
in the "old days") and in many cases, in order to get the sons to stay 
on the farm, some of his friends have gone ahead and legally passed on 
their land while still alive.
On their walk back home, the two men laugh at a curious sight, 
which underlines the innate contradictions of this agrarian society 
undergoing rapid change: about fifty head of cattle are being herded 
up the road by a group of cowboys (complete with cowboy hats) waving 
out the windows of a VW "Bug!"
In addition to cacao, the Zapatas also grow some maize, have a 
number of small livestock and a few head of cattle, a variety of fruit 
trees, some beans and chiles. The family is no longer self-sufficient 
in maize, and has to purchase quite a lot to feed their cattle. They 
do use their own maize for tortillas and pozol, however, for its taste 
is far superior to that which can be purchased.
The house is full of babies and wonderful cooking smells when the 
men return around 1:30. While they bathe, Dona Rosa and her daughters- 
in-law complete a special barbequed chicken (slaughtered in honor of a 
guest to the community), seasoned with spices found in the woods 
nearby. These women do not have a very extensive kitchen garden, but 
Instead go on occasional hikes to find the items they want for 
cooking. They also mind the livestock, process all the food produced 
on the farm, and help with the cacao harvest. That day they had spent 
cooking lunch, and cleaning the house immaculately: the next day they
would host the traveling rural clinic in their home.
At lunch, Dona Rosa, a hearty woman with "chutzpah,” tells stories 
about life in Quintana Roo when her children were young. Then, there 
were no doctors - she treated her boys herself, including doing minor 
surgery like separating a tied tongue with a butcher knife! She likes 
the new roads, which are being maintained well for the first time 
since she can remember. She herself rarely goes to town, but a number 
of her neighbors earn extra money by making purchases in town to sell 
to village friends. Some even travel to Veracruz or Mexico City, if 
they have relatives there, and bring back goods. Prices are so much 
higher in Tabasco, that they can make handsome profits on these trips.
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Talk turns to the petroleum boom - cause of the high prices. Don 
Antonio has had no bad experiences so far, but he has heard other 
farmers complain that their fences are rotting away, and many are also 
blaming lower than usual cacao yields this year on the fumes from 
petroleum processing.
The Zapatas are doing well because cacao prices have been so 
high. Don Antonio is enthusiastic about the local Cacao Producer's 
Association, which he feels is responsible for the high prices. He 
has used nursery stock from the Cacao Plan program, and has begun to 
ferment some of his cacao beans at the local fermenter, which improves 
bean quality. Daniel, however, is suspicious that the Union is build­
ing fancy new office buildings in Mexico City and other such things, 
and figures that in fact they should be making even more on the cacao.
Afternoon chores include work on the new roof, tool repair, and 
harvest of some fruit growing near the house. But the family all relax 
in hammocks as evening arrives and the breeze grows cooler and much 
more comfortable. The family stays up later now than they did last 
year, before the government extended electricity services to Quintana 
Roo.
But it's not very dark outside anyway. All along the northern and 
western horizons is the glare of natural gas flaring. One drilling rig 
is outlined by the glow - it looks like nothing so much as a rocket 
ship. They're used to seeing it now. Rumor has it that the company 
will soon be drilling in their own rancheria. Don Antonio is a little 
concerned that the drilling will ’’poison” his land.
Will Don Antonio's sons be running the farm twenty years from 
now?, asks their guest. "Oh, I think so. You can't go wrong with 
cacao. The young men may go away, sow their oats, make some money, 
but they'll be back." One of the older sons, back early from his 
construction Job, nods in agreement. But Agustin, who harbors strong 
ambitions to move permanently to town as soon as he can afford to do 
so, merely frowns as his mother throws him a knowing look.
Slapping at an odd mosquito, the family gets into their hammocks, 
ready to sleep. Through the open window, they can see the drilling rig 
outlined by the flare.
One wonders. Will the Zapata sons be there twenty years hence? 
Their lives have been changed by the petroleum boom in Tabaso, but not 
profoundly, and - most surprisingly - not for the worse. Could such 
campesinos survive in the modern industrial economy which Tabasco is 
likely to become?
It has rarely happened. Elsewhere in petroleum zones such fami­
lies are breaking apart, their incomes eroding, their farms abandoned 
- to become integrated at the margins of the new urban-industrial 
society. But such had not been the case for most farm families in 
Tabasco. The Zapatas felt content, secure and optimistic about a
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future still solidly based on agriculture, regardless of significant 
participation in the petroleum economy.
What was responsible for this unexpected and unprecedented 
flourishing of a peasant economy within a petroleum boom zone? Is it 
likely to endure? Is it relevant to other zones undergoing such rapid 
industrial transition?
When I first went to Tabasco, it was with the expectation that 
petroleum development would clash violently with the traditional agra­
rian society of that state. Such is the accepted wisdom from all parts 
of the world which have experienced a petroleum boom.
But in Tabasco, the Mexican government simultaneously pushed for 
agricultural development in a big way - a response to the crisis in 
basic foods production and consumption in the 1970's. The Southeast - 
the "last agricultural frontier" - was to play an important role in 
the country's rural reorientation.
Furthermore, a strong and activist state government funded by tax 
monies from PEMEX, coordinated a broad series of investments not only 
in agriculture, but in social infrastructure, tourism, fishing and 
other sectors, throughout the state. Those responsible insisted that 
it was indeed possible to "sow justice" with petroleum wealth, as the 
governor proclaimed in 1980.
Government policies to contain the negative effects of petroleum 
development, and to spread the benefits of the massive capital trans­
fers more widely through the state were only part of the explanation.
A second was the state's exceeding good luck in having the petroleum 
boom coincide with a period of rapidly rising international prices for 
its major agricultural products. The negative impact of this situation 
on local inflation was far outweighed by its positive effect on 
internal distribution of income and political power.
Most important, the state's agricultural structure, based on 
small-scale family farms, proved highly favorable. The dominant 
"campesinado" showed more economic flexibility than "capitalist" type 
farmers and greater stability in the face of falling relative farm 
prices. Family employment strategies permitted them to combine farm 
„ operation with employment in petroleum activities.
The marked mobility, levels of investment, response to price 
incentives, resolution of labor and wage constraints, interaction with 
the non-agricultural economy of the cacao farmers was impresssive.
The apparent multiplier effects of their prosperity - on rural employ­
ment, demand for consumer and investment goods, local and regional 
services - testify to the viability of rural-based development 
strategies. This evidence justifies a serious second look at the role 
of the peasantry in modern development.
Devising a methodology for analyzing the impact of major economic 
changes on the farm sector was challenging. It was tempting to attri­
bute to petroleum development changes which in fact were the result of
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internal dynamics, long-term state economic trends, and the dynamic 
agricultural growth of the 1970's.
Leading theories of development provided little guidance for a 
research method in this case. Many methodological tools were unavail­
able or inapplicable; most were too limited in scope. Research had to 
emphasize heterogeneity in choice of study areas, individuals inter­
viewed, institutions to be studied. The study presents an attempt to 
utilize detailed research to understand the local situation, but in 
such a way as to be relevant to broader theoretical and policy issues.
The first half of the study consists of an introduction to the 
problems of petroleum development, Tabascan economic history, Tabascan 
cacao farming, and the research methodology followed. The second half 
examines the production and employment characteristics of the four 
principal types of cacao producers and landless workers, and their 
experiences in Tabasco's petroleum economy.
We look not only at the differences in farmer response to the 
boom, but try to explain why these differences exist. The study 
concludes with a summary of principles for resolving agriculture- 
petroleum conflicts and a challenge to rethink the role of the 
peasantry in areas of rapid economic development.
Reference to many local terms and organizational names will be 
made throughout the study. A comprehensive glossary follows, for 
convenience to readers. It is suggested that the reader review it 
before beginning Chapter 1.
This paper is an abbreviation of my doctoral dissertation. All 
of the appendices and much of the supporting data presented in the 
thesis have had to be omitted from this version. Some of this 
material is referred to by the citation "Source: see thesis." Copies 
of the full dissertation may be obtained from:
University Microfilms International 
P.0. Box 1764 
300 N. Zeeb Road 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 
(800) 521-3042
The cost for microfilm or microfiche is $10 for academics, $17.50 for 
nonacademics; for paper copies it is $20 and $30 respectively.
GLOSSARY
afectacion
antlclpo
BANRURAL
cacaotero 
cacao variety
campeslno
campeslnado
CEPAL
CIES
CCT
coa
collective farm 
household
compadrazgo
comunidad
The process by which PEMEX, or a similar government 
agency, establishes the right of eminent domain 
over private property.
The payment made to a producer upon delivery of cacao 
to the Association on the basis of the price estimated 
at the beginning of the season. If the final average 
price is higher, the difference is distributed later 
as a "remanente."
Banco de Credito Rural, S.A. The Mexican national 
bank for rural credit.
A farmer who produces cacao.
There are three major types of cacao: "criollo," a
high-quality variety native to Tabasco; "forastero," 
a higher-yield but lower-quality variety; and "Ceylan," 
a hybrid of the other two.
Spanish term for "peasant;" literally, man of the 
countryside.
From campesino, referring to the entire peasant popu­
lation.
Comision Economica para America Latina. Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA).
Centro de Investigacion Ecologico del Sureste. The 
Center for Ecological Research in the Southeast.
Censo de Cacao de Tabasco. Census of Tabascan cacao 
producers, 1978, undertaken by SARH.
A hand-produced wooden implement used in cacao produc­
tion.
A family which belongs to a collective ejido, and farms 
on both the collective and a family plot.
The institution of inter-family ties based on a relation 
of "compadres" (or the relationship between a child's 
parents and godparents).
A type of village-based Mexican landholding based on 
historic indigenous communities. Members are "comuneros.
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CONADECA
CONAPO
CONASUPO
Comlslon Naclonal del Cacao. National Cacao Commission, 
formed in 1974, principally to deal with international 
marketing. In Chiapas State, CONADECA is chief local 
marketing agent and in charge of technical programs as 
well.
Consejo Nacional de Poblacion. National Population 
Council, located in Mexico City.
Comision Nacional de Subsistencias Populares. National 
Commission for Basic Commodities, the national marketing 
board for basic foods.
constructora A private construction company, usually large-scale.
Many government projects are contracted out to these 
enterprises.
contratista Individual who contracts with an employer to complete a 
particular job, for which he independently hires the 
necessary workers and supervises their work; a private 
contractor.
convite Traditional institution of communal sowing in the 
rancherias of Tabasco.
COPLADE
COPLAMAR
COPRODET
CROC
CTM
demographic
cycle
demographic
stage
dependency
ratio
Comite de Planeacion para el Desarrollo. Tabasco State 
Development Planning Commission (formerly COPRODET).
Comision de Planeacion para las Areas Marginadas.
Planning Commission for Marginal Areas.
Comite Promotora de Desarrollo del Estado de Tabasco. 
Committee to Promote Tabasco State Development.
Confederacion Regional de Obreros de la Construccion. 
Regional Federation of Construction Workers.
Confederacion de Trabajadores Mexicanos. Mexican Workers 
Union, the umbrella organization for Mexican labor unions
The life-cycle of an individual or family, which changes 
according to changing demographic characteristics such 
as marriage and raising children, with consequent changes 
in work and life-style patterns.
A stage within the demographic cycle; e.g., the period 
of early marriage before children, when the new couple 
may remain with in-laws.
Ratio within the family between the number of "dependents 
(non-working spouses, invalids, students, small children, 
retired workers) and the number of active workers.
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de planta 
ejldo
encomienda
enganchador 
exproprlacion
family economy
family farm 
household
fermentation
FIRA
hired-labor- 
based farm 
households
INCATABSA
jomalero
Type of worker who is employed full-time on a contract.
The principal unit of the Mexican agrarian reform; a 
grant of land usufruct rights to a group of "ejidatarios 
either for individual or group farming.
A charter to collect tribute from a given Indian com­
munity, granted by the King of Spain to individuals in 
the New World. Many encomenderos acquired rights to 
labor from the resident indigenous population. Some 
of the larger encomiendas covered hundreds of thousands 
of hectares and held thousands of workers.
An individual who charges a company needing workers 
a payment for each qualified worker he finds.
Expropriation; referring to the takeover of private 
lands by PEMEX or some other government agency. In 
return, farmers receive indemnification for the worth 
of their land (in the case of private property owners) 
and standing crops and improvements.
A branch of economic analysis which focuses on family 
economic decision-making strategies as both producers 
and consumers.
Type of farm household with sufficient land base to 
support a family without substantial off-farm income, 
whose farm can be operated primarily with family labor.
Process by which chemical composition of cacao is 
changed to release chocolate color and flavor; generally 
done by piling beans in boxes over a period of days, 
thus subjecting them to heat, triggering natural fermen­
tation.
Fideicomiso Instituido en Relacion a la Agricultura.
An organization of the central Banco de Mexico which 
funnels capital from various international banks into 
long-term investments in the agricultural sector.
Farm households with more land than can be cared for 
solely with family labor, which thus depend on hired 
help.
Industria de Cacao de Tabasco, S.A. Tabascan Cacao 
Industry. A group of cacao processing facilities owned 
by the cacao producer organization.
A wage worker who finds employment by the day, or "jornal," 
principally in agriculture. "Jornalear" is to participate 
in such work.
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League of 
Agrarian 
Communities
llbres
man-day
man-month
manga
mllpa
mlnlfundla farm 
household
munlclplo 
Pacto Rlbereno
PEMEX
peso
PIPER
PRODERITH
propledad
Long-established organization which became active In 
Tabasco In the 1970s to protect political and economic 
rights of campesinos. In 1980 It had 3000 members.
Type of worker In industry or agriculture who works 
without a fixed contract.
A unit by which work is measured: a man-day usually 
corresponds to about 5 to 7 hours of farm work. The 
"family man-day" refers to a man-day worked by a farm 
family member.
A month of 25 man-day equivalents.
Hand-made implement used in Tabasco for cacao farming.
A subsistence maize plot in Mexico; generally a shifting 
cultivation system.
Type of farm household whose land base is insufficient 
to support a family, and thus is dependent on income 
from off-farm employment. A "minifundia" refers to such 
a smallholding; "minifundista" to such a farmer.
Political unit in Mexico roughly equivalent to a county.
Organization of campesinos (with 7500 members in 1980) 
providing legal help in defending rights and payment of 
indemnification by PEMEX in Tabasco.
Petroleos Mexicanos, S.A. Mexican Petroleum Company, 
the nationalized oil monopoly of Mexico.
Monetary unit of Mexico. Between 1952 and 1976, it was 
valued at US$.08. With subsequent devaluations, its 
worth fell to US$.045 in 1976, to US$.021 in 1982 and 
to US$.007 in 1983.
Programa Integrado de Desarrollo Rural. Integrated 
Rural Development Program.
Programa de Desarrollo de los Recursos del Tropico Humedo. 
Commission responsible to SARH, working since the early 
1970s to investigate resources of the humid tropics and 
develop ecologically, socially and economically sound 
programs to exploit those resources.
Mexican tenure designation for private property ownership; 
maximum size is limited by law. "Propietario" refers to 
the owner of such private property.
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pruning Important activity in cacao production to shape trees 
properly. The principal types of pruning in Tabasco 
cacao farming are: "desmadre" (removal of main stems), 
"desmamone" (removal of young shoots), "deschupone" 
(removal of suckers), and "poda" (early pruning of 
formation).
rancheria A small, unincorporated rural community.
remanente A payment made to cacaoteros for their cacao after 
marketing has been completed, usually based on profits 
from international sales. (See "anticipo.")
SAG Secretaria de Agricultura y Ganaderia. Ministry of 
Agriculture and Ranching (until 1976).
SAM Sistema Alimentario Mexicano. Mexican Food System, 
established at the end of the Lopez Portillo adminis­
tration, to coordinate efforts to increase agricul­
tural production by low-income farmers, and food 
consumption by low-income consumers.
SARH Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos. 
Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (after 
1976).
sexenio A period of six years; in Mexico, a reference to the 
length of one term in office for politicians.
shade trees Principal varieties of shade trees for cacao planta­
tions in Tabasco are mote (Erythrina sp.), cocoite 
(Gliricidia sp.), saman and chipilin.
SPP Secretaria de Programacion y Presupuesto. Ministry of 
Planning and Budget (after 1981).
SRH Secretaria de Recursos Hidraulicos. Ministry of 
Hydraulic Resources (until 1976).
SST Sociodemographic Survey of Tabasco. "Encuesta Socio- 
demografica del Estado de Tabasco." Survey in January 
1980, sponsored by CONAPO and COPRODET.
tecnico An individual who has been trained in some technical field
tequio Traditional system for communal work projects, such as 
school- and road-building.
transitorios Type of industrial worker hired through a temporary 
contract.
UNPC Union Nacional de Productores de Cacao. National Cacao 
Producers' Association.
CHAPTER 1. THE AGRICULTURE - PETROLEUM CONFLICT
"Estan sacando el petroleo y el gas; estan debilitando a 
las tierras para que no produzcan ya lo que producian antes de 
que vino Petroleos!"
"They are taking out the oil and the gas; they're weakening 
our lands so they no longer produce what they did before the 
petroleum company came!"
- Mexican farmer, 1980
Petroleum in Mexico
Mexico had a long and eventful history of oil production well 
before the extraordinary discoveries of the past decade. Map 1 shows 
the major historical zones of production.
At the turn of the 20th century, an American began exploration 
for oil on the east coast of Mexico near Tampico. His finds were the 
first in what would prove to be an oil-rich area known as the "Golden 
Lane." The major oil companies soon moved there and by 1921, Mexico 
was the second largest oil producer in the world after the United 
States. These fields were soon ruined by over-production, however, and 
later disputes between the companies and the Mexican government over 
labor policy in the mid-1930's led to Mexico's nationalization of 
production and the formation of Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) (9, 10, 
119, 141).
PEMEX in the next few decades discovered new fields around Poza 
Rica, Veracruz (the "New Golden Lane") and farther south by Angostura, 
Veracruz. The twin cities of Minatitlan and Coatzacoalcos in southern 
Veracruz became an important Mexican petrochemical and distributing 
center. In the 1960's, petroleum and natural gas were found in 
Tabasco, in the municipios of Comalcalco, Cardenas and Macuspana.
Mexico in 1972 had by far the most expert and experienced petro­
leum industry personnel in the developing world. But attention to new 
reserves had slackened due to inadequate investment in exploration, 
and the industry was in something of a crisis (9, p.16; 10, p.62).
The 1972 discovery of a huge, rich field in the Tabasco/Chiapas 
area took almost the whole country by surprise. A new technique of 
deep drilling revealed a giant Jurassic-Cretaceous "reef." Total 
production of crude rose from only .442 million (m.) barrels per day to 
2.2 m. barrels per day in 1980 (88). Estimated reserves of oil, gas 
equivalent and gas liquids reached well over 200 billion (b.) barrels 
by 1982, a great deal more than Alaska's North Slope or the U.K.- 
Norwegian North Sea.
The dramatic recent production gains came almost entirely from 
three fields in the "Reforma" area in southern Tabasco and northern 
Chiapas states. Due to mountain barriers south of the Reforma field,
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MAP 1. LOCATION OF MEXICAN HYDROCARBON PRODUCTION*
*Adapted from H. O'Shaughnessy, Oil in Latin America (The Financial 
Times Ltd.: London, 1976); and Mexico, Secretaria de Programacion y
Presupueste, La Industria Petrolera en Mexico, pp. 353-355.
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most of the generated local economic activity in new drilling, 
exploration and pipelines has been centered in Villahermosa, the 
state capital of Tabasco, and Cardenas, thirty miles to the west.
Unfortunately, this is the heartland of a densely settled agri­
cultural region dominated by campesino farmers. In fact, the last 
remaining agricultural frontier in Mexico - the Southeast, comprising 
the states of Tabaso, Veracruz, Chiapas, Campeche and the Yucatan 
peninsula - sits over a vast pool of exploitable oil and natural gas.
Can an eminently agricultural community participate effectively - 
or even defend itself - in an oil economy? What role can or should 
agriculture play in economic development? Is the much-lamented conflict 
between agriculture and petroleum insuperable?
The Importance for Mexico of Agriculture-Petroleum Coexistence
The possibility of "peaceful coexistence" between campesinos and 
the petroleum industry is critical to Mexico today. Stagnation of 
campesino agriculture over the past fifteen years has led not only to 
severe food supply problems. Neglect and exploitation of the campesino 
sector has limited national investment and employment opportunities 
and development of a mass economic base.
During the 1950's and 1960's, the "Mexican growth miracle" took 
place, with five per cent annual GNP growth. Mexican agricultural 
production rose as a result of the development of new irrigation 
districts in the north, application of the "Green Revolution" to wheat 
production, and the resurgence of ejidal production after the Revolu­
tion. In addition, a very prosperous sector for export of fruits and 
vegetables to the United States developed (152). A combination of 
major infrastructure construction, industrial investment, development 
of extensive irrigation districts, and the more modest growth of 
rainfed agriculture provided sufficient employment to keep up with the 
rapid growth of the Mexican work force.
Since the late 1960's, however, agricultural production in 
general grew much more slowly than demand, and food grain production 
actually declined in many years. Between 1969 and 1981, maize 
production hovered between eight and ten million tons per year, though 
demand rose from eight to twelve million tons over that period (37). 
The role of the agricultural sector in the GNP declined from two 
thirds in 1950 to less than 40 per cent in 1970. Agricultural employ­
ment declined from nearly three quarters to only about fifteen per 
cent, although total numbers of workers increased until very recently 
(140).
Although long-cycle fruits, vegetables and forrages production 
showed continued growth and oil crops and industrial crops made modest 
gains, basic food crops and fibres showed a downward trend. There were 
major imports of maize, wheat, soy in the 1970's, and a number of 
other crops which Mexico exported in the 1960's had to be imported in
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the 1970's. Despite impressive production gains during the 1970's, 
Mexico experienced shortages of sugar and beef as well. Mexican 
agricultural exports became restricted mainly to the tomato and other 
high value garden-type crops.
Actually, the stability of maize production is a remarkable sign 
of the persistence of campesino production. The real price of maize 
over that time period plummeted, as did prices for many other basic 
foods. This was the result of policies to keep urban wages down by 
keeping food prices low. Larger commercial producers, and most of 
those on irrigated lands, switched to more remunerative products: the
fruits, vegetables and livestock products demanded by the increasingly 
prosperous middle classes (143).
But the vast majority of Mexican agriculturalists are "cam- 
pesinos" - 87 per cent, according to analyses of the 1970 Census.
They are characterized by small plot size, high employment and value 
of production per hectare, low value of production per person employed 
and the importance of subsistence production. Most are in rainfed 
areas; most did not in 1970 use fertilizer; some were even without 
draft animals (183, Charts 2, 3, 34, 35, 36).
Slower economic growth, massive mechanization of the irrigation 
disticts and a stagnating agriculture converged to sharply reduce the 
rate of new employment opportunities for these campesinos. At the 
same time, the largest generation ever of young people in Mexico began 
to enter the work force. A highly capital-intensive industry could 
employ few of them; most were engaged in the services sector, which is 
now swollen with poor-paying, low-productivity activities. Migration 
from rural areas accelerated and unlike the migrants who went to more 
prosperous agricultural areas in the 1950's, they went to the cities. 
The resultant over-crowding in major urban centers, particularly 
Mexico City, has become critical (138, 144).
The new migrants, generally untrained in needed urban skills, 
along with the campesinado producing poorly remunerated crops, com­
prise the "impoverished forty per cent" of the Mexican population. 
Their economic condition contrasts starkly with the middle-class pros­
perity in more dynamic sectors of the economy.
When the oil boom emerged in the late 1970's, the economy as a 
whole grew extremely rapidly, and millions of new jobs were created. 
But after the financial difficulties of 1982, the pace of growth 
slowed dramatically, again creating chronic conditions of unemploy­
ment .
Throughout the 1970's there was considerable experimentation with 
rural development for campesinos - integrated development (PIDER), 
stabilization of marginal areas (COPLAMAR), collectivization projects 
and many others. The tie between the equity problem and rural struc­
ture and employment was overtly acknowledged in the Sistema Alimenta- 
rio Mexicano (SAM) program inaugurated in 1980. With a broad system 
of subsidies and production incentives, SAM sought to increase the 
production of low-income rainfed grain farmers as well as food
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consumption by low-income urbanites (48, 112, 115, 116, 117). The 
production response was considerable, but its total cost is unknown.
The program disappeared in 1982 with government budget upheavals, 
although the multiple devaluations worked in favor of maize producers 
by raising the real product price and reducing competitive imports.
But some policy must replace SAM, to deal with the persisting inequity, 
unemployment and agricultural problems, and it must directly 
address the issue of campesino development. Some of the experiences 
from Tabasco suggest guidelines for such a policy.
A second major thrust of policy in the 1970's was development - 
both experimental and large-scale - of new lands in the humid tropics, 
particularly the Southeast. Map 2 illustrates the southeast region, 
its major cities and agricultural areas.
According to a recent PRODERITH report,
"In the coastal plains of the Gulf and Southeast zones, 
more than 3.6 million hectares of high or average agri­
cultural productivity have been detected, presently 
underutilized with precarious agriculture or extensive 
ranching; the Mexican humid tropics are the most impor­
tant agricultural frontier of the country (106, p.3) .J-/
The chief advantage of the region is its abundant water resources. 
During the past decade, a major program was undertaken to transfer 
crops with very high water requirements out of the northern irrigation 
districts to substitute more valuable crops which could better justify 
expensive irrigation. New cane and rice processors were constructed in 
the Southeast; sources of oil such as coconut and African oil palm 
could potentially substitute for many oilseed crops now grown under 
irrigation. As new water sources for irrigation grow scarcer and 
increased non-agricultural demand on water supplies from urbanization 
and industry become heavier, the need for alternative, cheaper means 
of production and sources of water will accelerate (2^ , 106).
Sugar cane, oranges, mangos, other fruit trees, cacao, coconut, 
cattle, rubber and spices now dominate tropical agriculture. The area 
in maize, rice, beans, bananas and cassava is greater, but maize 
yields are relatively low and the crop is grown largely for subsistence. 
Small increases in productivity could lead to greatly expanded 
supplies, even though basic grains are more efficiently produced in 
more moderate climates. Great gains could be made in livestock produc­
tion, even if restricted to land unsuitable for crop production.
The Southeast is relatively close to the major domestic market 
area of the Guadalajara-Mexico City-Veracruz axis, and is well
1/  This compares to approximately two million hectares in the 
northern and central zones of the country which it is feasible to 
put under irrigation. Tabasco has one million hectares of this 
area, plus 600,000 hectares of average or low agricultural poten­
tial which could be used for livestock production.
MAP 2. MEXICO AND THE TROPICAL SOUTHEAST*
T I J U A N A
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placed for foreign trade on the Atlantic (through the ports of Coatza- 
coalcos and Dos Bocas) and Pacific (across the Isthmus land bridge and 
through Pacific ports).
Its agricultural potential is thus very important - and the 
prospect of achieving significant long-term agricultural development 
despite petroleum expansion should generate the support and confidence 
necessary to push for balanced programs of tropical development there.
International Experience with the Agriculture-Petroleum Conflict
But would such confidence be justified? The international 
experience of agriculture-petroleum interaction is not promising.
Until the 1970's, there was a general sense among academics, 
developing country administrations and others that nations with large 
oil reserves were privileged and faced no more serious problems for 
their social and economic development than a shortage of skilled labor 
(45, p.347). But evidence gathered from around the world in the past 
decade indicates a multitude of serious socioeconomic problems, 
particularly petroleum's almost uniformly negative effect on agriculture 
(38, 125, 130, 147, 160).
The common manifestations of the petroleum-agriculture conflict 
are stagnating food production, increasing food imports and the emi­
gration of farmers and farm workers to petroleum centers seeking non­
agricultural employment. A prosperous enclave within the production 
zone of petroleum workers and those providing service to them commonly 
develops, while the agricultural community outside the enclave 
experiences economic stagnation and declining living standards.
Mexico
Mexico's own experience is unpromising (119, 172).
A major study undertaken by the state of Veracruz indicated that 
despite average per capita income in Poza Rica far above the state 
average (due to extractive industry), aggregate value in agriculture 
was very low, lower than the state average - although sixty per cent 
of the population worked in that sector (82, pp.223-225; 91).
An observer of Poza Rica's boom commented:
"Though it has long been one of Mexico's most important oil 
centers, Poza Rica, as town and region, is pockmarked with 
oil wells and most of its people continue to be poor. The 
oil company rests upon a privileged enclave, a comfortable 
segregated middle-class PEMEX residential area, but the 
system did not generate jobs and prosperity for the rest of 
the population" (146, p.3).
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In Minatitlan, the 1970's showed sharp reductions in maize pro­
duction: from 25,000 hectares in 1971 to 10,000 in 1973, 4000 in 1975,
500 in 1976, almost none in 1977 (105). "Lost cities" of rural 
migrants grew up all around the petroleum centers.
Venezuela
The Venezuela example provides a stern warning, one to which the 
Mexicans are particularly sensitive (122, 137). Except for a short 
period between 1957 and 1965, the agricultural sector stagnated from 
the 1940's to the 1970's. Venezuelan imports of goods in 1978 were 
eleven times greater than those in 1963; outstanding among these was 
food. A third of all internally consumed foodstuffs were imported in 
1978, mostly cereals, legumes, oilseeds and milk (44, p.101).
"Despite her beneficial foreign exchange position and 
relative abundance of capital, Venezuela has not been 
able to use retained earnings from oil to build a solid 
agricultural and industrial base for economic progress 
independent of petroleum" (165, p.168).
Income improvements in the rural sector lagged far behind the 
urban sector, despite increasing flows of migrants to the cities. 
Belated government attempts in the 1970's to promote livestock 
production and crop intensification near petroleum regions (intended 
mainly to substitute for imports) have demonstrated little success.
Nigeria
Nigeria's more recent oil wealth stimulated rapid economic change 
in the country, but its benefits were highly concentrated (132, 148). 
The chief beneficiary is the government, whose revenues have sky­
rocketed. The wide spectrum of oil-funded development projects that 
were begun show few results, largely due to management problems and a 
shortage of skilled personnel. When oil prices declined in 1981, the 
overextended government suffered severe cash shortages even in its 
daily operations.
Despite the country's relatively successful political comeback 
after the devastating Civil War of 1967-70, its economic organization 
has been poor. There is generally a greater emphasis on trade than 
investment or production, and an orientation to the short-term profits 
so easily come by in a boom economy. The currency is highly over­
valued - as in most oil-producing countries - to provide relatively 
cheap imports for construction and the oil sector, but this has had a 
very depressing effect on domestic producers. Jobs in oil and 
"development" projects have prompted rapid urban migration and a 
corresponding boom in crime, congestion and general security problems.
Domestic farmers in particular have suffered from import competi­
tion and low official farm prices. Smallholder export farming was the 
mainstay of colonial Nigeria, based on palm oil, cocoa and groundnuts;
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in early 1982, all but cocoa (of which little was exported) had to be 
imported.
"Nigerian export agriculture put money straight into the 
countryside, and was the mainstay of thriving indigenous 
communities. Now it is dead, and the communities it 
supported are dying. Optimists reckon that Nigerian food 
production is growing by about half of one per cent a 
year, while the population is growing much faster. Food 
now takes about 15 per cent of total spending on imports, 
and will be taking more each year" (173, p.28).
Experts estimate that Nigerian agriculture has the potential to 
double the area under cultivation and treble yields on already culti­
vated land, but relative prices offer no incentive for the farmer to 
do so. Several attempts at large-scale government-corporate projects, 
e.g. in sugar, were spectacular failures, so agricultural policy 
refocused on the smallholders, with international agencies playing an 
important role. But Nigeria can find few trained people interested in 
helping make the modest improvements likely to work, so long as income 
and career possibilities in the oil economy are so tempting. Urban 
pressures make the prospect of higher relative farm prices unlikely 
(173).
Iran
In Iran, agriculture's importance dropped precipitously with the 
oil boom after 1959, as did the sector's productivity. The agri­
cultural share in GNP dropped from 32 per cent in 1959 to 9.4 per cent 
in 1976. During the decade 1963-1973, oil revenues rose 15 per cent 
annually, while industrial production rose nine per cent and services 
eight per cent. By contrast, agricultural income increased less than 
three per cent, at about the rate of population growth. Despite a land 
reform, increased national real income, increasing agricultural prices 
and increased use of technical inputs, the sector stagnated, in part 
due to extreme concentration of those agricultural resources availa­
ble.
Rural-urban migration in Iran in 1977 was officially 1.7 per cent 
per year; employment for the migrants came almost entirely from 
periodic construction booms, resulting in considerable unemployment 
problems between booms. As in Venezuela, bigh internal migration, 
high urban unemployment and high import bills in the mid-1970's led to 
renewed official interest and investment in agriculture. But new 
programs to encourage Iran as a net exporter of agricultural products 
in the early 1980's have fallen far short of this goal (45).
Reasons for the Agriculture-Petroleum Conflict
Inflation, labor scarcity in agriculture and pollution are the 
chief culprits in weakening the position of farmers in the oil zones.
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The prices of agricultural inputs, labor, consumer goods and housing 
increase, while the level of agricultural prices of locally grown 
commodities remains relatively stable. The local economy is rarely 
organized to provision the large population increases that accompany 
the boom. The import markets that open in response rarely close later 
on, even after local farmer supply increases, and inflation makes it 
difficult for locals to compete with imports.
The difficulty of making a living in agriculture under these 
conditions - and the attraction of high incomes in the petroleum 
sector - induce workers and farmers to seek off-farm employment. 
General farmwork and maintenance activities decline; farmers may even 
be unable to find - or afford - workers to harvest their crop.
Finally, environmental damage from oil wells, pipeline projects 
and construction; air pollution from flaring and chemical plants; and 
destruction of property either through expropriation or temporary 
eminent domain threaten farms. In addition to the direct destruction, 
fear of potential disruption argues against long-term farm investment. 
Farmers may even disinvest - sell assets to send children for training 
in urban occupations or make speculative or productive investments in 
town.
There are few backward or forward linkages between agriculture 
and petroleum activity. Because the ultimate labor force for petro­
leum is relatively small, its presence does not significantly affect 
long-term demand for food, and a smaller part of their income 
increases are in fact devoted to food than among the general - poorer - 
population.
In Nigeria, for example, between 1950 and 1964 only an average of 
35 per cent of total petroleum expenditures were made within the 
country; 40 per cent of local expenditures were made to contractors 
(of whom two thirds were foreign); 20 per cent of local expenditures 
went to wages and salaries; only ten per cent of local expenditures 
went to agriculture and forest products, small and large-scale indus­
try combined. There were few technological linkages other than the 
use of petroleum roads for farm-to-market transport (148, pp. 181—
182).
Political Weakness of Agriculture
The seeming paralysis of inspiration and action to assist the 
agricultural communities suffering from the above problems stems from 
a basic political weakness of rural populations. Petroleum development 
weakens their voice further (49).
Urban pressure to reduce food costs - which rise in petroleum 
regions due both to rising demand and to inflation - encourages the 
use of lower-cost imports (from other regions or countries) or price 
ceilings, further eroding rural income and status. The surpluses 
promised by petroleum revenue make dependence on imports seem an 
attractive alternative to agricultural development. The overvaluation
of currency that commonly occurs exacerbates international competi­
tion.
Few resources are available for the agricultural sector, and 
those which are tend to be spent without serious consideration of the 
policies necessary to deal with structural changes caused by petroleum 
development.
In the petroleum regions, new political formations weaken farm 
support. Even where political realignments do not occur, regional 
officials may be so paralyzed or occupied by trying to deal with the 
immediate visible problems of overcrowding, lack of services, etc. in 
the petroleum boom towns that no time, money or energy is left to 
support rural needs.
Most decisions about petroleum development take place in national 
urban centers far away. There is little interest in or regard for 
rural issues there - although new transport infrastructure, location 
of petroleum processing plants, housing services, market systems for 
petroleum workers all have important effects on local rural economies.
There is little to prevent petroleum companies from becoming 
dictatorial. At one point, PEMEX tried to build a petrochemical plant 
in the midst of the most productive cacao land in the country. Local 
protest and support from Mexico City did lead the company to rescind 
its decision (164, p.31), but in a fit of pique:
"PEMEX announced that it would move all its new instal­
lations or a large part of them to Chiapas, in view of 
the fact that in Tabasco they were not well-received.
This was fundamentally an attempt to pressure Tabasco 
to accept PEMEX unconditionally. And to make that pres­
sure harder, PEMEX halted the construction of housing 
in Villahermosa" (164, p.103).
Contrary to popular belief, the discovery of oil and natural gas 
does not lead to an immediate availability of substantial capital 
surpluses. Antonio Bermudez, former director of PEMEX in Mexico, 
warned against using oil profits for general development. He believes 
that for many years to come, all revenue from oil and gas sales will 
have to be ploughed back into exploration, drilling, petroleum infra­
structure and payment of petroleum debt (9^, p.25).
Mexico's official pledge to "sow the petroleum" during the past 
sexenio - including major new programs for the agricultural sector - 
has in reality meant dramatically increasing the debt load of the 
country, using future petroleum production as collateral - a risky 
financial and political path that has been followed in most developing 
petroleum economies. When a temporary world oil glut occurred in 
1981-82, pushing prices down, the foreign exchange used to pay 
interest on that debt was not forthcoming, and Mexico was forced to 
devalue its currency several times. The future of the agricultural 
development programs, and of economic conditions in general, are 
uncertain.
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The Unique Case of Tabasco
As was expected, Tabasco - even more than the rest of Mexico - 
suffered extreme disruptions from the oil boom. But despite them, 
agricultural production in the state for major products rose 
throughout the decade of the 1970's. Maize production declined, but 
cacao, bananas, coconut and beef production reached unprecedented 
levels. Although there was extremely high participation by rural 
workers and farmers in petroleum-related employment, rural emigration 
rates were relatively low.
These extraordinary contradictions are the subject of this study; 
their explanation has far-reaching implications for agricultural 
development policy. State agriculture is dominated by smallholders 
whose production strategies reflect a campesino (peasant) economic 
orientation. "Capitalist"-oriented crop producers did indeed reduce 
production, but the campesinado did not. Their farm cost and resource 
structure enabled them to use family labor flexibly both on and off- 
farm, and to withstand many of the economic pressures of the petroleum 
economy. Their continued and increasing production buoyed the rural 
economy and was a major stabilizing force in Tabasco during the 
petroleum boom.
The evidence from Tabasco is that the campesinos have a major 
role to play in promoting desirable agriculture, employment and income 
distribution patterns in rural economies under stress. In the course 
of the study we will attempt to address the broader theoretical issues 
of the campesinado in Mexico: the survivability of the campesino mode
of production under the stress of petroleum development; the 
possibility of reversing the traditional exploitative relationships 
between the campesino and non-campesino economies; and effective 
approaches to capitalizing campesino farms.
How Tabascan petroleum-agriculture interactions will evolve in 
the future is not certain, but initial success in the resolution of 
basic conflicts shows that coexistence is indeed possible. Tabasco's 
experience is widely relevant for other regions and countries 
attempting to promote petroleum or other large-scale industry in 
agricultural communities.
CHAPTER 2. AN INTRODUCTION TO TABASCO: HISTORY AND 
THE "BOOM" EXPERIENCE
"In the Chontalpa region, there is too much oil.
Unavoidably a very serious conflict between agri­
cultural development and the petroleum industry 
will take root. Who will vanquish whom? Undoubt­
edly it is petroleum that is winning the battle 
up to now."
-Manlio Tirado, 1977
"Basically, major conflict between petroleum and agri­
culture is unnecessary, if enough support is given the 
agricultural sector. We are doing that. Look at the 
results: the highest cacao and coconut production
in history."
- Governor Leandro Rovirosa Wade,
Tabasco, 1979
This chapter summarizes the history of Tabascan development, 
highlighting the interactions between the agricultural economy and the 
petroleum industry during the decade of the 1970's. This history 
establishes the depth of change and disruption which petroleum brought 
to the state. It also documents the unexpected agricultural boom, and 
the principal factors responsible for the boom.
Tabasco: An Archipelago
Tabasco lies on the alluvial plain below the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec, stretching along the Atlantic side of the Sierra Madre.
The fundamental feature of its geography is an abundance of water. Only 
slightly exaggerating, one observer noted: "It is the only case in the 
world of an archipelago situated on solid ground" (13, p.3). The 
Tabasco plain receives the flow of Mexico's mightiest rivers - the 
Usumacinta and Grijalva - which, together with their also impressive 
tributaries, pour into this state about one third of all the water 
resources of the country.
Map 3 shows the principal features of the state and its major 
sociogeographic regions: the Chontalpa, Rivers, Sierra and Center.
Maps 4 and 5 contrast the natural vegetation of Tabasco with 
contemporary land use patterns.
The mountains south of Tabasco form a barrier to moisture-laden 
Atlantic winds, resulting in a rainfall pattern which ranges from an 
average of only 1500 mm per year along the coast to nearly 5000 mm in 
the peaks above Teapa: the second rainiest spot in the world. The 
rainy season lasts from seven to nine months, lengthening nearer the 
Sierra. For at least eight months of the year, 52 per cent of Tabasco's 
land area (mostly in the Rivers region) is covered with water; thus the 
description "archipelago." Fifteen per cent is permanent swamp.
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MAP 3. PRINCIPAL TOWNS AND ROAD COMMUNICATIONS IN TABASCO STATE, 1980*
•  2 5 0 ,0 0 0  (C a p ita l) ---------  Paved roads
A 2 0 ,0 0 0 - 5 0 ,0 0 0  --------- A ll-w e a th e r gravel roads
•  1 0 ,0 0 0 -2 0 ,0 0 0  -++M+H- R ailroad
• Less thon 10 ,000
*The road system is a revised version of that found in Map 4 of Eduardo Bolis Villanueva, La Eco- 
nomia del Estado de Tabasco, Banco de Comercio, March 1976. Town population figures were taken from 
preliminary data of the 1980 National Population Census.
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MAP 4. THE NATURAL VEGETATION OF TABASCO*
* Meet, R.C., N.P. Psuty, B.G. Thom, 
dal Estado da Tabaaco, Vlllaharaoaa,
Las Tlarraa Bajas da Tabaaco an al Suraata da Mexico. Coblaroo 
Tabaaco, 1976, p. 76. ^ — ----
MAP 5. CONTEMPORARY LAND USE IN TABASCO*
VERA CRUZ
CAMPECHE
OAXACA
_ _ |  M o iie , Beons —  Posture, lloodad port o f yeor
Cocoo V ////X  Teor- round posture
I . ' Coconut ------------S to le  Boundory
E3 Cone — —  N otiono l Boundory
Bonanos
GUATEMALA
*Based on SARH, Representaclon de Tabasco, "Plan Agricola Estatal," 1979, Land Use Haps.a /—  Note that additional subsistence maize and beans are found throughout the populated 
regions of the state.
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The rivers carry a remarkably huge burden of sediment each year, 
much of which is left along the floodplain, enriching the already deep 
alluvium, high in potentially fertile clay soils. On the natural dikes 
of the Old and New Chontalpa, this forms exceptionally good soils; 
where the ground water is higher and in the depressions (such as the 
Chontalpa "Bowl")» soils are often gleyed and have formed impermeable 
horizons.
The Rivers region whose natural vegetation was either swamps or 
mixed forest and savannah, is now used for extensive cattle pasture in 
the dry season, or year-long, depending on drainage. The Sierra 
region, originally mixed savannah-forest, with rainforest in the 
southern mountains, is also primarily a cattle zone. Along the Teapa 
and Tacotalpa river banks, however, are fertile, well-drained soils 
which can be used for crop production. Like the southern Center 
region, it is particularly suitable for banana production. Because of 
higher rainfall and cooler temperatures, the area is less suitable 
than the Chontalpa for cacao production.
The Chontalpa is the agricultural heartland - and hence historic 
population center of the state. Except for the mangrove forests and 
swamps along the coast, now used for coconut plantations, the natural 
vegetatation of this region was rain forest. But the rain forest has 
disappeared in all but the most remote corners of the state. On well- 
drained land, the cacao plantations with their shade trees mimic the 
natural forest structure, protecting soils from severe erosion and 
building fertility. A series of huge drains built in the 1950's and 
1960's as part of the Chontalpa Plan, opened a large area formerly 
subject to flooding, to sugar cane, banana, and year-long pasture 
production.
On other lands, deforestation occurred over many centuries due 
primarily to burning for agricultural uses. Exposure to leaching and 
high temperatures led to decreased fertility over large areas and the 
less fertile, mixed-savannah-forest land turned to pure savannah.
These soils, primarily found in the Savannah sub-region, are now used 
for cattle production.
Traditional Agriculture in Tabasco
Archeological ruins indicating early Mayan and Olmecan settle­
ments are found throughout the Old and New Chontalpa and all along the 
Usumacinta River. The indigenous population at the time of the 
Conquest was predominantly Chontal, with some Nahuatl, Popoluca and Zoque 
populations (169, p. 114). They were concentrated in the Old Chontalpa 
and less so in the Sierra, along well-drained natural river dikes 
where the best cacao land was found. Indigenous population estimates 
for the time of the Conquest run as high as 300,000, but the most 
likely figure was 135,000 (169, p.115).
Subsistence was obtained through yearly double-cropping of maize, 
often with slash-and-burn, or in flooded areas, through seasonal 
movement from flooded to unflooded soils. The main staple was pozol,
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a thick liquid mixture of crushed maize and cacao; accompanying foods 
were the beans, squash, tomatoes and chiles typical of Mexico, plus a 
number of tropical tubers not commonly consumed farther north, such as 
sweet potato and cassava.
Cacao was grown in Tabasco as early as the fourteenth century, 
and the Tabascan cacao variety "criollo" is considered the origin of 
the species. At the time of the Conquest, there were thick stands 
along what are today the Cunduacan River and the dry riverbed of what 
was the San Bernabe River. Seventy per cent of the cacao was located 
in the Chontalpa; the rest in stands along the Grijalva and Usumacinta 
rivers, near Villahermosa, and to the south along the Teapa,
Tacotalpa and Chilapa rivers (169, p. 130).
Cacao was used as the medium of exchange for trade between the 
Mayan city states of Yucatan and the Caribbean coast, and the Aztec 
kingdom. The principal trade cities - Xicalongo, Cimatan and Potonchan 
- were usually controlled by Aztec or Mayan traders, who handled salt, 
slaves, cotton cloth, tools and honey from the Guatemalan coasts; 
decorated cloth, gold and turquoise objects, copper bells, dyes, 
obsidian tools and slaves from Central Mexico (169, p.116).
Tabasco also sent cacao - a luxury good from which a foamy choco­
late beverage was made - as tribute. One document from 1562 reports 
that 81 tons of dry cacao were sent from Tabasco annually to Veracruz 
and Mexico City - thirty per cent as tribute; the rest for commerce 
(169, p.128).
Diversification of the Tabascan Agricultural Economy
Between the indigenous period and the modern era, the landscape 
and economy of Tabasco changed radically.
The Colonial Period; Cacao, Cattle and Dyewood. After the Conquest, 
Bernal Diaz himself sought an encomienda of cacao plantations in 
Tabasco. But with the coming of the Spaniards, the coastal population 
was decimated through diseases and violence. At the end of the 18th 
century, the total population of Tabasco was probably no more than
10,000 (29, p.25). The Spaniards themselves fled the lowlands, un­
healthy and prone to attack by pirates, to the Sierra where they and 
mestizos replaced most of the Indian population. The state capital 
moved from Santa Maria de la Victoria to Villahermosa in 1602, then to 
Tacotalpa in 1666, and back to Villahermosa - today's capital - in 
1796. To fulfill labor needs on the cacao plantations, salaried Indian 
workers from Chiapas were brought to Tabasco; some stayed, others 
moved back and forth seasonally.
Tabasco continued to produce cacao. But import competition was 
fierce from Ecuador and Venezuela, and later from other plantations 
established by the Spanish in the Caribbean and Central and South 
America.
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Seeking other sources of income, the Spaniards introduced two far- 
reaching economic changes. Cattle were brought in and served to open 
interest and settlement in the interior savannahs of Tabasco and the 
fresh water swamps and fields by the coast. Cattle, skins and tallow 
became important sources of income for local Spaniards.
The second major change was the exploitation of forest resources, 
mostly the "pita" (a tropical fiber), sarsaparilla (a medicinal root), 
Jamaican pepper, and dyewood, a tree which produced a deep red to 
purple dye, which was by far the most important. Spaniards partici­
pated in this trade, but after 1660, English "semi-woodsmen, semi­
pirates" began active exploration for dyewood, particularly around the 
Laguna de Terminos.
Independence; Migration to New Lands. After Mexican Independence in 
1821, the main process leading to change in Tabasco came from migra­
tion to previously sparsely settled land. This took place in three 
movements; from Old to New Chontalpa, from Cardenas northwest, and 
from Huimanguillo east. The population of Tabasco at that time is 
estimated to be nearly 60,000, of whom half were Indians (29, p.25).
The Chontalpa movements were occasioned principally by major 
changes in river flows, which are diagrammed in Map 6. Originally, the 
Grijalva and Usumacinta systems were entirely separate, with what is 
now called the Grijalva actually the Sierra River. What is now called 
the Mezcalapa was the Old Grijalva River.
Until 1675, the Old Grijalva flowed nearly north to the sea.
After that date, it abruptly turned east, joining the two systems. In 
1882, its course broke again to form the Carrizal River, which flowed 
to the Bar of Chiltepec (through the old Gonzalez River) rather than 
the Grijalva-Usumacinta system. In 1902, it was diverted once again to 
the new Grijalva; and in 1932 opened a third west-east branch - the 
Samaria River - whose water flowed north at times to flood the 
Chontalpa Bowl. The Samaria River reached the sea through the Bar of 
Chiltepec, the Carrizal and Gonzalez rivers and the new Grijalva- 
Usumacinta system.
The major effect of these changes in river course was to reduce 
the productivity of the Old Chontalpa region, while opening up the 
extremely fertile, now dry riverbed of the Old Grijalva River - the 
”Rio Seco.” Massive emigration began from the former to the latter for 
cacao planting. In 1823 whites and mestizos settled the town of Paraiso 
and in 1827, Comalcalco - right in the old riverbed. By 1854, the 
region was prosperous and full of cacao (169, p.141).
The second migration stemmed from the town of Cardenas, which had 
been established in the old Rio Seco at the end of the 18th century.
By 1869, 1159 Indians and mestizos had moved along the old tributaries 
to the Mezcalapa to plant cacao and subsistence crops.
The third route of colonization was of Ahualculco Indians who 
settled near Huimanguillo and Ocuapan, at the close of the 18th century
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MAP 6. HISTORICAL RIVER FLOW CHANGES IN TABASCO*
M ajo r p o p u la tion  cantors -  "O ld  C h o n ta lp a " and " S ie r r a "
(j|§; C hon to lpo  Bowl
M o jo r p o p u lo tio n  centers - "New C h o n ta lp a "
R ivers
Towns
*Source: See thesis
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along major rivers west. Their presence established the present 
border with Veracruz.
These changes brought renewed vigor to cacao activity in Tabasco. 
Whereas in 1854, the Sierra had three quarters of the cacao trees in 
Tabasco, by 1890, cacao production in the Chontalpa had once again 
passed that of the Sierra, which had suffered severely from floods and 
droughts in the interim (169, p.162). In 1828, Mexico's first choco­
late factory using sugar was built; in 1876, the first milk chocolate 
factory (133, p. 10).
After the Great Dry Spell of 1859-1861 caused a sharp decline in 
cacao production in the Sierra, large sugar cane haciendas were planted 
for the first time on the floodplain of the Tacotalpa, producing 
rum and raw sugar. Hevea rubber, coffee, originally used as cacao 
windbreaks, and some tobacco near Ocuapan were also planted in the 
late 19th century in small quantities. The expansion of cattle 
production, and a vast increase in logging stimulated by United States' 
demand for mahogany, exterminated most of the remaining jungles, 
completing the land use changes which took place between Independence 
and the Mexican Revolution.
Early 20th Century: Bananas, Coconut and Improved Cattle Breeds.
Tabascans were active in the Revolution, largely because of the 
considerable local resentments against largeholders - primarily owners of 
cane and cattle ranches - who practiced debt peonage and encroached on 
smallholder land. Nonetheless, new ejidos which were promised by the 
federal government did not take form until the 1950's.
The major changes in the first half of the century were the 
introduction of bananas and coconut and the spread of cattle ranching.
The most famous of the post-Revolution governors of Tabasco, Tomas 
Garrido Canabal (1928-1934), a radical populist, organized farmer 
producer groups for all major products, which have remained active to 
the present.
At the turn of the century, several landowners, inspired by the 
lucrative production of bananas in Central America began commercial 
production of the "roatan" or Gros Michel variety on the well-drained 
river dikes. At first they cleared previously forested land, but later 
replaced food, rubber and cacao crops, and encroached upon remaining 
smallholder properties all along the Usumacinta. By the 1920's and 
1930's, a "banana boom" had spread throughout the lower Grijalva, the 
Sierra rivers and even the Chontalpa. Marketing and transport were 
organized by the newly formed cooperatives and export shipped to the 
United States by boats belonging to the large U.S. fruit companies.
Between 1920 and 1930, bananas replaced cacao as the primary 
source of agricultural wealth in the state. During 1938-1942, however, 
sudden attacks of the Sigatoka disease (a banana leaf disease) and 
Panama disease (a root parasite), coupled with lack of space in shipping 
boats during World War II, led to a drastic decrease in production. 
Through copper sulfate applications for Sigatoka control, the industry
-32-
recovered in the 1940's, but never resumed exports. Usumacinta
and Sierra plantations reverted to livestock and subsistence crops;
only the Center and Southern Chontalpa zones remained productive (169,
p.168).
The first coconut was planted on the Chiltepec and Frontera 
coasts at the end of the past century, but major production did not 
begin until World War II, when the normal copra supplies from Asia and 
Oceania were cut off from the Allies. High prices led to large 
plantings all along the coast - the first intensive use of this land, 
which had formerly been utilized only for pasture - and the first 
population movement there (169, p.170).
Until the 1930's, cattle herds in Tabasco were almost entirely 
"criollo.” In 1932, Brahman cattle were imported, and later Santa 
Gertrudis, part of a new breeding program of the Cattle Producers 
Association. Improved pastures had been brought in earlier: Egypt 
grass (Panicum purpurascense). 1872; Guinea (Panicum maximum). 1900; 
Molasses grass (Melinisminutiflora), 1923. To permit higher stocking 
rates of the new crossbred cattle, other new pastures were introduced: 
elephant grass (Penniseum purpurerum), pangola (Digitaria decumbens). 
jaragua (Hypererehenia rufa) and German grass (Echinochloa polystachya).
Land Use Changes After 1950
Middle-aged Tabascans still remember when one prepared for a trip 
to Mexico City by writing one's will. From the town of Teapa, for 
example, two to three days in a small boat brought one to the sea, 
where a precarious sea voyage to Veracruz was followed by a dizzying 
climb overland past the peak of Orizaba before descending into the 
Valley of Mexico.
But in 1950, the National Railroad of the Southeast was extended 
through Teapa and Tenosique on the higher, more stable land above the 
floodplain to avoid flood risks. Since population centers were 
located far north of the tracks, the rail line stimulated building of 
numerous roads north-south. While the railroad was being built in 
1948, the state's first all-weather road was built from Villahermosa 
to Teapa, and a road between Puerto Ceiba and Huimanguillo, through 
Comalcalco, was gravelled. In 1961, a paved road connected Villahermosa 
with Mexico City. In 1967 Villahermosa was finally connected by an 
all-weather paved road to the Yucatan peninsula.
Flood Control. With increasing commercial activity on the Tabascan 
floodplain, the age-old problem of flooding became an important 
political issue.
In 1932 and 1952, the Old Chontalpa suffered devastating floods, 
which turned what had been the second most important producing zone of 
the state into - for the most part - an area of subsistence agriculture. 
In response to the disasters, the national government set up
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the Grijalva-Usumacinta River Basin Commission in 1951, to control 
flooding in Tabasco and promote general economic development there.
The Commission completed the Netzhualcoyotl dam at Malpaso, Chiapas 
in 1964, and dams at Chicoasen and Angostura in the 1970's. Their 
primary role was electricity generation. Truly effective flood control 
- even if possible, given rapid silting due to the rivers' heavy 
sediment loads and potential shifts in river flows - would depend on 
the construction of several more dams. Still, Malpaso has so far 
successfully protected the New Chontalpa area and the city of Villa- 
hermosa.
Several large drainage structures built to control the Mezcalapa 
waters are shown on Map 6. The Old Comalcalco road, the Left Dike and 
Right Dike protect the Rio Seco area and the Villahermosa-Cardenas 
highway, at the expense of increased flooding in the western zone and 
the "Bowl.” The Samaria, Veladero and K-24 Drains protect much of the 
area between Cunduacan city and the highway, but have been continually 
threatened with siltation.
A series of drains were built west of Cardenas in the late 1960's 
for the Plan Chontalpa to foster intensive agriculture in that 
formerly ill-drained zone. Expensive infrastructure projects, including 
paved roads, villages with homes of concrete block and full water, 
sewerage and electricity services, were carried out for 22 newly-formed 
ej idos.
Growth of Commercial Agriculture. The improvements in transport, 
land reform, and drainage, opened new opportunities for commercial 
agriculture in Tabasco for both formerly subsistence-oriented campe- 
sinos and market-oriented farmers. Total land in production rose greatly 
in the 1950's and 1960's, with livestock production becoming more and 
more important. Between 1965 and 1972, the value of total foreign 
exports from Tabasco ranged from $45 to $157.8 m. - ten to twenty per 
cent of the total value of agricultural production - largely in cacao, 
coconut and shrimp. The state's overall trade balance was positive and 
high. But because crop prices during the 1960's were generally stagnant, 
there were not correspondingly impressive gains in productivity.
There was little increase in the total land put into agricultural 
use, because the state was effectively cleared by this time. But 
grazing lands were planted to improved pastures, and newly-drained 
lands were converted from pasture to crops. Ejidos control over a 
third of all farmland - more in the agricultural zones of the Chontalpa. 
Private land ownership in Tabasco is extremely concentrated, with 
four per cent of owners controlling 59 per cent of private agricultural 
land. Half the private farmers (with only three per cent of the 
private farmland) hold under five hectares (111, 1970).
However, most of the large extensions are in the Rivers area or 
the Savannah; in the rest of the Chontalpa there are few large 
properties. In fact, the most important agrarian problem there is 
minifundization, which has been accelerating since the final settlement 
of the frontiers earlier in this century.
-34-
A close interface between cattle farming and the smallholder 
sector developed in the 1970's. The growth of the cattle industry led 
to greater demand for forrage, so that ranchers began to contract with 
ejidatarios and other smallholders for grazing rights in return for 
keeping half of the year's new calves. This is called "mediania" and 
is distinct from the other common practice of simply renting pasture- 
land for a fixed price per hectare per month. Promoted by government 
loan programs and mediania, livestock are now an important asset of 
cacaoteros and other smallholders.
The Impact of PEMEX on the Tabascan Economy 
PEMEX in Tabasco Before the "Boom"
Modest drilling in Macuspana and Reforma, Chiapas, by private oil 
companies and PEMEX before 1950 had little impact on the state (169, 
p.178; 191). But in 1951, the most productive site in the state known 
before the 1970's was discovered in Macuspana, where PEMEX City, an 
industry "new town" for 300 employees was set up. Pipelines to send 
gas to Minatitlan, Veracruz and Mexico City were built. Comalcalco was 
made District headquarters. Between 1954 and 1958, new sites were 
found near La Venta, related to the formations of southeastern 
Veracruz. A second permanent establishment was set up in La Venta by 
PEMEX, and dozens of temporary "lost cities" sprung up.
The Isthmus salt basin near the Veracruz border also produced 
some oil and gas; in the area stretching from Macuspana northeast to 
Campeche, huge gas reserves were found. The first commercial 
production from Gulf off-shore areas was in 1958. By 1961, the entire 
Southern Zone, including the Isthmus, was producing 24 per cent of 
Mexican crude, 24 per cent of natural gas liquids and 44 per cent of 
the natural gas - with 42 per cent of the nation's wells (89, 90).
The Oil Boom of the 1970's
In 1970, PEMEX accelerated its drilling activities in Tabasco, 
and began to work much deeper, at 4500 meters. With wells Sitio Grande 
#1 and Cactus #1 in 1972 and Pozo #5 in February 1973, they struck 
high pressure pay (191, pp.4-5). Subsequent exploration wells were 
drilled with extraordinary success rates and yields per well - the oil 
boom had begun.
After 1977, PEMEX expanded rapidly. Between 1976 and mid-1978, 
the number of productive wells rose from 114 in seven fields to 160 in 
14 fields, with expectations that by 1983 there would be 477 wells 
drilled (164 pp.10-11). These areas are shown on Map 7 along with 
other petroleum infrastructure in the zone and newly planned 
projects.
A petrochemical plant was built in Cactus in 1973-74 for gas­
sweetening and expanded to a capacity of 200 m. cubic feet per day by
MAP 7 PETROLEUM INFRASTRUCTURE IN TABASCO, 1980
Oil and Gas Pipelines
-------- Oleoducts
---------Petrochemical polyducts
iLOUiI
*Mexico, Secretaria de Programacion y Presupuesto, La Industria Petrolera en Mexico, 1979 
pp. 353-355. ~
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1979. 368.8 kilometers of polyducts were built (including the start
of the Reynosa-Cactus gas pipeline), and gasoline pipelines to Cactus 
from Cunduacan, Sitio Grande and Nispero. A vast network of roads was 
built through the swampland, 225 kilometers by 1978. Future plans 
include expansion of the Cactus plant; construction of a new petro­
chemical center in Gil Perez; a port facility in Dos Bocas capable of 
exporting 700,000 bbl/day oil; and a 6500 ton/day capacity ammonia plant in 
Villahermosa, in addition to more pipelines and wells (146, p.6).
Principal Effects of PEMEX on the Tabasco Economy
PEMEX invested billions of pesos in Tabasco during the 
1970's, building wells and other infrastructure as rapidly as 
possible. This activity disrupted Tabascan society in four principal 
ways: inflating the economy and causing commodity and labor scarcities
stimulating migration and changes in the labor market; subjecting 
agricultural land to expropriation, trespass and pollution; and 
disrupting established social patterns and mores. The effects in the 
Rivers, eastern part of the Sierra and Savannah regions were minimal. 
The impact was felt most strongly in the quadrangle formed by Villa­
hermosa, Cunduacan, Cardenas and Reforma towns.
But there is a strong temptation to attribute all recent changes 
in Tabasco to petroleum development, when in fact many socioeconomic 
phenomena of the past decade are part of longstanding historical 
trends in the state. The following section summarizes the various 
changes in Tabasco in the 1970's, and their sources.
Economic Impact of PEMEX. Total national petroleum investment rose 
from $4576.1 m. in 1971 to $62,703 m in 1978. Of this, the greatest 
part was spent in the Tabasco/Chiapas area. Chart 1 shows changing 
federal investment in Tabasco between 1959 and 1979, and the dominant 
role of PEMEX. In 1978, PEMEX paid $7.2 m per day in salaries in 
Tabasco. By contrast, the total value of agricultural and livestock 
production in the state in 1974 was only between $1500 m and $2000 m 
(67).
This profile is somewhat misleading, as most PEMEX expenditures 
in Tabasco were for purchases made elsewhere. An estimated 15.5 per 
cent were for local wage and salary payments, and 21.9 per cent were 
for profits and other expenses in state (67, p.59). Most internal 
economic linkages were for construction work; there were few productive 
linkages to the non-petroleum Tabascan economy.
PEMEX became the most important taxpayer in Chiapas and Tabasco. 
Total state and municipal receipts in Tabasco rose markedly (73, p.14):
1973 $ 1.5 m
1974 14.0 m
1975 150.0 m
1976 280.0 m
1977 650.0 m
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By comparison, in 1976, the state received only $21.3 m from the 
cacao sector and $81.5 m from the livestock sector (164, p.63).
This enormous increase in local purchasing power stimulated the 
commercial and service sectors. The number of established commercial 
enterprises rose 30 per cent between 1970 and 1978 (compared with 65 
per cent 1960 to 1970 for smaller-scale operations). The volume of 
commerce rose many times this, even without including non-established 
commerce (such as street vending), which is evidently booming.
Inflation and Scarcities. As a result of this increased economic 
activity introduced from outside the state, inflation has run rampant. 
Some items, particularly construction goods, ran 70-100 per cent 
higher in cost in Villahermosa, Cardenas and Comalcalco than in Mexico 
City in 1979/80 (70, 78). The cost of food for a family in Cardenas 
town rose between 22 and 51 per cent between 1976 and 1979, depending 
on their typical "food basket" (40).
Housing was particularly scarce in the major towns, and extremely 
expensive, even in squatter settlements. Most available hotel rooms 
were rented by working people, disrupting the state's tourism program 
for lack of accommodations.
The state government had made some strides in controlling specific 
types of inflation, such as food (by building CONASUPO and cooperative 
stores), transport (building new trucking centers and operating 
competing bus lines), and housing (operating a small number of direct 
and contracted building programs). But the devaluations of 1982 are 
likely to exacerbate inflationary problems in the near future.
Labor Market Disruptions. In general, wages in Tabasco have increased 
faster than the cost of living index in the past decade.
PEMEX basic labor payments are well ahead of most other groups.
To work full-time ("de planta"), one must be a union member and pay an 
expensive entrance fee. The union - the Sindicato de Trabajadores 
Petroleros de la Republica de Mexico (STPRM) - is extremely powerful 
and plays a large role in running PEMEX. Temporaries ("transitorios") 
work at much lower rates, yet are chosen by the union whose officials 
often charge for bestowing jobs. Large-scale contractors also 
frequently hire through the union.
Direct employment by PEMEX and the construction companies 
contracting with them rose from about 6000 (of whom two thirds were 
temporary) in August 1977, to between 40,000 and 50,000 in 1979/80 
(164, pp. 13-14). They lived primarily in Villahermosa and Cardenas 
or near the petroleum operations.
Chart 2 shows the composition of the EAP of Tabasco in 1970. The 
entire population working in construction at that time was only 6000. 
Agriculture was obviously dominant. Very few workers earned over 
M$1000 monthly - a few workers In large-scale transformation activities,
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CHART 2 a/CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 1970 EAP IN TABASCO-
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oil workers, a few thousand participating in high-income service 
activities in Villahermosa, and a very small percentage of farmers.
By 1980, the proportion in oil-related activities had grown 
enormously, as had the construction sector as a whole, and urban 
services. Agricultural employment was much less important.
These statistics, however, indicate only the primary occupation. 
Other sources, such as the Sociodemographic Survey of Tabasco, show 
that secondary employment is widespread, including among agricultural 
workers. It is also extremely common for farmers to leave farming 
temporarily for a period of weeks, months or years to earn wages off- 
farm. This was the case for perhaps a fourth of Tabascan farmers 
during the oil boom.
Of all the rural landless - those who in 1970 were unpaid or paid 
family workers and those with no ties to the land - we estimate that a 
third sought some part-time or permanent off-farm employment during 
the 1970's. In the immediate vicinities of oil production, this ratio 
is certainly much higher. Combining farmers and landless, we find that 
some thirty per cent of the 1970 agricultural labor force had partici­
pated by 1980 in employment in one of the "new" non-farm sectors. See 
Chart 3.
Immigration and Settlement Patterns. The demand for skilled labor for 
petroleum development, and the general attraction of the economy of 
Tabasco led to considerable new immigration to Tabasco in the 1970's. 
Counteracting this trend somewhat, however, was the continued strength 
of out-migration from Tabasco of natives, and of PEMEX-related workers 
who came to Tabasco only to finish a particular job.
A PEMEX official of the Cunduacan area estimated that in 1980 
perhaps twenty per cent of the transitorios and a little under ten per 
cent of the permanent workers were Tabascan. He guessed that a fifth 
of the people then working for PEMEX had also been working for the 
company in 1970, while the rest were people who were relatives or 
recommended by former PEMEX workers in Veracruz. New workers since 
1978 tended to be Tabascans.
In just the past decade, Villahermosa grew from 99,565 to 107,450 
and Cardenas from 15,643 to 31,005, but had reached population peaks 
in 1978/79 of an estimated 300,000 and 100,000, respectively, due to 
temporary inhabitants. The urban population accounted for a third of 
the population and Villahermosa alone for nearly a quarter, whereas in 
1970, the population was still predominantly rural, with only a 
quarter residing in cities of over 10,000 (66, 110).
Of all migrants to Tabascan cities, at least half were from out of 
state. Whereas in the 1960's, there was considerable migration to 
rural areas due to frontier settlement and the Chontalpa Plan, during 
the 1970's there was little migration to agricultural areas, with the 
exception of the Balancan-Tenosique Plan area in the eastern panhandle 
( 6 6 , 1 1 0 ).
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CHART 3. ESTIMATED IMPACT OF PETROLEUM BOOM ON TABASCAN FARMERS 
AND FARMWORKERS *
Landless Agricultural Workers
(136, 149)
TOTAL AGRICULTURAL LAP OF TABASCO
Farmers with Land Rights
*Based on state expropriation information and extrapolations from the Cacao 
Farm Case Studies, Malaria Control population information, Population and 
Agricultural Census Information, and the Sociodemographic Survey of Tabasco.
a/There is probably some overlap between these two groups.
b/Note that 30 per cent of the entire agricultural labor force seems to 
have participated in petroleum-related employment at some time during the 
decade.
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Pollution. Ecologiclal impacts of PEMEX include crops and pasture 
contamination, fisheries destruction, death and illness of cattle, 
water pollution, human eye and lung ailments from air pollution, 
corrosion of fence wire and zinc roofs, leaks of chemicals from the 
holding ponds by drilling sites; and ruined roads from excessive 
transit by heavy vehicles (69). Some Grijalva Commission engineers 
project large-scale ecological damage to coastal lakes from the port 
activities on the coast; and road construction planned by PEMEX which 
would change floodplain drainage patterns and increase flood risks.
PEMEX did regularize many operations in the late 1970's and 
improve pollution controls. In September 1977, an Office of Environ­
mental Protection was set up in Villahermosa by the state government 
to keep check on progress.
Expropriation and "Afectaciones". By 1980, PEMEX had drilled wells or 
built roads and pipelines on the properties of several thousand 
ejidatarios and propietarios; perhaps five to ten per cent of all the 
state's farms. A small percentage of land was expropriated for perma­
nent activities, but most was affected temporarily, as a passage for 
equipment, for example. Expropriations have been greater on ejidal 
land than private, because in such cases, the company does not have to 
pay the value of the land, only improvements. The most serious land 
use change was the felling of thousands of hectares of coconut 
plantations near Paraiso for the pipeline and port.
For many farmers, the loss of some land or cattle, or the ruin of 
annual or particularly perennial crops, was a severe economic set­
back. Compensation for damages was made according to a formula widely 
felt to be obsolete. In 1977, ruined maize crops were compensated 
with $3500 per hectare versus $4090 cost of production; cacao with 
$17,000 versus $30,000 per hectare; and a one-year-old cacao sapling 
with $50 vs. $200 production cost.
Due to farmer outrage, a special claims commission was set up in 
Villahermosa with representatives from SARH, the Ministry of Patrimony 
and Industrial Promotion (SPFI), the Agrarian Reform Ministry, the 
state government, PEMEX and the League of Agrarian Communities.
Between 1976 and 1978, the value per year of payments for pollution and 
affectation proceedings grew nearly four-fold; PEMEX had paid over $50m 
in compensation by early 1978 (j^  pp.44-46).
The fears and insecurities of these farmers have an effect beyond 
their numbers - in decisions by other farmers not to invest in their 
land for fear it will be expropriated or ruined.
The Social Impact of PEMEX. The increase in government funds for 
social infrastructure which accompanied the petroleum boom did indeed 
have an important positive effect on living standards in Tabasco. 
Between 1970 and 1980, there was, for example, a sharp increase of 
piped water and sewerage facilities, and near-total coverage of 
schooling for school-age children.
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But the social fabric of Tabascan society has been rent.
Throughout the petroleum areas one hears complaints of violent crime, 
drinking, pornography. Recreational activities are oriented to young 
single men with cash, not families. Relations inside families are 
changing - women are put in charge of farms while husbands and sons 
leave all week to work in Cardenas; many families have been abandoned.
The active work day for those employed in petroleum activities is 
longer than in farming. There are long commutes in crowded, dangerous 
trucks - added to the anxieties of industrial or construction accidents. 
Diets are changing; cash needs are increasing with inflation. Even 
where large monetary indemnifications are paid for affected land, 
lack of experience with cash investing has led to tragic squandering 
of resources.
There have been few efforts by natives to welcome or socially 
incorporate newcomers. They are expected to leave within a few years 
and their own behavior - families left in Mexico city, weekends and 
vacations spent away - reinforces this.
"PEMEX has brought to Tabasco three things: lots of filth, lots of 
undesirable people, and lots of inconvenience" was how one native 
summed it up. More telling still of the deep resentments felt by many 
toward PEMEX is the emergence of a horrifying myth. There has long 
been widespread superstition in Mexico that into all large bridges 
some child must be thrown as sacrifice to ensure that it stands 
strong. Supposedly the government steals children to provide this 
protection. The story has been changed now, and I heard versions of 
it among frightened Mexico City housewives as well as in Teapa,
Paraiso and Cunduacan. It is now PEMEX that steals the children - to 
throw down the oil wells to ensure that the black gold flows.
Social and Political Conflict with PEMEX. The haste with which early 
PEMEX activities were carried out created lasting resentments in 
Tabasco: drilling rigs were built on farmland before expropriation
papers were ever finished, and payments were delayed for over a year. 
Roads were destroyed by over-use; the negative impacts described above 
became obvious.
External control over PEMEX activities was sharply eroded by the 
1978 reform of Articles VII and X of Article 27 of the Mexican consti­
tution. This made it impossible to refuse PEMEX occupation or expro­
priation and gave petroleum production priority over any alternative 
land use (164, p.33).
PEMEX at one time proposed siting of the new petrochemical plant 
in a densely inhabited cacao zone of Cunduacan (164, p.31). It was 
eventually moved to Gil Perez in Centro, after demonstrations and 
protests by cacaoteros. On another occasion, the army was brought in 
to squash farmers' refusal to allow PEMEX trucks to enter their 
rancheria, in protest of low or no indemnification payments. In January 
1981, an estimated 10,000 armed campesinos cut off roads in the Chiapas
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petroleum zone, in protest of water pollution that had supposedly 
destroyed much of their cacao crop (176).
The League of Agrarian Communities organized some 3000 indi­
viduals in 1980 to improve campesino political organization. The "Pacto 
Ribereno” is a group of 7500 campesinos who organized legal help to 
defend their rights and payments of indemnifications (164, p.43).
Temporary workers for major PEMEX contractors have also periodi­
cally protested conditions. Attempts in 1974 to organize a union and 
require transport services and the usual benefits of Mexican working 
standards led to the firing of 800 workers. The workers' reaction was 
so violent that 1000 soldiers were called in. Shortly after, a general 
strike was called that lasted a month - and ended with a contract.
But in the next few months, the companies claimed to finish work, 
closed contracts - and then began work with different people. Other 
strikes followed, but actions by the PEMEX union and other groups to 
break up organization were successful. In 1979/80 there were no 
guarantees at all for transitorios.
Collaboration between state government, the farm producer 
associations, and supporters in Mexico City led to some restrictions 
of PEMEX, including an obligation to inform the Tabascans in advance 
of proposed activities. But the collaboration is shaky. People resent 
that the main beneficiaries of the boom are the "rentistes, 
contractors, large merchants, speculators, landlords, bankers, industri­
alists, PEMEX union officials and privileged PEMEX workers " (164, p.79)
- and suspect these of having close contacts with the government.
The Contradiction: An Agricultural Boom
Despite all of the above real problems with petroleum develop­
ment, the agricultural sector over the same period experienced its own 
boom. Chart 4 demonstrates that agricultural production during that 
decade rose for all major products except maize and beans. (The 
scanty evidence for maize farmers suggests large-scale emigration for 
off-farm work, whether temporary or permanent is not known).
The generally successful performance of the rest of the sector can 
be attributed to rising agricultural prices, new agro-processing 
investments, the state program of assistance to and investment in 
agriculture, and the flexibility of the smallholder farm sector.
Agricultural Prices
Chart 5 shows changing real prices for selected commercial prod- 
ducts. Price levels for cacao and beef were particularly favorable, 
that for sugar cane, coconut and bananas less so, but still rising in 
real terms. For the export crops, devaluation of the peso in 1976 
helped to spur price increases and production. The contrasting 
relatively low price of maize, in the context of an inflated cost of 
living, amply justified maize farmers' negative response.
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CHART 4A. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN TABASCO, 1960-1980* 
Crop Production
234
*Sources: Secretaria de Industria y Comercio, Direccion General de
Economia, Censo Agricola, Ganadera y Ejidal, 1960 and 1970, "Tabasco," 
Cuadro 10, Mexico, D.F.; Eduardo Bolio Villanueva, La Economia del 
Estado de Tabasco, Coleccion de Estudios Economicos Regionales, Sistema 
Bancos de Comercio, Mexico, D.F., March 1976; Manlio Tirado, Tabasco 
y el Gasoducto, (Ediciones Quinto Sol, S.A.: Mexico, D.F.), 1978, pp.
54-60; SARH, Departamento de Economia Agricola, Residencia Tabasco, 
Villahermosa, Tabasco, statistical records.
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CHART 4B. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN TABASCO, 1960-1980 
Livestock Production
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CHART 5. PRICES FOR MAJOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
OF TABASCO, 1970-1979*
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* Mexico, SARH, Econotecnia, Vol. IV, No. 8, August 1980, pp. 18-30.
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To offset the impact of PEMEX, the program would train skilled 
workers locally to reduce immigration, bring sports centers and 
concerts to offset the influence of petroleum workers' cantinas, 
attract tourists so that petroleum workers are not the only outsiders, 
strengthen agriculture to offset petroleum dominance of the economy 
(153, p.12).
The focus of economic development plans for the state was the 
already densely populated area from Cardenas to Villahermosa, and 
north to Paraiso. These three cities are to be the major urban 
centers. The most important investments during the 1976-82 period 
were the Gil Perez petrochemical plant and the integrated petroleum 
port in Dos Bocas.
Petroleum led the sectoral distribution of the budget (42 per 
cent) - followed by industry (19), human settlements (11), agriculture 
(11) and tourism (9).
A modern new airport for Villahermosa was completed in 1979 and 
work began on a four-lane highway from Coatzacoalcos to Villahermosa. 
Also in the capital are "Tabasco 2000,” a large-scale urbanization 
project, and a convention-museum-tourism center.
The "Industrial City" of Villahermosa was constructed in 1972 and 
began operating in March 1973. Under the "Alliance for Production" an 
agreement was signed between the Governor and private industrialists 
for investments there. Over 6000 jobs were expected from the 83 
projects under that agreement. By 1978, 28 industries had contracted 
with the City, of which nearly a third were agro-processors or storage 
facilities for agricultural products (13, p.46; 81, p.46).
Of $8500 m pesos for Alliance expenditures in 1979, nearly a 
quarter went to agriculture (mostly production credit), 37 per cent to 
industry (mostly construction materials), 12 per cent for human 
settlements, 21 per cent for tourism (67, p.47). Including PEMEX, and 
other public and private expenditures, total Plan investments in 1979 
ran to over $30,000 m (or US$1.3 b dollars). Of this, nearly forty 
per cent was to have been made by private interests, in return for 
tax advantages, credit assistance and infrastructure provision.
Of Plan funding, 54 per cent came from the federal government, 30 
per cent from federal financing for private investment projects, ten 
per cent from private sector financing and six per cent state and 
local financing. The federal sources include a substantial amount of 
international financing for PEMEX, social infrastructure and agriculture.
Government Investment in Agriculture
Although in relative terms, agriculture represented only 11 per 
cent of the budget, in real terms this was an unprecedented level of 
assistance to the sector. Map 8 shows the major agricultural projects 
in Tabasco in 1980. These include the rainfed agriculture district
MAP 8. AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN TABASCO, MEXICO*
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*Mexieo, COPRODET, "Plan Sectorial: Agropecuario y Forestal," Plan Estatal de Desarrollo , 1979.
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programs, the Plan Chontalpa, Plan Balancan-Tenosique, and the 
Grijalva Commission drainage projects.
District I emphasizes livestock production; District II, agri­
cultural production. SARH runs a series of programs, including input 
production, research, technical assistance, crop improvement programs 
for cacao, coconut and bananas; promotion and planting programs for 
rubber, cassava, cashew, achiote and Jamaica; and programs for fruit 
trees, apiculture and basic crops (72, p.49).
The Chontalpa Plan has been re-organized, and in the late 1970's 
showed much improved statistics on production, credit repayment and 
labor absorption. The Balancan-Tenosique Plan - another collective 
enterprise primarily for cattle production - was begun in 1971 on
61,000 hectares.
The great "Drain to the Sea" was proposed and initiated to 
protect the Central Chontalpa area from flooding, and open new land for 
cultivation. This costly project, which would extend from Centro to 
Paraiso municipios, is highly controversial for economic, political 
and ecological reasons.
Other drainage projects are underway in Zapotal (a PRODERITH 
pilot project), Isla and Rio Seco. The Rio Seco project, originally 
the Chontalpa Plan's second phase, covers 37,000 hectares in the most 
densely populated part of the state, and requires the completion of 
the "Drain to the Sea" to be successful. There are a number of other 
projects to build drains, dikes and bridges, and to desilt drains and 
rivers, mainly in the Chontalpa region.
The federal Integrated Program for Rural Development (PIDER) 
operated in 1980 on nearly eight ejidos, with over 4500 ejidatarios, 
mainly in the Sierra and Old Chontalpa regions. Its projects included 
drains, roads, fencing, and plantation establishment.
The Planning Commission for Marginal Areas (COPLAMAR) worked in 
agriculture and social infrastructure with indigenous groups, mainly 
in the Old Chontalpa semi-flooded areas. Storage capacity for CONASUPO 
in the state was increased from 1500 tons in 1977 to 21,500 tons in 
1979.
In 1979, total agricultural investments amounted to 14 per cent 
of that year's estimated total agricultural production. In addition, 
federal agricultural credit guarantees (FIRA) amounted to well over 
half a billion pesos, mostly for long-term livestock loans (79, p.47).
The Campesino Economy as the Principal Stabilizing Factor 
in Agricultural Production
But while good agricultural prices and strong governmental 
support were critical to Tabasco's agricultural boom, they were not 
sufficient in themselves. For, upon closer examination of the pro­
duction statistics and widespread interviewing among farmers, it was
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evident that large numbers of farmers did respond to the disruptions 
of the petroleum boom by reducing production. These were the larger 
farmers who depended upon hired labor for farming; those whose 
behavior was guided by the objectives of neo-Classical microeconomics. 
Even where prices were such as to permit profits on such farms, these 
farmers frequently chose to invest their resources in town, where the 
returns were higher.
The stability of agricultural production in Tabasco came mainly 
from the campesino sector, in particular the farms of sufficient size 
to support a family, yet small enough to be operated predominantly 
with family labor. Their rationale for production decisions was based 
on considerations best explained by the theory of "family economy." 
These farm families both supplied labor on the off-farm labor market, 
and hired labor at critical times on their own farms. Their supply of 
labor was so flexible that, when high farm prices and high off-farm 
wages warranted it, they could expand employment both on- and off- 
farm.
The peak labor demand periods for major farm activities in Tabasco 
are March-May and November-December. The main period for construction 
activity on roads, drains, and other projects, by contrast, is 
February-May, the dry season. This labor seasonality leads to 
differing composition and size of the agricultural labor force at 
different times of the year, and wreaks havoc on macro-statistical 
analyses of employment in the state.
To meet peak labor demand, a large part of the smallholder sector 
(nearly sixty per cent of farmers) worked periodically for largeholders, 
and often for each other, in between work requirements on their own 
land. Such work relations were often formalized, with largeholders 
providing credit and help during sickness in return for valuable 
peak season help - and neighbors joining in godparenthood and work 
teams.
Many individuals in the "worker" category were in fact sons of 
smallholders who were paid by parents or neighbors, and probably lived 
at home, hence not "landless" in the strict sense. Many others are 
"ejidatarios without land rights." This status, though often literally 
the case, frequently masks a cooperative situation in which, for 
example, several brothers farm together, but only one is represented 
on the ejidal council or on official records.
Permanent hired labor is uncommon, but probably over fifty per 
cent of all farmers - and this includes many with under five hectares 
of land - hire non-family labor at some time during the year. The 
level of demand for such work depends on product price and on yields. 
When prices are high, it is worthwhile for farmers to hire help for 
more intensive cultivation. When yields are high either due to 
natural conditions or to more intensive cultivation, much more hired 
labor is required at the peak harvest seasons.
Potential family labor not generally utilized provides much of the 
flexibility. The marked differences in employment figures between the
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Population and Agricultural Censuses clearly illustrate the critical 
role and extent of agricultural labor by family members who do not 
consider themselves to be principally involved in the agricultural 
sector (Thesis, Appendix Table E-l). This includes farmers' wives 
and daughters, children usually in school, and children or cousins 
with other jobs who help on the weekend and afternoons on the rela­
tive's plot at peak labor times. In the cacao-producing municipios 
of Tabasco, this characteristic is pronounced.
Because the major petroleum zone was so densely populated, good 
communications with urban centers permitted farm family members to 
work for PEMEX or the constructoras without leaving home. In the 
Chontalpa, even farmers who were away all week returned to do farm 
work on the weekends. Hence, rural emigration rates were relatively 
low, despite extensive employment off the farm.
In addition, the farm budgets of these family-based farms were 
organized to minimize the impact from petroleum-induced economic 
changes. Not only was hired labor a relatively small part of the 
budget, but the families could sometimes substitute family labor for 
purchased inputs which became too expensive (such as hand labor for 
herbicides).
The Cacao Economy as a Case Study
The importance of the campesino producers in offsetting the 
economic disruptions of petroleum development is clearly illustrated 
in the case of the Tabascan cacao farmers. The cacao crop requires 
extremely high labor inputs and farmers would be expected to be parti­
cularly sensitive to off-farm wage changes. Yet production has risen 
and area planted has expanded. Cacao production is still the most 
important agricultural sector in Tabasco, in terms of income and rural 
employment.
The next chapter discusses the cacao economy of Tabasco, and 
introduces the major types of cacao producers in the state. The inter­
play between farmers, farmworkers, PEMEX, government assistance pro­
grams and the general Tabascan economy provides a fascinating example 
of the nuances of economic development, and a useful case study to 
illustrate the flexibility of campesino farming systems.
CHAPTER 3. THE CACAO ECONOMY OF TABASCO
"Junto a una taza de te, platicamos; junto a una de cafe, 
discutimos; con un chocolate, ninos, mozos y viejos, 
sentlmos el placer de la vida."
("Beside a cup of tea, we chat; beside one of coffee, we 
argue; with a cup of chocolate we - children, adults and 
older folk - feel the pleasure of life.")
- Enrique Perez Gutierrez 
(quoted in 133)
"Delicacy of the gods"
- Linneus
Cacao has for the inhabitants of Tabasco an importance beyond the 
economic - it is one of the identifying features of the Tabascan 
image. But from the staple component of a traditional subsistence 
livelihood, its production has evolved into a dynamic part of the 
state's modern economy with sophisticated processing and marketing 
components and a structure of production quite unlike that of even a 
few decades ago.
An Introduction to Cacao
Before discussing this structure and the principal causes of 
increased production, it would be useful for the reader to get a brief 
review of the international cacao market, the principal technical 
characteristics of cacao production, and the role of labor in produc­
tion.
Cacao is a tree naturally found in the lower stories of the 
tropical rain forest, from whose seeds chocolate is made. Hernando 
Cortez, after discovering cacao in the Conquest of Mexico, brought it 
to Europe. When the Europeans learned to combine the bitter paste with 
sugar, a popular drink was born, creating a commercial demand for 
cacao. In the 19th century, chocolate industries developed in Europe.
The principal trade products of cacao are the cocoa bean, typi­
cally fermented; cocoa butter, the fatty part of the seed which has 
numerous food and non-food uses; cocoa powder and cakes used for 
cooking; cocoa paste; and of course the more elaborated chocolates for 
drinking or eating.
In 1978, 28 per cent of world cacao production came from South 
America, half of which was from Brazil. Seven per cent was from 
Central America; 60 per cent from Africa (Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast 
and Cameroon), and five per cent from Asia and Oceania (62, pp.2-6). 
The major consumers are in North America and Europe.
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Technical Processes of Cacao Production
Cacao (Theobroma cacao) in the wild is a small tree in the lowest 
story of a rainforest, about six to eight meters high. Optimum condi­
tions for its production require temperatures of 21-32 degrees Cel­
sius; over 1250 millimeters rainfall with no month under 125 millime­
ters; altitude under 300 meters; well-drained and aerated, deep soils 
with a crumb structure (135, p.575). Established cacao is not hurt by 
flooding for several weeks (166, pp.34-35).
Properly raised and pruned, cacao develops a main stem one to two 
meters high, at which point it divides into a "fan" or "jorquette" of 
three to five horizontal limbs. A sucker (or "chupon") immediately 
below the jorquette on the main stem leads up to a new jorquette.
Buds on the stem and leaves are called "cushions", where the flowers 
arise. After the flower forms, a "cherelle" (or small pod) emerges:
only five per cent of these are pollinated (158, p.6). The cherelles
attain full size four to five months after fertilization and ripen in 
a month.
Each contains 20 to 60 seeds (135, p.578). Harvest can take place 
over two to three weeks, and once harvested, the pods keep for up to a 
week (135, p.589). In general, the farmer harvests each tree every 
fifteen days during peak production season and once a month at other 
times.
There are three main types of cacao: the criollo, the forastero, 
and their cross. The first produces the highest quality bean, but 
takes six years to come into production, is susceptible to disease and 
produces only a quarter kilo of dry beans per tree. The forastero is 
more resistant, very productive and begins producing in the third 
year. The clonal hybrid and "Ceylan" (or "grafted") crosses are very 
tall and somewhat more productive, on average, than the forastero.
The color of the criollo bean is white; the forastero deep purple, 
their cross, a range between the two. The criollo has a higher 
fat content, pronounced chocolate flavor after fermentation and is 
very aromatic. These characteristics are minimal in the forastero and 
limited in the crosses (14, Chart 9). Mexico began substituting its 
traditional criollo plantations with forastero and Ceylan varieties in 
the 1940's.
Shade control is important in cacao management. Seedlings must 
be grown under shade, both lateral and overhead. After the second 
year, the lateral shade can be removed and only the main shade trees 
kept. The desirable level of shade in adult trees is determined by 
the fertility of the soil. There is an inverse relation between them 
such that extremely well-fertilized soils need little shade and vice 
versa.
Pruning is done at the end of the dry season (15, pp.176, 178­
179). In Mexico the various prunings are differentiated into the 
"desmadre" (cutting of the "mother" trunk to leave a stronger princi­
pal branch); the "desmamone" (cutting of young shoots); "deschupone"
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(cutting off the suckers); and the "poda" (the first formation cut­
ting).
The process of fermentation removes mucilage from around the 
beans, diffuses the purple pigment of raw beans, and removes astrin- 
gency. Subsequent drying should decrease moisture content from 56 to 
six per cent for storage. About 750-1000 cured beans make a kilo (135, 
p.589).
Cacao plants remain productive for decades, but reach maximum 
productivity around twenty years of age, and decrease production after 
forty. Other factors leading to declining productivity are a poor 
canopy, weeds, loss of leaves through disease, poor or too dense 
shade, and parasites (15, p.215). In Tabasco, the principal diseases 
and pests of cacao are: black rot (Phytophthera palmivora). Ceratosto- 
melia, thrips (Selenothrips rubrocinctus), aphids and ants. There is 
some additional threat now of the fungal disease "frosty pod rot" 
(Moniliaphthora roreri) which has spread from South to Central Ameri­
ca. Insecticides are used to control thrips, and Bordeaux and other 
copper-based solutions are used to combat fungal infections.
Plantations are renovated by one of three methods: regeneration, 
rehabilitation and complete replanting. The first method requires 
planting seedlings under existing trees and removing the latter by 
stages. The second interplants young trees by sections, every year, 
then requires pruning existing trees to decrease their yield gradually 
in favor of the saplings. In complete replanting, old trees are cut 
down and a new plantation begun from scratch; the new stand is more 
productive, but the cost is high (46, p.161).
In Tabasco, the average area in cacao is 2.7 hectares. The situ­
ation is similar in most producing countries. Of the six leading 
cacao producers, in Cameroon, the average is 1.2-2.0 hectares; in 
Ghana, two hectares; in Nigeria 1.4 hectares. Only in Brazil have 
large-scale plantations in this century been successful: over 80 per
cent of land planted to cacao is in holdings of over thirty hectares 
(181, pp. 9-31).
Labor Use in Cacao Production
Chart 6 illustrates the recommended calendar of cacao production 
activities for Tabasco. The labor input is considerable; even more so 
in frontier areas where new plantations must be cleared. November, 
December and January are the prime months of the "Cosecha" ("Har­
vest"). A second peak occurs in May (the "Alegron”). Year-to-year 
variability in both major harvest and minor harvests is extreme, as 
shown in Chart 7. During the peak month of cacao harvest, production 
varied from under 4 1/2 million kilos (1977-78) to 8 1/2 million kilos 
(1978-79).
Labor use is a function of intensity of input applications, 
weeding and pruning care, requirements for drainage systems, and 
particularly harvested value of the beans, which determines time spent
CHART 6 . RECOMMENDED CALENDAR OF CACAO PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES*
OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT
Spray for .
"black rot"--------
Spray
with
copper
Fertilize
soil
Spray
Maintain 
drains------
Insect-
for
Spray for 
"black rot"
sulfate insect­
icide for , 
"thrips" - 7
"pulgon,"
"salivazo II c/
Prune----
Disinfect 
pruning 
cuts----
Pesticide
for
lizard
Fertilize Resow-
soil
Remove Remove
old excess
trees new
shoots
New New
plantations----------  plantations----
Harvest
*SARH and Union Nacional de Productores de Cacao, "Calendario para el Combate de Plagas y Enfer- 
medades de las Plantaciones de Cacao y Labores Culturales," Villahermosa, Tabasco, September 1979. 
a/'^.Phvtophthora palmivora Butl.
— ySelenothrips rubrocinctus Giard.
—  Aphis, gossypii Glover; Stephanoderes guatemalensis Hopkins; Xyleborus affinis Eich.
CHART 7. CACAO PRODUCTION CYCLES IN MEXICO, 1971-1979*
* Mexico, Union Nacional de Productores de Cacao, Boletin Informativo #4, June 1979 and 
Boletin Informativo #1, 1981,"Produccion Mensual de Cacao por Ciclos Agricolas."
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on harvesting and the financial incentive to apply inputs on the 
plantation. Post-harvest processing such as pod-breaking, bean-wash­
ing and drying or fermentation account for a large part of all labor 
costs. Reported labor use in Africa, the West Indies and Mexico 
ranges from 27 to 130 man-days per hectare per year, with wide yearly 
differences due to establishment procedures and yearly harvest 
increases in the development phase (11, 14, 15, 41, 104, 128, 166).
There is wide variation in the distribution of labor between 
cacao activities. This is largely because labor can nearly always be 
substituted for any capital needs of cacao production. Most common 
purchases are seed, fertilizer, and pest and disease control chemicals. 
Nearly all of these have labor substitutes (home nurseries and 
bean collection, hand-picking insects). There are few tools required 
that cannot be hand-made from low or no-cost materials. Land is, of 
course, a critical production input. However, there are almost no 
true economies of scale to large plantation size, because of the 
inappropriateness of mechanization and in Tabasco, the long history 
of a central marketing organization. As Kolawole says for Nigeria, 
"Yield and not size is the principal source of cost economies” (46, 
p.238).
Yields in Tabasco averaged 538.5 kilograms per hectare in the 
1970's, with official yields (1967-1978) ranging between 458 and 841 
kilos per hectare (118, 97). Between 1930 and 1971, yields varied from 
162 to 439 kilos per hectare; .294 to .798 kilos per tree. The lowest 
level was in 1930-34; the highest 1962-63 (133, p.90). This compares 
favorably with international figures: in Venezuela and Cameroon,
average yields were only 270 kilos per hectare; in Nigeria 250-300; 
Ghana 330. As of the mid-1970's, the best new hybrids were producing 
about 875 kilos per hectare (135).
The Structure of the Tabascan Cacao Economy in the 1970's
Until this century, cacao production took place primarily on 
individual campesino smallholdings, or on larger plantations using 
hired or encomendado labor. Marketing was by private commercial inter­
mediaries, often foreign.
The state had 3.5-5.0 million trees in 1854, of which 79 per cent 
were in the Sierra, mainly Teapa. In 1890, the number was down to 
three million trees, and the Sierra had 39 per cent. By 1950, the 
state again had five million trees, 74 per cent of which were in the 
Chontalpa.
Cacao production in the early 20th century amounted to under 1000 
tons per year, on under 3000 harvested hectares. There were probably 
no more than 1500 producers. Fifty years later there would be about
13,000 producers on 42,000 hectares, marketing over 30,000 tons per 
year.
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Cacao Zones of Tabasco
Map 9 shows the cacao-growing areas of Tabasco. For historical, 
technical and social reasons, the state can be divided into five cacao 
regions: Huimanguillo, the Chontalpa Plan (parts of Huimanguillo and 
Cardenas), the Sierra, the Old (eastern) Chontalpa (along the Cundua- 
can road); and Rio Seco (along the Cardenas-Paraiso road).
Rio Seco is by far the most important zone now - with half the 
producers and cultivated area. Its soils are the most fertile and 
best drained; land is not as sub-divided as in the eastern Chontalpa 
(with the exception of Paraiso). The "old" (eastern) Chontalpa is more 
subject to flooding problems and in general is less prosperous. In 
the Chontalpa Plan, cacao production is divided between collective and 
private plots. In the former, plantations are operated on a large 
scale on land newly drained in the late 1960's and 1970's.
Huimanguillo production is on lower quality soils, and tends to 
be on larger plots of land owned by recent colonists. Sierra growing 
conditions suffer from higher rainfall, lower temperatures and poorer 
soils. Table 1 provides details about the regional variation in PEMEX 
activity, cacao labor scarcity and wages, economic conditions in 
general and specifically for cacao, and farmer migration patterns.
The history of the cacao regions, particularly the changes 
brought about by new river routings and farmer migration, were 
discussed in the last chapter. They explain the present distribution 
of farmers and farm size: the New Chontalpa and older non-flooded
zones of the Old Chontalpa are heavily populated and dominated by tiny 
cacao farms, the minifundia. Areas opened up relatively recently in 
the Chontalpa are less populated and minifundization is less advanced. 
In Huimanguillo and Teapa, properties tend to be larger because ejidal 
settlements are relatively new.
A Cacao Farmer Typology
Throughout the centuries of cacao production in Tabasco, the 
predominant farm type was that of a diversified subsistence, family- 
oriented farm household. The amount of land planted to cacao was 
dependent on the availability of family labor - probably averaging 
four to six hectares. This general pattern was broken by those 
farmers who were first opening up new lands to cacao production, who 
generally had temporarily smaller plots, and by an occasional large- 
holder specializing in export, with some control over a labor force. 
With the takeover by Spaniards of indigenous farms in the 1600's and 
later the commercial farms in the early 20th century, very large 
holdings developed throughout much of the state dependent on 
encomendado or debt-peonage labor.
The structure of the cacao economy, however, is now considerably 
different - the result of population growth and the closing of the 
agricultural frontier. The temporary phase of growing crops for 
subsistence while awaiting the cacao plantation's coming into production
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MAP 9. CACAO-GROWING ZONES OF TABASCO*
*SARH, Representacion Estatal, "Tabasco," Plan Indicativo Agricola 1978-
1982, Villahermosa, Tabasco, December 1977.
a/Cacao Area Planted, by Municipio: (hectares)
Cardenas 6,032 Jalpa 4,435
Centro 72 Paraiso 4,931
Comalcalco 16,258 Teapa 1,148
Cunduacan 6,556 Tacotalpa 101
Huimanguillo 2,368 TOTAL 41,900
— ^Cacao Zones, Area Planted, and Number of Producers:
Sierra 1250 hectares 500 producers
Huimanguillo 2300 500
Plan Chontalpa 1000 2,000
Eastern Chontalpa 13,250 2,500
Rio Seco 18,000 7,500
Coast 5,000 2,000
TOTAL 41,000 15,000
NOTE: Area planted estimated from 1978 Cacao Census and from sales
data of the Union Nacional de Productores de Cacao. Producer numbers
estimated from 1978 Cacao Census, UNPC estimates and the Promotora
Chontalpa. The latter are very rough approximations.
TABLE 1. THE TABASCO CACAO ECONOMY - REGIONAL DIFFERENCES
REGION PEMEX ACTIVITY CACAO LABOR SCARCITY C ACAO  L A B O R  WAGE
EASTERN
CHONTALPA
Most PEMEX activity: 500 workers 
in union (half transitorlos; hal 
permanent); In 1980 - 500 worker: 
in PEMEX-related construction 
CTW membership (not all POiEX) - 
1978 - 5000; 1980 - 2500 
PEMEX work mainly in dry season
Significant labor scarcity; 
Accelerated substitution of herblcidei 
for machete weeding 
Most farmers who worked off-farm in 
1960's no longer do so because farm 
Incomes have Improved 
Others switched to off-farm construct
Highest wages here - minimum of 
$120 per day for 6-7 hours day; 
Wage on ejidos reported higher 
than on private farms because 
cacao Income Is more essential
on
RIO SECO Minimal petroleum activity 
Minimal direct Impact of PEMEX 
on population
Most farmers with under 1000 trees 
work off-farm part-time, but mostly 
In agriculture
Labor scarcity complaints only near 
Comalcalco petroleum zone from small' 
holders; everywhere by largeholders
$20 per jornal leas than in 
eastern Chontalpa
CUONTALPA
EJ1DOS By 1980, several veils drilled within ejldal cone; many more 
are planned
outside workers
Labor requirements in agriculture 
doubled over two-three years;
Now minimum labor requirements in 
cacao on many ejldos; nevertheless, 
dependent on outside workers
"Libres" paid $75 per Jornal, 
plus housing, social security 
and other benefits
TEAPA Several wells drilled in area; 
more planned.
Teapa is important source of 
labor for petroleum-related 
construction
Large number of men aged 16-36 parti­
cipate in off-farm employment; severi 
scarcity for largeholders 
Significant new labor demand on ejida! 
cacao farms due to improvements and 
higher prices
Similar or lower wages than In 
Hulmangulllo
Largeholders unwilling to pay 
competitive wages to attract workers
COAST
Major disruptions from pipeline 
construction and development of' 
petroleum port
Most severe labor shortages in state
HUIHAN-
GUILLO Considerable drilling activities. Rare complaints about pollution 
High employment of local popu­
lation in nearby Cactus, Chiapas
Farmers still tend cacao, but jorna- 
leros have gone to PEMEX and caused 
shortage for largeholders;
Large number of subsistence maize 
producers now work off-farm
$70 - 100 for a 7-8 hour day
E A S T E R N
CHONTALPA
Widely reported among farm famllie 
usually temporary
In northern Cunduacan, most worker 
from farms with under 1000 trees 
migrate temporarily for part-time 
work
i, Many complaints about pollution;
Anger over indemnification procedure 
i and payments
Much planting of new cacao
Inflation most acute here 
: Land values have risen wildly
RIO SECO Smallholders do not seek work far 
away
More lntenalflcatlon of production, 
rather than new planting 
Most fertile area for cacao In Tabasi 
Long-active cacao associations 
Small and medium-sized producers 
claim cash is greater constraint
Most prosperous cacao region
:o
CHONTALPA
EJIDOS Little emigration of ejldatarlos or libres for PEMEX work 
Sons of ejldatarlos and some llbrei 
have worked for the constructors 
one estimate was 1000 per year
than labor
Highest profits for ejldatarlos come 
from cacao; thus general desire to 
Increase production 
Half of ejldatarlos with rights are 
said to be planting cacao on private
General expansion of ejldal 
economic activity
TEAPA Much dally and weekly travel to 
PEMEX construction sites through­
out state
plots
Most largeholders have switched from 
cacao to livestock; production is 
dominated by ejidos 
Lower yields due to poorer natural 
conditions
Non-agricultural economic activity 
up; improved roads, etc. 
Subsistence farmers have aban­
doned plots in large numbers
COAST Much temporary migration locally Much more inter-planting of cacao wi 
coconut
Problem with older plantations 
Big effort to organize producers for 
credit and processing activities
h Huge Increase In population and 
economic activity 
Much agricultural land has been 
cleared for construction pro­
jects
HLIMAN-
GUILLO
High temporary migration for PEMEX 
and constructors
Cacao workers coming in to substi­
tute for migrants, from northern 
Chiapas, southern Veracruz
Most new land developed is going 
into livestock production
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occurs infrequently. There is now little available land for settle­
ment by the children of cacao farmers, which has led to accelerated 
minifundization. Meanwhile, many largeholders have moved Out of 
cacao into livestock production, and the average size of the cacao 
largeholding is much reduced. Furthermore, hired labor for cacao is 
now extremely common due to growing numbers of landless workers and 
minifundistas, hence changing the nature even of family-based farms.
The structure that has arisen is basically composed of five 
groups:
Minifundia have under two hectares of cacao (1000 trees) - the 
amount a single person with occasional family help can manage. This 
group accounts for about half the producers and in 1978, 30 per cent of 
the cacao produced in the state. Off-farm employment is extremely 
important for this group.
Family farm producers with two to six hectares of cacao (1000­
3000 trees) are generally able to cover labor demands with family 
workers. Labor is hired only during especially busy harvest periods, 
at times when some family members work off-farm and must be replaced, 
in a crisis, or when the family is at a life-cycle stage with few 
working members. Over a quarter of Tabascan cacaoteros are family- 
based; they produced about a third of the state's cacao in 1978.
Those with over six hectares of cacao depend upon hired labor. 
These hired labor based producers have a wide range of economic alter­
natives to cacao production because of their greater resource base. 
About ten per cent of Tabascan cacao farmers are dependent on hired 
labor, but in 1978, they accounted for nearly 30 per cent of produc­
tion.
A fourth type of producer belongs to collective ejidos and may 
work in both collective plantations and cacao on personal plots. The 
collective uses separate criteria to hire ejidatarios with and without 
land rights, and the landless; in general, the collective has many 
alternatives to cacao production. The personal plot often operates 
along the same lines as minifundia production,!/ In fact, the vast 
majority of collective production comes from the collective plots.
This group numbers approximately fifteen per cent of total producer 
numbers as individuals, but as some are only marginally involved in 
cacao, this overestimates their importance. Collective cacao accounts 
for nearly ten per cent of the state total.
The fifth group in the cacao economy structure is composed of 
landless laborers who reside in cacao-growing communities and work as 
jornaleros throughout the year on family farms and hired-labor-based 
plots. They probably number about 4000-5000. They account for a 
fifth of all workers in cacao. This compares to about 12,000 cacao
—  Collective producers are included among the "minifun- 
distas” in the Cacao Census, because only their private plot pro­
duction was included there.
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Chart 8 shows the relative importance of these types of farmers, 
in terms of numbers, area planted to cacao, and total cacao produc­
tion in 1978. Analysis of the Mexican Censuses suggests that between 
1970 and 1980, the numbers of minifundistas increased, and cacao 
economy information suggests that the proportion of cacao coming 
from largeholders decreased through the decade. Minifundia predominate 
in densely populated Comalcalco, Jalpa and Paraiso and are largely (85 
per cent) propletarios.
There are relatively more largeholders in Cunduacan. There, the 
third of producers with under two hectares produce only a fifth of 
municipal cacao; in Comalcalco, nearly two thirds of cacao producers 
are minifundistas, who produce nearly 43 per cent of municipal cacao. 
Roughly a third of family farms and hired-labor-based farms are 
ejldal.
Although thirty per cent of farmers plant cacao alone, the rest 
plant maize, bananas, coconut or sugar cane, or have cattle, as well. 
It is likely that any appropriate land on the smaller farms was 
planted to capacity with cacao during the period of high cacao prices. 
Minifundistas are more likely to produce cacao alone, or combined with 
maize than are family farmers or hired-labor-based producers.
farmers (52 per cent of all workers) and another 6000-7000 farm family
members who work in cacao.
The Cacao Boom of the 1970's
Throughout this period of structural change (since the 1940's), 
area in cacao and production continued to increase steadily, mainly 
through incorporation of new lands due to new settlement and improved 
communications. Charts 9-11 illustrate these trends.
But during the 1970's, cacao expansion took on a different 
character. Table 2 illustrates the contrast between numbers of 
producers, area in production, total production, price and extent of 
fermentation in 1970 and 1980. Total production in 1980 was 14 
per cent greater than in 1970 (a fairly good year), 45 per cent greater 
than 1968.
Responsibility for this unusual growth in production and produc­
tivity was three-fold: excellent prices, producer association marketing 
ventures, and the federal/state government-sponsored Cacao Plan.
A Price Revolution
Charts 12 and 13 illustrate cacao price changes in the past 
decades on the international and national markets. Apart from the two 
"lows'' in world prices in 1960-61 and 1964-65 - the latter offset for 
Tabascan producers somewhat by government guarantees - prices trended 
upward for producers, though not greatly in real terms.
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CHART 8. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF TABASCO CACAO FARM TYPES
1978-80
100 r
80
60  -
cQ)<J\—Q>0.
40 -
Collective Farms
Hired Labor 
Based Farms
Family Farms
M in ifu n d ia
Number
of
Producers 9 J *
Area
Cacao ty
Cacao
Production 9 J
*Estimated from data in SARH, Censo de Cacao de Tabasco, 1978: 
COPRODET and CONAPO, Encuesta Sociodemografica del Estado de Tabasco, 
Villahermosa, Tabasco, 1980; SARH, Promotora de la Chontalpa, "Cacao," 
1980.
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CHART 9. CACAO AREA HARVESTED IN MEXICO, 1925-1980*
95 r
85
75
Total area in Mexico 
Total area in Tabasco
Secretarla de Agrlcultura y Recursos Hidraulicos, Direction General de Economia 
jricola, Econotecnia Agricola. September 1977, "Cacao."
CHART 10. CACAO PRODUCTION IN MEXICO, 1925-1980
a/- Data for 1976-1980 was taken from the Union Nacional de Productores de Cacao, 
Bolet in Informativo for respective years.
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TABLE 2. CHANGES IN THE TABASCO CACAO ECONOMY, 1970-80
1970 1980 Percent Change
Producers 11,800^ 13,000^ +10.2
Area in Production (hectares) 38,000^ 42,000^ +10.5
Total Production (tons/hectare) 19,500^-24,900^ 28,465^ +14.3-46.0
Average Cacao Price (beans, 
international market, New 
York; US$ per pound) .30^ 1.50s/ +400
Average Cacao Price (beans, 
national market; M$ per kilo) 6.50S ' 44.00-71.00^ 
(53.00-73.00 to 
international market)
+577-992
+715-1023
Percent Beans Fermented &! 51.4^ +757
a./ Emilio Bracho Roblin, Ing. Guillermo Vazquez Rodriguez, Ing. Marco Antonio Wing Martinez, 
"Situacion del Cacao en Mexico," Fondo de Garantia y Fomento para la Agricultura, Ganaderia y Avi- 
cultura, Mexico 1972, p. 72.
b/ Comite Promotor de Desarrollo Socioeconomico del Estado de Tabasco, Plan Estatal de Desar- 
rollo (Segunda Version), Plan Sectorial: Agropecuario y Forestal, December 1979, p.
cj Union Nacional de Productores de Cacao, Boletin Informativo, #10, January 1981.
d/ Mexico, Comision Nacional de Cacao (CONADECA), Indicadores- Economicos del Cacao, 1975, p. 12.
e/ Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos, Econotecnla.
fj  Union Nacional de Productores de Cacao, Boletin Informativo, September 1980.
gj International Cocoa Organization, quoted in Union Nacional de Productores de Cacao, Boletin 
Informativo, #4, June 1979.
h/ Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos, Econotecnla, September 1977,
iJ  Union Nacional de Productores de Cacao, Boletin Informativo, #10, January, 1981.
jJ  Mexico, Comision Nacional de Cacao, Indicadores Economicos del Cacao, 1975, pp. 14, 16.
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CHART 11. CACAO YIELDS IN MEXICO, 1925-1980
CHART 12. CACAO PRICES IN MEXICO, 1925-1980
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CHART 13. AVERAGE MONTHLY PRICE OF CACAO, 1970-1980*
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 I960
M o n t h  a n d  Y e a r
*Organizacion Internacional del Cacao, Boletin Trimestral de Estadistica del Cacao, "Precio Promedio 
Mensual, Cacao en Grano," reported in UNPC, Boletin Informativo, June 1979, #4 and January 1981, #10.
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The real increases occurred in the 1970's. During that decade 
the national market price rose from $6.50 to $71 per kilo; the inter­
national price from U.S.$.33 to U.S.$1.44 per pound, with a peak in 
1977 of U.S.$1.97 per pound. The difference between the national and 
international prices is due to the establishment of managed prices 
within the Mexican cacao industry since 1961.
A yearly meeting of the National Cacao Commission with represen­
tatives of the Union of Cacao Producers, industrial users of cacao and 
the Secretary of Commerce sets the internal price of cacao and the 
portion of supplies to be reserved for national industry. Because of 
the collective political strength of the cacao producers, these 
meetings have since 1974 honored the cacaoteros' requests for prices 
commensurate with their costs of production, high by international 
standards. Industry is forbidden to Import foreign cacao.
The devaluations of the mid-1970's were a great boon to the cacao 
export market, as the internal price in U.S. dollars was worth nearly 
double the former quantity of pesos. Producers chafed at the large 
part of the cacao supply promised to national consumers at a price 
well below the International price. Since 1979, however, farmers have 
received well over the plummettlng world price from their industry 
consumers, and most production was sold nationally.
Price Increases for cacao during the 1970's were so dramatic as 
to make fundamental changes in the standards of living of cacao 
farmers. Their material culture now Includes "modern" appliances, 
entertainment, et al. Children have been taken out of the regular work 
force to go to school and have achieved educational attainments and 
job opportunities unthinkable for their older brothers and sisters.
Cacao Producer Organization
The first cacao producers' organization was set up in the 1930's, 
a part of Governor Garrido's farmer mobilization, primarily 
functioning as a credit union.
Early attempts to improve cacao quality and processing, and 
control planting in anticipation of a world glut (recommended by the 
"Trinidad Commission") were ignored in the face of Rio Seco pioneer 
settlement and extensive planting of low-quality, high-producing 
varieties. The producer organization broke up in 1953 when cacao 
prices and production levels Increased, and the need for joint action 
seemed less urgent.
Achievements of the 1960's. But the anticipated glut indeed began in
1960. The government of Mexico, in response, set a support price for 
the first time - of $8.60 per kilo for the internal market, and set up 
Import barriers to protect national production (14, p.20). In December
1961, with Governor Madrazo's encouragement, a producer's union with 
more far-reaching powers was devised to relieve the chaotic results of
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The National Union of Cacao Producers (UNPC) began to operate in 
1963 with 20 local Tabasco associations and 17 from Chiapas; an indivi­
dual joins a particular association because of geographic proximity, 
credit availability, and trust in the leadership, but he may deliver 
cacao to any association.
Funding from UNPC associates was used to build the Industrializa- 
dora de Cacao de Tabasco, S.A. (INCATABSA), the first modern Tabascan 
chocolate factory, in 1960-64, with a capacity of 10,000 tons of dry 
cacao per year (3, pp.68-71). Prior to this time there were only 
three much smaller chocolate processors in the state (14, p.59).
In 1962, Kennedy's Alliance for Progress program funded FIRA in 
Mexico to, among other programs, increase credit for cacao production. 
The government of Mexico and UNPC began a new program of research and 
extension in 1964 to boost cacao productivity. Grafts and "clonal" 
cacao were popularized; new shade trees recommended; a program was set 
up to encourage use of chemical pesticides. Fertilization was intro­
duced, but was as yet uneconomical and unaccepted (3, pp.23-25).
In 1968, FIRA-backed private bank loans were made for the Rio 
Seco Association to build the state's first large processing plant for 
post-harvest fermentation, to improve bean quality (14, p.94).
Between 1964 and 1969, total cacao exports - mainly to the United 
States - rose seven-fold, though nearly all Mexican cacao was primi­
tively processed (only washed and sun-dried).
the 1960 price tumble; and to take advantage of future international
export potential.
The 1970's: Market Diversification and Vertical Integration. In its
first decade UNPC marketed cacao mainly through private financiers. 
But as a result of the drop in prices in 1968-69, the newly indepen­
dent Union found itself near bankruptcy and unable even to pay the 
advance to farmers upon delivery. UNPC was given direct control over 
$80 million pesos worth of cacao held by comisionistas, and marketing 
credit worth $95 million was arranged with the Banco Agropecuario del 
Sureste, S.A.(174, pp.9-12).
Thereafter, UNPC directly marketed cacao and INCATABSA-produced 
cacao sub-products to industrial and international consumers. When 
cacao is brought to the association (or fermenting plant), it is 
weighed and the farmer is immediately paid an "anticipo" somewhere 
near the guaranteed price with borrowed funds. The "remanente" is paid 
after the cacao is sold, often months later. It is the remainder left 
over after the anticipo, marketing costs, and Union administration 
expenses are deducted from the sales price. The remanente is basically 
dependent upon the level of export sales. Chart 14 shows the levels of 
anticipo and remanente between 1973 and 1980.
As a result of aggressive marketing, Mexico exported to 18 coun­
tries by 1977. At the end of 1979, Mexico was the seventh most important
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CHART 14. SALES PRICE ON THE NATIONAL MARKET AND "ANTIC1PO LIBRE" TO 
PRODUCERS FOR WASHED CACAO, 1973-1980*
*Mexico, Union Nacional de Productores de Cacao, Boletin Informative #1, November 
1978, p.3 ; December 1980; and CONADECA, "Indicadores Economicos", 1977, pp.14-15. 
a/—  See text for definitions of "anticipo libre" and remanente."
i
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cacao producer in the world (118, #6). By 1980, the market 
distribution of Tabascan cacao had evolved as follows: 57.1 per cent
sold to the national market; .8 per cent export of beans; 29.7 per 
cent sent to INCATABSA for cocoa butter exports and cocoa powder sales 
to the national market.
CONADECA and UNPC hope eventually to limit exports entirely to 
processed cacao products, rather than beans, and to ferment all beans 
sold internally. This policy seems wise: within a few years, new
plantings in Brazil and Ivory Coast will come into production and it 
appears that this may coincide with a prolonged period of weak demand 
due to depressed world economic conditions.
Between 1975 and 1977, eight fermenting centers were built and 
others begun. By January 1981, fermentation capacity had been expanded 
to 30,000 tons of dry cacao beans: almost enough to meet farmer 
demand at peak harvest periods. In 1975, only 20 per cent of cacao was 
fermented; in 1980, 51 per cent (118, 1/81).
In 1978 a cacao drying facility with capacity for 27,850 tons 
was built. By 1981 INCATABSA had expanded from 6,500 to 12,500 tons 
capacity, and was operating at 72 per cent capacity. New distribution, 
storage and transport facilities and new headquarters in Mexico City 
were built. Construction of a new plant to process cacao sub-products 
is proposed. The UNPC also joined national industries in a program to 
encourage domestic chocolate consumption.
Federal and State Support for the Cacao Plan
The state and federal governments supported the cacao producers 
of Tabasco in several ways: tax relief, construction of needed infra­
structure, support in international marketing, support in struggles 
with PEMEX, and cooperation with the UNPC for a major technical 
assistance program, the Cacao Plan.
In November 1980, as part of SAM, state and municipal taxes on 
agricultural production were lifted. Also in 1980, the national 
government returned all indirect and general export taxes paid for 
cacao exports. Mexico was a party to the Third International Cocoa 
Agreement, and lobbied unsuccessfully for its acceptance by inter­
national consumers.
The Tabasco State Plan program and federal investments in the 
state have yielded a number of new infrastructure projects useful to 
the cacao economy. Roads were built, improving both farm-to-market 
transport and national marketing. Electrification and education 
investments (particularly primary school and agronomy studies) assisted 
cacao farm families. The Cacao Plan gave concrete form to the politi­
cal backing given by the federal and state governments to the cacao- 
teros. It demonstrated serious support for agriculture at the very time 
when petroleum development was most threatening to the agricultural 
sector.
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The present Cacao Plan Is part of a nation-wide program inspired 
much earlier in the decade to plant cacao throughout southern Mexico, 
increasing total area by 50-100 per cent (Personal communication, 
Turner Price, September 1982). Hence the program was not a response to 
the "boom," rather part of earlier agricultural development policies.
The Tabasco program has four parts: establishment of new planta­
tions, rehabilitation of older plantations, technical assistance to 
improve yields and farmer incomes, and research. The goals are:
1) to increase yields per hectare from .641 tons (average 1974­
1980) to 1.3 tons by 1982 on rehabilitated plantations;
2) to rehabilitate 34,900 hectares during 1979-82 (i.e. , three 
quarters of all Tabascan cacao);
3) to establish 2000 hectares per year of new plantations -
10,000 hectares in all by 1982;
4) to achieve production of 49,800 tons in 1982 (Plan, 
p. 17). y
To achieve these goals, it was estimated that 81 per cent of 
costs would be borne by producers; the rest by SARH.
Eighteen nurseries were set up throughout the state providing 
stock free of charge; by 1981,1850 producers had received cacao and 
shade plants. Between 1977 and 1980, 6000 hectares of cacao had been 
planted and 15,000 hectares had been rehabilitated.
The technical assistance program was set up under the Rainfed 
Agriculture District of SARH. In 1979 seven agronomists and 
fifty agricultural technicians were working with the cacao farmers 
specifically - seven-fold more than before the Plan. Still, 
the average area covered by an assistant was 500-600 hectares.
As of January 1981, some type of extension contact had been made 
with 10,800 cacaoteros on 30,239 hectares. In addition to the pro­
grammed four to five yearly visits to each farmer involved, a weekly 
radio program was aired by the head of the Plan, which was listened to 
enthusiastically by every cacaotero surveyed. Research plots were 
planted in farmers' fields, and on experiment stations; few major 
findings had yet been reported.
2/—  Planners estimate that without the Plan, production 
in 1985 would reach only 32,558 tons, worth $1771.2 m; with the 
Plan, they hope for 57,100 tons worth $3106.2 m: or a total 
increase of 75 per cent in production, value and farmer incomes. 
Without the Plan, production would reach a plateau of 33,358 tons 
in 1982; with the Plan, 63,700 tons in 1990 (104, pp.63,67).
Over a ten-year period (1979-1988), total returns would be fifty- 
six per cent higher with the Plan. The program would cost an extra 
$4268 m, but would increase the value of production by $9601.3 m, 
not including multiplier effects to local economies.
Table 3 compares the technical characteristics of Tabascan cacao 
farms in 1978 with the technical recommendations of the SARH. The 
chief problems appear to be insufficient weeding, fertilization and 
pruning; a poor age distribution of cacao trees; and poorer than 
average condition for cacao and shade trees.
Table 4 compares the costs of production of cacao cultivation 
with and without rehabilitation. These budgets do not include costs 
for interest on loans, depreciation for farm equipment or buildings, 
cacao transport or on-farm processing. Opportunity costs for 
farmers' labor are assumed to be the same as an agricultural worker's 
wage. Land is grossly undervalued at $4000 per hectare. With 
"technification," labor use rises 71 per cent, current costs by 75 per 
cent, yet the difference in profits (even by these optimistic budgets) 
is only 5.4 per cent from a 30 per cent estimated yield increase.
Given these statistics, it is rather remarkable that large 
numbers of farmers have indeed adopted parts of the package. In fact, 
what has happened is that the family farm group has been the principal 
adopter of the new technologies, and they have done so under a far 
different real budget structure. The hired-labor-based producers, for 
whom this type of budget is more or less applicable, have not adopted 
the technologies, due to the poor profit possibilities shown above; 
collectives have had a similar problem. Minifundistas are generally 
unable to meet the cash requirements of the new program at all.
Impact of the Petroleum Boom on the Cacao Sector
The economic disruptions from PEMEX activities by no means 
bypassed the cacao farmers. Certain changes affected all farmers 
negatively: inflation and pollution damage. Other major impacts,
however - labor scarcity, production changes and political unrest - 
varied significantly in their impact according to family type.
Before the petroleum boom, the prices of basic food and goods, as 
well as farm inputs in the cacao regions tended to fluctuate with the 
cacao price. After 1976, this was no longer so.
Cacao farms suffered ecological damage from the drainage waters 
of oil drilling, and cutoffs of drainage canals by PEMEX pipeline and 
road-building. Industrial smoke and fumes seemed to affect flowering 
and wear out fencing materials. A number of cacao farms were expro­
priated for PEMEX projects, and farmers worry that more land could be 
permanently lost should there be a major oil spill from a pipeline or 
the Dos Bocas port.
Labor Scarcity and Migration
Labor supply for cacao production has suffered increasing scar­
city as well as increasing price, as a result of increasing general 
wages, increasing cacao prices and worker migration to petroleum zones.
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TABLE 3. CHARACTERISTICS OF TABASCAN CACAO PRODUCTION, 1978
(percent, unless otherwise specified)
C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ---------------- a7------P r e s e n t — R e c o m m e n d e d ^
A v e r a g e  n u m b e r  of t r e e s  p e r  h e c t a r e (number) 5 67.74 5 0 0 - 6 0 0
A v e r a g e  p r o d u c t i o n  p e r  h e c t a r e  ( k i l ograms) 538 . 5 1 0 0 0 - 1 3 0 0
A r e a  w i t h  c r e d i t 6.01 2 0 - 2 5
E j i d a t a r i o  p r o d u c e r s 3 7.3 -
P r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y  p r o d u c e r s 6 2.7 -
P r u n e d  tre e s 8 4 . 9 8 1 0 0
P r o d u c e r s  w h o  f e r t i l i z e 4 6 . 4 1 0 0
P r o d u c e r s  w i t h  s p r a y i n g  e q u i p m e n t 6 4 . 0 1 0 0
W h o  use: m a n u a l  s p r a y e r 5 6 . 9
m o t o r i z e d  s p r a y e r 4 2 . 9
U s e  of  i n s e c t i c i d e s : 8 0.8 1 0 0
M e t i l i c o 6 3 . 2 7
L l n d a n o 13.7
B H C 1 2 . 5
P a r a t h i o n 8 . 9
U s e  of f u n g i c i d e s : 8 0 . 8 1 0 0
C o p p e r  s u l f a t e 9 4 . 0 1 0 0
T r i b a s i c  s u l f a t e 2.7
C u p r a v i t 1.9
L o c i d e 1.1
C o n d i t i o n  o f  s h a d e  trees:
G o o d 37.4 1 0 0
R e g u l a r 55.7
Bad 6.8
F a r m  n e e d s  d r a i n a g e 2 6 . 6 5
F a r m  h a s  d r a i n a g e  (those that n e e d it) 6 3 . 8 1 0 0
C o n d i t i o n  o f  c a c a o  t rees:
G o o d 4 3 . 1 100
R e g u l a r 5 1 . 2
Bad 5.6
F a r m e r  h a s  c a c a o  n u r s e r i e s 5.8 R o t  n e c e s s a r y ,  s i n c e  U R P C  h a s  
s e t  up n u r s e r i e s
F a r m  a c c e s s  to a l l - w e a t h e r  roads 5 4 . 7 1 0 0
F a r m e r  is l i t e r a t e 8 2 . 3 100
T y p e s  o f  c a c a o  p l a n t e d :
C r i o l l o 6 7 . 4 H i g h e s t  q u a l i t y ,  b u t  l o w  y i e l d s
C a l a b a c l l l a 8 0 . 3
A m e l o n a d o 6 9 . 2
C l o n a l 8 2 . 4
G u a y a q u i l 7 8 . 8
T y p e s  of s h a d e  t r e e s  p l a n t e d :
M o t e  ( E r y t h r i n a ) 76.2 H o p e  to c u t  down, d u e  to pest 
i n f e s t a t i o n
Sam a n 1.7
C o c o i t e 12.1 W a n t  to i n c r e a s e  p l a n t i n g s
C h i p i l c o i t e 1 1 . 1
(continued)
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(Table 3, continued)
A g e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  trees:
0-5 y e a r s 8.6 W a n t  to c o m p l e t e l y  r e p l a c e
6 - 1 0  y e a r s 34 . 9 t r e e s  a f t e r  30 y e a r s ;  h a v e
11-15 y e a r s 2 5 . 3 c o n t i n u o u s  c y c l e  o f  n e w  trees
1 6 - 2 0  y e a r s 30.6 c o m i n g  i n t o  p r o d u c t i o n
2 1 - 2 5  y e a r s .3
2 6 - 3 0  y e a r s .2
31-40 y e a r s .03
50 y e a r s  p l u s .03
Y e a r l y  m o r t a l i t y  o f  t r e e s  in n e w  p l a n t a t i o n s 2-5
W e e d i n g —  :
O n c e  a y e a r 21 . 8 T h r e e  o r  fo u r  t i m e s  a y e a r
T w i c e  a y e a r 49 o r  e n o u g h  to k e e p  c l e a n
T h r e e  t i m e s  a y e a r 19
Fo u r  t i m e s  a y e a r 10
P r u n i n g —  :
2-3 s m a l l  b r a n c h  p r u n i n g s  a y e a r 60 100
O n e  l a r g e  p r u n i n g  a y e a r 51 1 0 0  e v e r y  y e a r  o r  two
a/ SARH, "Censos de Cacao," Villahermosa, Tabasco, 1978.
b/ SARH, "Plan de Incremento de la Produccion de Cacao en el 
Estado de Tabasco," Villahermosa, Tabasco, January 1979.
TABLE 4. COSTS OF PRODUCTION FOR CACAO CULTIVATION IN
TABASCO STATE*
Without Rehabilitation With Rehabilitation
Activities Cost Man-Days Cost Man-Days
(pesos) (pesos)
Weeding 996 12 1,992 24
Pruning 747 9 747 9
Fertilisation 207.50 2.5 830 10
Pest Control 996 12 1,660 20
Disease Control 1,245 15 2,490 30
Drain Maintenance 249 3 498 6
Purchase of Pesticides 1,047 - 2,365 -
Purchase of Fertilizer 1,500 2,366.25 -
Harvest and Pod-Breaking 2,324 28 3,320 40
TOTAL 9,311.50 81.5 16,268.25 139
Yield: 637 kg. /ha. 825 kg./ha.
Cost Difference: $6,956.75
Yield Difference: 188 kg./ha. @ $44/kg. - $8,272
Profit Difference: $18,715.50 vs. 19,731.75 - $1,015.25 *
*SARH, Plan de Incremento de la Produccion de Cacao en el Estado 
de Tabasco, Villahermosa, Tabasco, January 1979, p. 71.
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Before the petroleum boom labor prices rose more or less parallel 
to the cacao bean price, at a rough ratio of one kilo/one jornal (a 
day's work). Because young men have flocked to jobs In petroleum and 
construction, the price of labor has been bid upwards. One cacao 
leader estimated that the cacao/wage ratio had risen to three kilos of 
cacao /one jo m a l .
But the Impact of these changes was quite different for different 
groups. Landless workers benefitted from the labor situation, as did 
minifundistas, many of whom substituted petroleum-related work for 
wage work on largeholder cacao plots. Because of the boom in cacao 
prices, there was actually a decline in off-farm employment (both in 
agriculture and in construction) by workers in family farm households. 
It was principally the hired-labor-based producers who suffered 
serious labor shortages which affected both profitability and cacao 
production. Furthermore, in many places the traditional relations of 
production between cacao producers and landless workers were altered.
The Sociodemographic Survey documented a significant exodus 
from cacao work. Between 1965 and 1979, 20 per cent of the EAP with 
some history of cacao activity (69 per cent of the total EAP surveyed) 
had ceased working in cacao. Five per cent of all who had ever owned 
cacao land and 32 per cent of those who had worked, but never owned 
land, left the sector. (These figures include a small number who 
simply retired, as well as those who changed occupation.)
A fifth of the surveyed population over seven years of age had 
experienced a change of residence at some time in their lives. Of all 
migration, 68 per cent took place between 1970 and 1980. But if we 
break up this figure into the periods before (1970-75) and after 
(1976-80) the boom, significantly more moved in the earlier period 
before cacao prices rose. Migration of men over forty particularly 
declined in the latter part of the decade.
Cacao Production
These changes in the distribution of the most important input in 
cacao production - labor - have markedly affected production possibili­
ties for the different farmer types. They certainly suggest that goals 
of the Cacao Plan for raising labor inputs in production by over 70 
per cent in order to adopt more productive technology are ill-conceived. 
This is particularly so given the modest increase in yield and profit 
expectations which demand significant increases in cash inputs. 
Basically, only those farmers who can minimize cash costs - by utilizing 
family labor in place of hired labor and in substitution for cash inputs 
such as pesticides - will find it economically rational to adopt the 
program.
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Ihu8, cacao production from family-based farms did increase, as 
family members' employment off-farm decreased because of better 
returns from on-farm work. Minifundistas maintained fairly stable 
production in most cases, quite limited in their ability to purchase 
cash input8, and frequently switched from jornalero to non-agri­
cultural off-farm employment to meet cost-of-living increases.
Farmers dependent on hired labor reduced production. Their former 
minifundista and landless workers preferred work for PEMEX; and family- 
based farmers preferred to intensify family cacao production. They 
were further induced to reduce their efforts in cacao by the sudden 
availability of numerous Investment alternatives created by the 
petroleum boom.
PEMEX-Cacaotero Conflicts
Direct PEMEX-cacaotero confrontations have taken place over the 
company's practices of expropriation, trespass and ecological destruc­
tion, which were discussed earlier in this chapter. There has been a 
real increase in levels of personal violence, within families, in 
communities, between strangers, as a result of increased tensions, 
frustration, insecurity and the unscrupulous elements of the popula­
tion that tend to appear in turbulent areas barely under civic 
control.
Yet the level of political violence among cacaoteros has not been 
marked. I certainly expected there to be far more, and am still some­
what perplexed. The political system involving Tabascan cacaoteros 
seems to have worked well to control conflict.
The "uprisings" reported were in fact concerted political moves, 
by politicians well in control, to show Strength in the face of PEMEX 
or federal intransigence on some issue. Though violence was at times 
threatened on one side or the other, there were few examples of either 
the government's unleashing the national guard or police with deadly 
weapons, or violent destruction of PEMEX property or threats to per­
sonnel by campesinos. One wonders if the same would have been true 
had petroleum development taken place in central Chiapas or Oaxaca, 
which have a history of campesino repression.
How do the farmers themselves perceive these conflicts? There is 
little ambiguity about the anger of farmers whose lands have been 
damaged, who still await compensation. Many farmers in drilling areas 
are truly concerned about the long-term ecological damage of PEMEX 
activity, and tend to blame pollution for problems on their 
plantations.
But for most - even those with relatives working on PEMEX projects 
- the oil company is very remote and its impacts nebulous: the poorly
understood cause of inflation, the source and object of congested 
highways on the way to Villahermosa. Anger is found mainly among
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But even this anger was relatively controlled - because there 
were effective outlets for it. The UNPC associations were forums 
immediately available for airing and sharing complaints, and the 
leadership did put its grievance system into action. Municipal, ejidal 
and rancheria leadership also supported farmers with the governor and 
others. Decisions to bar PEMEX trucks and other direct actions seem to 
have been well-organized community decisions approved by some coopera­
tive, political or community group when other routes of action were 
ineffective.
The effectiveness of cacaotero political action, like that of the 
rising cacao prices, was essential in protecting the cacao producers 
during the oil boom. But the most important protections were found at 
the level of production organization and strategy, especially for the 
family-based cacao producers. The following chapters explore those 
family responses to the dizzying economic and social changes brought 
about by the oil boom.
populations in the Reforma area and parts of Cunduacan and Paraiso
directly involved in intensive drilling or processing.
CHAPTER 4. ANALYZING CACAO PRODUCER STRATEGIES
To understand the response of Tabascan cacao farmers to the 
petroleum boom requires not only documenting farmer behavior at the 
global level, but explaining that behavior in terms of on-farm 
conditions and farmer incentives. A particular challenge is to 
separate the effects of the "boom” on production from other economic 
trends or the innate characteristics of the particular farmers. Only 
by understanding the phenomena at the farm level can we judge the 
efficacy of development policies or anticipate farmer responses to 
future changes.
This chapter will briefly examine the methodological problems of 
this kind of research, and the actual methodology chosen. It then 
focuses on comparing and contrasting the major farm household types of 
the cacao economy, mainly in terms of aggregated macrostatistics. This 
will serve as an introduction to Chapters 5 through 9, which look at 
these same farm types from a microeconomic perspective and emphasize 
decision-making strategies.
Methodology, Data Collection and Analysis
There were two key methodological problems for the study of the 
Tabascan cacao economy in the oil boom. First, how to determine 
relevant heterogeneity of farmer groups for purposes of analyzing 
"boom" response; second, how to explain state-level statistical trends 
in production, employment and migration. This section summarizes the 
approach that was used to resolve these problems.
Identify Economic Forces in Tabasco
In order to establish what the most important economic trends in 
Tabasco state were in the late 1970's, macro-data were used which had 
been collected by COPRODET and PEMEX showing levels of new investment, 
growth in production, new governmental programs. Past analyses of 
boom economies suggested collecting information about inflation 
rates, wage scale changes, migratory flows, urban population growth, 
product and service bottlenecks, much of which was available from 
COPRODET and other state studies (38, 44, 123, 132, 137, 160, 165).
This data base was supplemented by a large number of open-ended 
interviews with major Tabascan businesses, unions, PEMEX, government 
officials, and agricultural leaders. These provided a sense of which 
groups were losing and gaining from the boom, and what the major 
economic and political issues were in the state. Most of the resulting 
analysis was presented in Chapters 1 and 2.
Identify Major Impacts on the Cacao Economy
Interviews with some twenty key individuals in Tabasco's cacao
community - UNPC officials, leading producers, Cacao Plan tecnicos,
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BANRURAL credit officers, chocolate industry management - established 
that labor market disruptions and changes were the principal effects 
of the oil boom on cacao farming. This was due to the fact that labor 
was the key input in cacao production.
A second stage of field research involved 48 interviews on 
rancherias and ejidos with cacao farmers across the state, and access 
to nine cacao community studies made by the Universidad Autonoma de 
Chapingo at Puyacatengo in 1979 (193). This regional survey focused on 
the heterogeneity of cacao economy conditions - variations in wage 
rates and labor patterns, farm size and technology, politics and 
prosperity, regional cacao history. It laid the basis for Chapter 3.
Hypothesize Cacao Farm Family Sub-Groups
At this point, the study became focused on the interplay between 
the oil and cacao economies at the level of labor flows and employment 
impacts. But standard analyses did not seem appropriate. Marginal 
analysis relating wage rate changes directly to farmer migration and 
agricultural production did not explain the preliminary results of the 
regional survey.
The latter suggested that in some areas larger numbers of cacao 
family members were indeed flocking to petroleum jobs; but in other 
areas just the reverse was happening - farmers who used to work off- 
farm were returning to farm work exclusively. While some farmers were 
producing unprecedented quantities of cacao (state production levels 
were at an all-time high), others had nearly ceased all cacao 
production save maintenance.
The above contradictions were not elucidated by grouping cacao 
farmers according to land tenure, cacao association, or even directly 
by size (Thesis, Appendix B charts). However, when grouped by family 
labor characteristics (hired-labor based, family farm, minifundia, 
collective, landless), the confusion seemed to be resolved. The 
"family economy" approach, which will be explained later in the 
chapter, became central to research.
Establish Appropriateness of Sub-Groups
It was important first to assure that the cacao household sub­
groups did indeed represent groups with substantially different 
behavior. The 1978 Tabasco Cacao Census (CCT) (45) and 1980 Socio­
demographic Survey of Tabasco (SST) Cacao Sub-Sample data (75) were 
utilized for this purpose. The Cacao Census collected data on basic 
farm and farmer characteristics, cacao production and technology use 
on nearly 11,000 cacao farms. The SST Cacao Sub-Sample was a more in­
depth study of family employment and migration for 408 households, of 
which 315 possessed cacao farms.
Tabasco Cacao Census cross-tabulations showed few significant 
differences in variables such as tenure or cacao association, whereas
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among family economy-based sub-groups, a number of variables differed 
markedly. The SST showed even more marked differences in basic demo­
graphic and employment characteristics among the different farmer 
types. These results will be summarized later in the chapter.
Micro-Analysis to Explain Macro-Behavior
Aggregated data do not explain behavior, and particularly cannot 
determine whether movement of particular variables are caused by long­
term trends or short-term phenomena. The disaggregation of different 
cacao household types alone did not explain the farmers' planning 
objectives, nor the income/labor use/cost structure of their farms. 
This required more in-depth field study.
Because cost and labor data are very time-consuming to collect, 
such a sample would have to be small. The methodological problem 
involved here was how to maximize heterogeneity with a small number of 
cases, and yet make the results from those cases relevant to macro­
level considerations.
We resolved the former by interviewing in three small communities 
which had widely different economic conditions: an old cacao-growing 
area in Cunduacan in the heart of the oil producing region; a newer, 
more marginal cacao zone in Teapa away from most oil disruptions and 
in the process of transition to a predominantly ranching economy; a 
collective ejido with substantial cacao production in the Chontalpa.
Because community interactions, history and economic conditions 
affect household decision-making and experience, we spent several 
weeks contacting key informants in these areas for general open-ended 
interviews, as well as collecting local cacao input cost and marketing 
information.
The next step was to choose the household cases. Ejido C-29 
represented the collective producers, who were studied as a single 
economic unit. Two farmers in Cunduacan represented the minifundistas 
(of whom there were very few in Teapa). Six farmers in Teapa and 
Cunduacan represented the family and hired-labor-based cacao house­
holds.
Interview Techniques. Data collection for the collective farm had two 
parts: personal and group interviews, and use of archives. History, 
problems, labor use, ejidal organization, were collected through 
interviewing. The archives contained information on cacao and general 
production costs, payments of wages and profits, use of hired labor, 
ejidal income and investments, and cacao production over time.
For the eight case study households, an elaborate questionnaire 
was devised for application in four visits. The first visit included 
an introduction, and collection of information on family members, farm 
layout, history and assets. The second visit covered farm activities 
and employment by activity, and other employment of family members.
The third visit was for collection of farm cost and family income
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information. The last visit was for checking incongruities and completing 
an open-ended questionnaire on personal plans, historical and projected 
activities and responses to changing cacao production conditions, 
and farmer-community interactions.
With the exception of most cacao production data, which was 
corroborated with receipts from the Cacao Association, and generally 
at the Association offices as well, all information was via recall.
Recall appeared to be quite good for specific detail (how much foliar 
fertilizer was purchased in March), quite poor for summary type 
statistics (total fertilizer purchased in 1979), therefore the 
questionnaire was organized to elicit detail.
These data were then analyzed for cost structure and employment 
patterns, and compared to Cacao Plan budget prototypes. Profit levels 
under different definitions of income and cost were computed. Principal 
constraints to further cacao production, both technological and in 
terms of labor, capital and land assets, were deduced. Questions 
involving these analyses were referred to the farmers a year later, in 
a return visit to Tabasco (during a particularly bad cacao season), at 
which time comparative information on the next year's production and 
employment were collected.
These questionnaires established the economic levels at which 
cacao production is carried out on the different types of farms, and 
the types of expenditures which might be expected.
Document Sub-Group Activities at Macro-Level
The CCT provided overall production information, which showed the 
importance - in 1978 - of each of the cacao household types, but 
unfortunately we have no time series of production for the groups.
Thus there is no hard macro-level documentation of the decline in 
hired-labor-based cacao production, the increase in family farm and 
collective production, the stability of minifundia production.
Historical production data scarcity and unreliability both at the 
farm level and the Cacao Association level precluded such analysis 
during a two-year field study. So, rather than concentrate on 
absolute production levels, this study analyzed the direction and rate 
of change of economic activity - and the reasons behind those changes 
- via the various surveys and case studies.
The SST did provide substantial information on migration and 
employment changes over time for different types of households. 
Differential migration rates for different age groups were established 
for the farmer types, which corresponded well with the collective 
histories (in terms of land settlement, inheritance and farm employ­
ment opportunities during different periods) gathered from interviews.
Employment changes between critical economic periods in the 
state's history - 1965, 1971, 1977, 1978, and 1979 - document the move­
ment of heads of households and of the EAP of cacao families between 
agricultural wage labor, cacao and other farming, and non-agricultural
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activities. Again, these substantiated the overall picture of employ­
ment changes revealed in key informant and case study interviews. 
Together with the farm studies, they form the analytical basis for 
Chapters 5 through 9.
Analyze Global Cacao Production and Employment Response to 
Changing Economic Conditions
The final stage of analysis was to examine the combined effects 
on the state economy of decision-making by farmers of the different 
types studied. Their response patterns were then related to the 
problems of economic development in Tabasco - and other zones undergoing 
similar industrial transitions.
Family Economy Analysis
Farm enterprise studies in the "third world" have generally built 
upon neo-Classical microeconomics, which worked reasonably well 
for that sector of third world farm economies which approximated that 
in the capitalist west - individual or corporate proprietorship on 
relatively large holdings, oriented toward market production, where 
relative returns to capital are the guide for farmer investments.
But the methodology breaks down considerably when dealing with 
subsistence and mixed subsistence/commercial farmers. In the peasant 
household, some goods are produced for use value (the subsistence 
sphere) and others are for market (commercial sphere). Labor time 
and other inputs are not valued the same in the two spheres. Peasants 
respond to relative price changes in the same way as a capitalist when 
they produce for the market; but not in the subsistence sphere where 
meeting minimum subsistence requirements is the guiding rule. 
Subsistence objectives "distort" resource patterns and inputs and 
outputs in the subsistence sphere cannot be priced, since they do not 
enter the market.
With the growing importance of farm management analysis and 
economic prediction for agricultural prices and production in develop­
ment policy, various approaches have been devised to deal with these 
problems. (See Thesis, Chapter 4, for a review of the leading 
methods). Many of these predicate a distinct production logic for 
"peasants."
My approach in this study is eclectic. I assume that families 
have multiple objectives, not necessarily farm profits, and that they 
behave rationally to achieve those objectives. I also assume that the 
conditions and constraints on family resources make a qualitative 
difference in decision-making objectives and strategies.
A number of family characteristics may affect production behavior: 
the demographic stage or "life cycle” of the family, the dependent-to- 
worker ratio, family access to land resources and to community 
and family support. Family members seek to balance the drudgery of
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work against a subjective estimate of the marginal utility of output, 
once a minimum level of production required for subsistence has been 
reached.
This would include not only minimal food and shelter require­
ments, but also maintenance of the family's basic farming resources 
(land, infrastructure, water supplies) and investment in goods, cash 
or labor in the community support system which, for example, provides 
insurance against the individual family's disaster (sickness of head 
of household, e.g.). The minimum acceptable return may be above or 
below the market wage (42).
The family's resources include the labor of its working members, 
its land base, cash income, savings in kind. These can be applied to 
agricultural activity, on-farm non-agricultural activities, off-farm 
agricultural or non-agricultural employment. Where land is scarce and 
capital resources are minimal, as is the case for most Tabascan cacao 
farmers, family labor use becomes the most significant variable input 
in the family's strategy. The ratio of producers to consumers in the 
family determines both the labor resources available and the level of 
production required for family subsistence.
Farm families with different types of resources and at different 
demographic stages will produce, market, hire labor, and hire out as 
workers differently.-'
For this study, the land:labor ratio was the critical factor used 
to group farmers, given that labor is of critical importance in the 
oil boom and in conditions of cacao production. For another study, 
some other basis for distinguishing farmers might be appropriate.
The family economy approach serves equally well for the 
"capitalist" farmers - but many considerations dwindle in importance 
when the farmer has a relative abundance of family resources, hence 
profit orientation may become dominant. Thus there are easily 
distinguishable differences between them and campesinos. The classic 
differences are outlined in Table 5. But that dichotomy is excessively 
simple: the difference between groups of campesinos may be just as
significant, as the contrast between minifundia and family cacao 
farming will document. 2/
In Mexico, the theoretical literature on such a "peasant economy" 
is quite developed. Questions related to agriculture-petroleum inter­
action in Tabasco are directly linked to the chief concerns of the 
Mexican debate:
— ^Pertinent literature includes Berry (1975), Chayanov (1966), 
Greenwood (1978), Greenwood (1973), Hill (1970), Martinez and Rendon 
(1978), Ortiz (1973), Popkin (1979), and the collection Relations of 
Production edited by Copans and Seddon (1978).
2 /—  Martinez and Rendon (1978), writing on Mexico, elaborate 
nearly a dozen types of farmers with distinct production 
characteristics.
TABLE 5. PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PEASANT AND ENTREPRENEURIAL AGRICULTURE*
Peasant Agriculture Entrepreneurial Agriculture
Object of production: Ensure reproduction of family 
and the unit of production
Maximize profit and the accumulation 
of capital
Origin of work force: Fundamentally the family, and 
on occasion, reciprocal inter­
change with other units; excep­
tionally, wage labor in marginal 
quantities
Wage labor
Working bond of farmer with 
farm workers:
Absolute (family ties) Non-existent, except by legal compo­
sition
Technology: High intensity of labor; low 
capital intensity and inputs 
purchased per day of work
Greater density of active capital and 
greater proportion of purchased inputs 
in the value of the final product
Destiny of product and origin 
of inputs:
Partially commercial Commercial
Criteria for intensification 
of work:
Maximum total product, even at 
the cost of declining average 
product; the limit is at zero 
marginal productivity
Marginal productivity equal to wage
Risk and uncertainty: Non-probabilistic avoidance of 
risk; "algorithm of survival"
Probabilistic internalization, seeking 
profits proportional to risk
Character of work force: Marginal or non-transferrable 
valorization of work force
Only employs work force transferrable 
according to qualification
Components of income or net 
product
Indivisible product or family 
income, realized partially in 
kind
Salary, rent and profits exclusively 
monetary
* Adapted from CEPAL, Economia Campesina y Agricultura Empresarial, p. 31.
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- the role of the campesinado In national agricultural production 
strategies;
- the threatened demise of campesino production as a result of 
capitalist competition for resources;
- the effective transfer of resources from the campesino economy 
to the general economy due to poor prices for campesino products, 
high prices for products bought by campesinos from the general economy 
or low wages in the reserve labor force of the campesinado;
- how to technify campesino farming;
- interaction of campesinos with the urban economy;
- rural-urban migration;
3/- desirability of collectivization.
Family Economy Profiles of Tabascan Cacao Farmers
The five kinds of families who participate in Tabascan cacao 
production - minifundia, family-based, hired labor-based and collective 
farm, and non-farm families - operate under fundamentally different 
modes of production. These are conditioned by the asset array 
available to them and the organization of labor. The charts and graphs 
in this section summarize the differences, which later chapters will 
attempt to explain. The principal aspects reviewed here are: farm
assets and means of production; farm family characteristics and the 
demographic cycle; family employment and relations of production; farm 
processes, production systems and costs; and family strategies for 
labor use and farm production.
Chart 15 indicates differences in the range of farm assets 
available to the various groups of families, based on the case study 
examples. It is important to contrast the value of assets in land - 
which have been highly inflated in the past decade - with the assets 
in buildings, equipment and livestock, items far more indicative of 
wealth. Land belonging to minifundistas and ejidatarios on collectives 
ranged in value below $500,000, or US$22,000 at the time; family-based 
farms ranged up to US$50,000; hired labor based between $50,000 on 
modest establishments and US$1,000,000 on largeholdings planted heavily 
to cacao. The value of buildings, equipment and livestock totalled 
well under US$5000 for minifundistas, under $10,000 for family-based 
farmers, and from $15,000 to half a million dollars for hired labor 
based producers.
3/—  For the considerable literature on the relations between 
the campesinado and capitalist agriculture, see: Warman (1978),
Barbosa-Ramirez (1976), Bienestar Campesina, Ed. by de Navarrete 
(1971), Estructura Agraria (1974), Esteva (1978), Barkin and 
Suarez (1982), Warman (1980), Capitalismo y Campesinado (1976).
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CHART 15. ASSETS OF TABASCO CACAO FARMS, BY TYPE*
b/M in ifu n d iq  Fomily Hired Labor , C o lle c tiv e - 
Farm Based —
3 r
2 -
I -
Capital Assets 
□  Equipment
Buildings
2 r Livestock Assets
6 i- Cacao Production
5
4 -------  Cacao Census
3
2
1
■ J  1
3° r
25 -  
20 -  
15 -  
10 - 
5 -
Form Size
------- Cacao Census
H.
*Composite values based on data in Thesis, Table 9.
^This does not include data from the largest-scale farmer. 
— Data on buildings and equipment were not included.
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Farm Assets and Means of Production
The minifundia average a little over a hectare In size, and 
produce roughly a fourth of the average production on family-based 
farms, which average about six hectares. The hired labor based farms, 
by comparison, average about fourteen hectares, and the average farm 
produces between two and three times as much as the family-based farm. 
Production per ejidatario on the collective Is In the range of the 
family-based producer.
Farm Family Characteristics and the Demographic Cycle
Cacao-producing families In Tabasco have very similar overall 
characteristics to the "typical" Tabascan family. Half of all family 
members are fifteen years of age or younger; slightly over a quarter 
are aged 16 to 30. Of all family members over seven years of age, 36 
per cent are head of household or spouse; 50 per cent were children of 
the head of household; and 14 per cent had assorted other 
relationships, commonly grandchild or daughter-in-law to the head of 
household.
Charts 16 and 17 illustrate the differences between the family 
types as regards the typical demographic stage. The hired-labor-based 
producers are generally older, and their children tend to be older as 
well. The minifundistas tend to be younger, and have more younger 
children. The population on collectives and without land is much 
younger than the farm households. Median age of head of household is 
only 35 in non-farm families, 40 on collectives, 47 on minifundia,
49 on family farms and 55 on hired-labor-based farms.
Largely as a consequence of this configuration, there are 
relatively more dependent family members in the minifundia, collective 
and non-farm families, and more family emigrants from family- and hired 
labor-based households, since these are generally married children.
This structure is mainly the result of the impact of the demo­
graphic cycle on landholdings. Farmers' sons go through a period of 
working either on or off-farm before acquiring title. Today, the plot 
they receive is generally sub-divided, of minifundia proportions. Over 
time, they may increase the size of the plot by marriage or purchase. 
The older owners of family-based and hired-labor-based farms generally 
received their plots several decades ago, when the average size was 
larger. Many will likely transfer land to their children in minifundia 
form.
Chart 18 shows migration histories for the family types. Nearly a 
quarter of all family-based farm household members (over seven years) 
had a history of changing residence, a fifth of non-farm family members 
and nearly two thirds of collective household members (because of the 
dislocation caused by collectivization). Note that on family-based, 
non-farm and hired-labor-based farms, residence change frequently 
occurred after 1976, indicating the Impact of petroleum employment- 
induced change. Minifundistas and collective farm families tended to 
remain tied to their land, even when active in off-farm employment.
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CHART 16. POPULATION IN THE SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY OF TABASCO CACAO SUB-SAMPLE,
BY FAMILY TYPE*
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*C0PR0DET and CONAPO, Encuesta Sociodemografica del Estado de Tabasco, Villahermosa, Tabasco,
January 1981, Cacao Sub-Sample.
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CHART 17. DEMOGRAPHIC STAGE OF CACAO HOUSEHOLDS, BY TYPE* a/
M in ifu n d io  Family Farm H ired-Labor Collective Non-Farm
Based
(1 2 6 ) (81 ) (6 7 )  (3 3 ) (93)
| | Unm arried
£•!•*] Single w ith children 
Older, w ithout ch ildren
Older w ith 
Schoolchild
Children all ages 
C hildren working 
Older school-age 
| | School-age ch ild
Young m arried
i
wi
*COPRODET and CONAPO, Encuesta Sociodemografica del Estado de Tabasco, Villahermosa, 
Tabasco, January 1981, Cacao Sub-Sample.
a/Definitions for the various stages may be found in Appendix Table C-6.
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CHART 16. POPULATION IN THE SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY OF TABASCO CACAO SUB-SAMPLE,
BY FAMILY TYPE*
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*C0PR0DET and CONAPO, Encuesta Sociodemografica del Estado de Tabasco, Villahermosa, Tabasco,
January 1981, Cacao Sub-Sample.
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CHART 17. DEMOGRAPHIC STAGE OF CACAO HOUSEHOLDS, BY TYPE* a/
M in ifu n d ia  Family Farm H ired-Labor Collective Non-Farm
Based
(1 2 6 ) (8 1 ) (6 7 )  (3 3 ) (93)
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Older, without ch ildren
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Children all ages 
Children working 
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Young m arried
i*£>LOI
*COPRODET and CONAPO, Encuesta Sociodemografica del Estado de Tabasco, Villahermosa,
Tabasco, January 1981, Cacao Sub-Sample.
CHA1T 11. EES HENCE CHANCES IN CACAO FAMILIES, 1Y TYPE*
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*COPRODET and CONAPO, Encuesta Sociodemografica del Estado de Tabasco, Villahermosa,
Tabasco, January 1981, Cacao Sub-Sample.
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Family Employment
Of all the potential EAP (those over 7 years old), a quarter were 
housewives and a third were students; the rest worked. Chart 19 shows 
occupation of heads of household by type. A fairly constant proportion 
of the heads of household (around 75 per cent) were cacao farmers. 
Relatively few minifundistas participated in other types of farming, 
but more were involved in skilled trades. Hired-labor-based heads of 
household tended to participate more in agricultural work, or trades 
and commerce. Only half the collective farmers claimed cacao farming 
as their primary occupation, with the rest in farming or agricultural 
work, almost universally on the collective. Of non-farm heads of 
household, 72 per cent were in agricultural work.
Almost all heads of household who did not claim cacao farming as 
a principal occupation, did so as a secondary occupation. The prominence 
of secondary occupation among collective farmers and its lack among 
non-farm heads of household is notable.
Charts 20 and 21 show occupations for all working individuals in 
the families. The minifundista family members tended to work more as 
cacao farmers (partly because there were few working members apart 
from the head of household), less in agricultural work, and more in 
non-agricultural activities. The preponderance of agricultural work by 
hired-labor-based producer households is partly the result of more 
older children in the EAP, who work on the family farm.
But disaggregating by age of worker in Chart 22 reveals very 
different patterns within and between the families. Minifundista workers 
aged 16-20 were much less likely to work in agriculture than 
those on family or hired-labor-based farms (because they were not 
necessary to on-farm production). They, like teenagers from non-farm 
households, frequently worked in non-agricultural occupations. Yet a 
far larger proportion of 20-30 year olds from minifundia were cacao 
farmers rather than workers than on the other farms. Note also that by 
age 30-40, few hired-labor-based producers worked off-farm, relative 
to the other groups.
Secondary occupation of minifundia workers tended to be in agri­
cultural work for cacao off-farm (not discounting those whose own farm 
work was the secondary occupation). The other farm types were unlikely 
to work in cacao as a secondary occupation.
Women's formal participation in the EAP was relatively low - 
under ten per cent. When women did work, it was in all types of 
occupations, although participation in agricultural work varied 
inversely with size of farm. Over half of active minifundia women were 
cacao farmers - far more than for other types, while family-farm women 
were most active in unskilled work and hired-labor-based farm women in 
agricultural work (at home) and skilled work. There was no particular 
tendency for younger or older women to predominate in the work force.
However, the SST only documented work that lasted for at least 
thirty days of the year. Field interviewing suggested that female 
participation in cacao harvests, in particular - or in processing - is 
very common at peak demand periods.
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CHART 19. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY OCCUPATION OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD
ON TABASCO CACAO FARMS, BY TYPE*
Primary Occupation
Secondary Occupation
*COPRODET and CONAPO, Encuesta Sociodemografica del Estado de Tabasco, 
Villahermosa, Tabasco, January 1981, Cacao Sub-Sample.
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CHART 20. PRIMARY OCCUPATION OF CACAO HOUSEHOLD EAP, BY TYPE
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CHART 21. SECONDARY OCCUPATION OF CACAO HOUSEHOLD EAP, BY TYPE*
MinifundiO Fam ily H ired -Labor C ollective
Based Based
Non-Farm
No Secondary 
Occupation
Commerce and 
r  -M S erv ices
□ Skilled Work
A g ricu ltu ra l
Work
^  Other Farm ing 
Cocao Farm ing
*COPRODET and CONAPO, Encuesta Sociodemografica del Estado de Tabasco, Villahermosa, Tabasco,
January 1981, Cacao Sub-Sample.
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CHART 22. PRIMARY OCCUPATION OF POTENTIAL EAP, BY AGE*£/b/c/
M ini fund io Family
Farm
H ired -Labor Collective 
Based
Non-Farm
Age Group
N on-A gricu ltura l 
Work
Ag r ic u ltu ra l Work 
Farming
(a lm ost all cacoo)
For footnotes, see NOTES, Chart 22.
*COPRODET and CONAPO, Encuesta Soclodemografica del Estado de Tabasco, Villahermosa, 
Tabasco, January 1981, Cacao Sub-sample.
iVO
VOI
There were only 16 "former cacao farmers" in the sample, who held 
a variety of occupations. Chart 23 shows the present occupations of 
"former cacao workers," who represented a third of all non-landholders 
who had ever been occupied as cacao workers. Nearly a third of the 
former workers had retired. Remaining minifundistas were doing non­
cacao agricultural work or skilled trades. Family-based workers were 
least active in farm work; hired-labor-based workers least active in 
unskilled work.
Analysis of historical occupations of cacao household workers 
showed a general decline in the proportion of cacao farmers, and a 
corresponding increase in agricultural workers and workers in skilled 
trades and commerce. The proportion of individuals working off-farm in 
cacao has gone down. Historical occupation of household heads changed 
less markedly over time, except for minifundistas and collectives. 
There were relatively more minifundista cacao farmers than in 1965; 
among collective ejidatarios, there was an abrupt occupation change 
coinciding with the start of the Chontalpa Plan project.
Labor use statistics from the case study farms are consistent 
with the patterns found in the SST. The collective and hired-labor- 
based producers performed approximately half the required work on the 
farm, except for the largeholder with 40 hectares of cacao. The 
family-based producers perform over three quarters of their own work. 
The minifundistas tended to perform all their own work; the exception 
in this chart was a young man who still had i portant responsibilities 
to work on his father's farm, and consequently hired a young boy to 
help him on his own plot.
Farm labor is not a large part of total family labor on mini- 
fundia. For family-based households it is the leading, but not sole use 
of family labor. In collective and hired labor-based households, non­
farm labor is minimal.
Farm Production and Family Income
The differing assets of the cacao farm types lead to production 
strategies which utilize very different combinations of labor and 
purchased inputs. Farming intensity and importance of farm income in 
total family income differ among them.
Chart 24 shows per hectare costs of cacao production in Tabasco, 
comparing the farmers' costs with the recommended farm budgets of the 
Grijalva Commission. Obviously, none of the case study farms reached 
total recommended input levels, even including the imputed value of 
family labor. The family-based farmers approached the total most 
closely by substituting family labor for purchased inputs. The 
exception was a farmer who refused to hire non-family labor even for 
important maintenance activities.
Yield data from the CCT suggest that cacao production per tree is 
slightly higher on minifundia than family farm or hired-labor-based
- 1 0 1 -
CHART 23. PRESENT OCCUPATION OF FORMER CACAO WORKERS* £ J
IOO
Commerce or S erv ices
U nsk illed  Work
S k ille d  Trades
Farm Work
Farm ing (N o t Cacao)
Not Working
T o ta l W orkers = 108
*COPRODET and CONAPO, Encuesta Sociodemografica del Estado de 
Tabasco, Villahermosa, Tabasco, January 1981, Cacao Sub-Sample.
/—  Note that there was one ex-cacao worker on a collective 
ejido who in 1979 was a farm worker.
— ^This does not include cacao farmers who were cacao workers 
before acquiring their farms, nor cacao workers who once were farmers.
C /—  A total of 337 individuals had a history of being cacao farm­
workers, without ever owning a farm; former workers therefore repre­
sent a third of the group.
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CHART 24. PER HECTARE COSTS OF CACAO PRODUCTION IN TABASCO, BY FARM TYPE
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For footnotes, see NOTES, Chart 24.
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farms. Production per hectare Is considerably higher on mlnlfundla, 
with family farms slightly above hired-labor-based producers.
The case study yield data show family-based farm cacao yields to 
be lower on average than those on hired-labor-based farms, presumably 
due to more effective use of labor, either through better sprayers and 
other equipment or better condition of plantations. The mlnlfundla 
yields were somewhat lower than the family-based yields, due to the 
greatly reduced level of chemical inputs. See Table 6. The Individual 
overlaps between groups were considerable. The case studies support 
the contention that management and family characteristics are more 
Important yield determinants than farm size.
But for the minifundistas, cacao income comprises less than a 
third of total income, so the reduced investment costs make sense.
Even for family-based households, cacao income frequently accounted 
for under half of total income, although total income levels from 
cacao are much higher than for minifundistas. On the hired-labor-based 
farms, cacao Income was extremely important, except for largeholder C, 
whose income from cacao was lower than that for farmer A, despite many 
times the area planted to cacao. See Chart 25.
Only the young minifundista earned and spent under $50,000 per 
year (US$2250). The general range for all but the two wealthier 
producers was $60,000-100,000 (US$2700-4500). Of particular impor­
tance was the very high level of expenditures on food (generally 
about 50 per cent), and medical expenses. Emergency expenditures 
for the latter required major family adjustments through debt or 
changing wage labor patterns.
These figures show only gross income; for most of the farmers, 
the level of household expenditures was very near - or in some cases, 
through credit, over - net family income. Savings generally took the 
form of purchase of livestock or farm investments, which appear in the 
budget as costs.
Analyzing the Case Studies
The following five chapters provide far more detailed budget 
analyses for the case study farms and landless workers, in order to 
understand the decision-making principles used in the production 
process, and in entering the off-farm labor market. The petroleum 
economy enters into many of these decisions through changes in off- 
farm wage levels, inflation in the cost of living and farm input costs, 
and inflation in the value of land. Through the personal stories of 
families trying in their individual ways to protect and promote the 
family welfare - and the statistical story of many families organized 
like them - those chapters will attempt to model the family economies 
of Tabasco's cacaoteros.
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TABLE 6. CACAO YIELDS ON TABASCO CACAO FARMS, BY TYPE
(kilos)
Family Hired
Yield Measure Minifundia Farm Labor Based
3. /Case Studies—
Production per tree .28-.45 .35-.77 .42-2.21
Production per hectare 170-301 173-340 254-1106
„ „ b/ Cacao Census—
Production per tree 1.0-1.2 .9 .9
Production per hectare 617-785 510 498
c /Recommended—
Production per hectare 
(without rehabilitation) 637 637 637
Production per tree 
(with rehabilitation) 1.0-1.3 1.0-1.3 1.0-1.3
Production per hectare 
(with rehabilitation) 825 825 825
a/ Sara J. Scherr, Tabasco Cacao Farm Case Studies , 1979-80.
b/ SARH, "Censo de Cacao," Villahermosa, Tabasco, 1978.
c j SARH, Representacion Tabasco, "Plan de Incremento de la Pro- 
duccion de Cacao en el Estado de Tabasco," 1980.
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CHART 25, FAMILY INCOME ON TABASCO CACAO FARMS, BY SOURCE AND 
FARM TYPE*
4 8 0 .0 0 0
4 5 0 .0 0 0
4 2 0 .0 0 0
3 9 0 .0 0 0
3 6 0 .0 0 0
3 3 0 .0 0 0
3 0 0 .0 0 0  
2 7 0 ,0 0 0
2 4 0 .0 0 0
21 0,000
1 8 0 .0 0 0  
1 5 0 ,0 0 0  
12 0,000
9 0 .0 0 0
6 0 .0 0 0  
3 0 ,0 0 0
□
N on-A gricu ltu ra l Work 
O ff-Farm  A gricu ltu ra l Work 
Non-Cash Farm Earnings 
Other Farm 
Cacao
M in ifu n d ia  Fam ily-Based
a / 
C ~
Hired Labor 
Based
*Author, Tabasco Cacao Farm Case Studies, 1979-80.
^  /—  Multiply all figures by '10' for this family.
CHAPTER 5. HIRED-LABOR-BASED CACAO FARM PRODUCTION STRATEGY
The Profit-Motivated Farmer: Historical Focus of Development
The hired-labor-based (HLB) farmer in Tabasco represents the 
prototypic entrepreneurial farmer. Production is almost entirely 
geared to the commercial market and exchange value. Use of hired 
labor is fundamental for production due to the quantity of land 
resources and the production process. For cacao farmers, this latter 
criterion applies to farms with over 5-6 hectares of cacao, due to the 
high labor intensity of the crop. This relatively small group - ten 
per cent of producers - was responsible in 1978 for about 30 per 
cent of state cacao production. Their proportion of production has 
declined since then.
There is a conceptual difference between the "farmer," repre­
sented by the vast majority of hired-labor-based cacaoteros in Tabasco, 
and the "largeholder" whose resource base both provides important 
local economic and political power, and the potential (and frequent 
preference) for utilizing substantial resources outside of agricul­
ture. Both are considered here.
The chief objective of production for this type of farmer is 
profit maximization, that is, return to total Investment including 
land and equipment. The strategy of production is to increase or 
decrease the application of labor and of cash inputs to various farm 
products in response to relative price changes.
HLB farmers are the focus of typical agricultural development 
projects and policies because of certain advantages. They have greater 
ease of technology adaptation than farmers with fewer resources and 
less financial security. They have sufficient family resources to 
provide self-financing for many new operations or programs. They are 
quite willing to alter production patterns and crop choices where it 
is evident that over-all market returns will increase. Under condi­
tions of general economic growth, rising farm prices, and good 
communications, it is argued that this category of farmers is most 
likely to experience farm "development” and increasing family incomes.
What has been less well studied and observed is the response of 
HLB farmers to more difficult economic conditions - confusing market 
signals, structural disruption, recession. Classic studies of capitalism 
in "crisis" suggest that there tends to be a high level of failures of 
the least competitive enterprises, then a concentration of remaining 
operations into fewer, larger firms.
Hired-Labor-Based Production in Tabasco
It is unlikely that during the 19th century many farms in the 
campesino sector in Tabasco hired "free labor," given a generally non­
monetary economy, tight community organization, and traditions of
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labor exchange. The larger plantations set up by descendants of the 
Spanish were predominantly based on hired labor or debt peonage. 
Workers were usually permanently employed; where extra labor was 
required at harvest time, Indigenous workers were hired. The owners 
themselves performed very little of the actual work; rather, they 
organized and supervised work, though this was often left to over­
seers. During the period when the Sierra dominated production, these 
"largeholders" probably produced a larger percentage of the state's 
cacao than is the case today.
This situation underwent basic structural change during the last 
few decades, as the cacao frontier disappeared, active markets in 
labor and land developed, and many largeholders changed to cattle 
activities. The appearance of large numbers of landless workers and 
minifundistas who need part-time work off their own cacao farms 
coincided with the growing use by campesinos of hired labor. With the 
exception of a few very large latifundia-type farms, most cacao farms 
are relatively small in area, rarely over 20 hectares. Many of these 
"farmers" have close family ties with campesino producers, and became 
HLB producers via a gradual accumulation of resources from a campesino 
base.
The Survey results summarized in Chart 26 show that hired-labor- 
based cacao producers are mainly older farmers (their average age was 
55), with large families, and children of working age. The large farm 
is the result of a lifetime of consolidation efforts, and partly made 
possible (as well as necessary) by a large number of dependents who 
could help in farm work as the farm was developed. Most farmers 
received their land as inheritance decades ago when the average plot 
size was larger.
These farm entities are not stable over time. Land inheritance, 
whether taking place during the lifetime of the farmer or after his 
death, in many cases breaks up the cacao plantations into family or 
minifundia type holdings. These may grow to be hired-labor-based 
farms again under fortuitous circumstances.
Typical HLB Households: Case Studies
The families chosen for in-depth analysis represent three of the 
major kinds of hired-labor-based farmers - the wealthy largeholder, 
the recent urban investor in cacao farming, and the traditional farmer 
who amassed a large number of plots over time.
Sr. PradoJ./ was an ambitious largeholder and rancher from Teapa; 
Sr. Ramirez, a very urban and enterprising cacaotero from Huimango 
town; Sr. Gomez, a barely literate campesino who through good manage­
ment and inheritance acquired a large farming base.
been
— ^Please note that all names of case study farmers have 
changed, to protect their privacy.
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CHART 26. DEMOGRAPHIC AND EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF HIRED-LABOR-BASED CACAO FARM HOUSEHOLDS
PERCENT OF TOTAL TABASCAN CACAO
Farmers Area Production
Fam ily S tructure M igration
Demographic
Stage
lOO r
</>crUJa>z
U Jz
80 -
60
EMIGRANTS
UNDER 
8
POTENTIAL 
EAP
; 4o-
20  -
EAP
Head of Household
PRIMARY SECONDARY
100 r
OCCUPATION
Family EAP 
PRIMARY SECONDARY
Potential EAPt By Age, Prim ary 
1 6 -2 0  2 1 -3 0  3 1 -4 0  4 1 -5 0
Farming A gricu ltu ra l Work | | O ther Work
0
031
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Data collected from the farm questionnaire are presented In a 
series of tables accompanying the text. More extensive data on 
employment, family labor use, household expenditures and monthly income 
flows may be found in the Thesis. Tables 7 and 8 show cacao inputs and 
production costs; and Table 9 all-farm production costs.
All financial information is in 1980 pesos. Because land prices 
are so important in budget analyses, all calculations were made for 
both high and low estimates for land value. Note the significant 
differences between cacao costs and all-farm costs. Depreciation costs 
were assigned to a specific enterprise or, where asset use was shared, 
equally between enterprises.
Costs are measured in three ways to permit analysis from various 
points of view. The first is "cash costs," which counts only those 
inputs for which cash was paid, and does not include family labor.
The second, "full costs," includes depreciation; the third, "costs 
with equity deduction" adds an arbitrary capital cost of seven per 
cent of assets to represent the income which could have been made had 
all assets been sold and the proceeds invested in the bank.
Table 8 on cacao production costs shows total costs, then 
analyzes per hectare costs, to permit comparison with other farms and 
with "recommended" budgets. This extracts the cash costs for inputs 
and the imputed cost of family labor (at the going wage rate for 
agricultural labor), then recomputes cash cost per hectare, full costs 
(including depreciation and Imputed family labor), and costs with 
equity deduction (which also includes imputed family labor costs).
Prado Family
Sr. Prado was born and raised in Teapa. He rose from peon to 
wealthy politician through his work on the land. He is 59, married, 
and has four children, three of whom are college-trained. None lives 
at home.
Landless until 1949, he worked two untitled lots of ten hectares 
each, which were later enlarged and made part of an ejido. He bought 
additional land in 1960, 1962, 1964, and 1971, all on credit. In 1980 
he owned 40 hectares of cacao and 250 hectares of pasture. His assets 
- all agricultural - were worth over US$1 m , with over 3/4 in land, 
the rest in buildings and equipment. He owned 39 adult pigs and their 
offspring, and a cattle herd of 500.
Sr. Prado works independently, although one son helps him with 
cattle activities and he has helped another son invest in a hog 
operation. But he has 27 permanent year-round workers, of whom 12 are 
occupied in cacao. Of these, 14 are over 50 years old and have been 
working for Sr. Prado for a long time. Due to feelings of obligation, 
he retains several who are no longer very productive. Half live on his 
property in houses constructed by him. Note that only the old prefer 
"resident" status; younger workers prefer freedom to find the best-paid 
work.
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Data collected from the farm questionnaire are presented In a 
series of tables accompanying the text. More extensive data on 
employment, family labor use, household expenditures and monthly income 
flows may be found in the Thesis. Tables 7 and 8 show cacao inputs and 
production costs; and Table 9 all-farm production costs.
All financial information is in 1980 pesos. Because land prices 
are so important in budget analyses, all calculations were made for 
both high and low estimates for land value. Note the significant 
differences between cacao costs and all-farm costs. Depreciation costs 
were assigned to a specific enterprise or, where asset use was shared, 
equally between enterprises.
Costs are measured in three ways to permit analysis from various 
points of view. The first is "cash costs,” which counts only those 
inputs for which cash was paid, and does not include family labor.
The second, "full costs," includes depreciation; the third, "costs 
with equity deduction" adds an arbitrary capital cost of seven per 
cent of assets to represent the income which could have been made had 
all assets been sold and the proceeds invested in the bank.
Table 8 on cacao production costs shows total costs, then 
analyzes per hectare costs, to permit comparison with other farms and 
with "recommended" budgets. This extracts the cash costs for inputs 
and the imputed cost of family labor (at the going wage rate for 
agricultural labor), then recomputes cash cost per hectare, full costs 
(including depreciation and imputed family labor), and costs with 
equity deduction (which also includes imputed family labor costs).
Prado Family
Sr. Prado was born and raised in Teapa. He rose from peon to 
wealthy politician through his work on the land. He is 59, married, 
and has four children, three of whom are college-trained. None lives 
at home.
Landless until 1949, he worked two untitled lots of ten hectares 
each, which were later enlarged and made part of an ejido. He bought 
additional land in 1960, 1962, 1964, and 1971, all on credit. In 1980 
he owned 40 hectares of cacao and 250 hectares of pasture. His assets 
- all agricultural - were worth over US$1 m , with over 3/4 in land, 
the rest in buildings and equipment. He owned 39 adult pigs and their 
offspring, and a cattle herd of 500.
Sr. Prado works independently, although one son helps him with 
cattle activities and he has helped another son invest in a hog 
operation. But he has 27 permanent year-round workers, of whom 12 are 
occupied in cacao. Of these, 14 are over 50 years old and have been 
working for Sr. Prado for a long time, Due to feelings of obligation, 
he retains several who are no longer very productive. Half live on his 
property in houses constructed by him. Note that only the old prefer 
"resident" status; younger workers prefer freedom to find the best-paid 
work.
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TABLE 7. INPUTS FOR HIRED-LABOR-BASED CACAO FARMS, 1978-80
P r a d o  F a r m R a m i r e z  F a r m G o m e 2 F a r m R E C O M M E N D E D :  fc/W / 0  R e h a b i l .  W i t h  R e h a b
P R O D U C T I V I T Y
# T r e e s 2 4 , 0 0 0  (600/h) 3,000 (662/h) 5 , 3 0 0  (662/h) 6 0 0 / h 6 0 0 / h
Ag e  1 40 y e a r s  -  1 4,400 4 y e a r s  - 375 15 y e a r s  - 2800
A g e  2 10 - 2 0  yr - 9 , 6 0 0 15 y e a r s  - 2625 10 y e a r s  - 2000
A g e  3 - 6 y e a r s  - 500
P D N / T r e e • 4 2 4/tree 2.21 k l l o s / t r e e .6 k i l o s / t r e e Avg. 1 . 3 / t r e e - 1 . 3
( Cacao Cene
P D N / H e c t a r e 2 5 4 . 5 / h  ($12,750) 1106 k i l o s / h 395 k i l o s / h Avg. 5 3 8  k i l o s / h
(S55.300) ($19,750) 6 3 7 835 k g / h
M a n - D a y s / H e c t a r e 8 2 . 5 - 8 7 . 5 5 2 . 6 - 6 0 . 6 6 1 . 9 - 7 6 . 7 81.5 130
P r u n i n g , 20 ( o v e r estimated) }  18 2 21 24c l e a r i n g f
D r a i n s 5.5 J 3.7 3 6
F e r t i l i z e r 3.0 3.4 2.5 10
I n s e c t i c i d e 14 6 . 3 6.9 12 20
F u n g i c i d e 5.3 7.7 15 30
H a r v e s t  & Pod- 43(48) 20(28) 38.2(53) 28 40
B r e a k i n g
I n p u t s / H e c t a r e
F e r t i l i z e r
U r e a - 1 X  (with met!' lice; - - 2 X / y e a r
1 8 - 9 - 1 8 “ 1 X - - -
1 5 - 1 5 - 2 3 1 X/yr - - - _
F l o r e n - - 1 X / y e a r - 1-2 X / y e a r
N u t r l s o l - 2 X _ _
G r o - G r e e n - (with me t l l i c o ) - _
C r e s c a l - - - - -
I n s e c t i c i d e s
T r i d e n t I _ 2 X / y r _ _
M e t l l i c o 2 X / y r 2 X / y e a r - 2 - 3  X / y e a r
F o l e y 2 X / y e a r - -
F o l i d o l 2 X /yr - - _
F o l l m a c - - - _ _
P o l i d o r - - - - _
F u n g i c i d e
L i m e  & Sul- (Used to do  10 X/yr) 4 X / y r 3 X / y e a r _ 5 - 8  X / y e a rfateC u p r a s o l - - - _ _
P r u n i n g (Used to do 5-6 X/yr) 3-4 X / y e a r
-
2 X / y e a r - 2 - 3  X / y e a r
*Author, Cacao Farm Budget Studies, 1979-81, Tabasco, Mexico. 
a/ kg = kilograms; yr = year; h = hectares; x = times, 
b/ This data is from estimates in the SARH, Plan de Cacao, 1979.
TABLE 8. COSTS OF CACAO PRODUCTION ON HIRED-LABOR-BASED CACAO 
FARMS, 1979-80
INPUTS Prado Fani Eaalrac Farm Cow* Fan Grl1al*as/
Plan . . 
Unrehab.-
Plan . 
Kehab
LABOI 8390,000 $ 25,920 $ 14,573 $ 9,400 $ 8,100 813,900
Interest - - - - - -
INPUTS: 75,600 9,800 3,713 5.075 2.547 4,731
Hisc, 24,500 2,800 1,523 “ - -
Fertiliser 19,000 2,680 230 3,200 1,500 2,366
Urea - 80 - - - ' -
18-9-18 19,000 2,200 - - - -
Floren - - 250 - - -
Gro-Green - - - - - -
Nutriaol - 400 - - - -
Insecticide 12,600 2,120 1,400 675 1,047 2,365
FoU m c - - - - - -
Tridente - 1,280 - - - -
Metilico - - - - - -
Methyl - 840 1,000 - - ■ -
BHC - - - - - -
Foley - - 400 - - -
Polidor - - - - - -
Folldol 12,600 - - - - - '
Funsiclde 19,500 2,200 540 1,200 - -
Line 1,500 200 - - - -
Sulfate 18,000 2,000 540 - - -
CASH COSTS $465,600 36,020 18,290 14,475 10,647 18,631
DEPRECIATION 11,900 9,145 800 - - -
FULL COSTS 477,500 45,165 19,090 14,475 10,647 18,631
EQUITY DEDUCTED^ 563,115- 90,457 112,560 14,000 14,000 14,000
055,155) (48,457) (56,560) (10,500) (10,500) (10.500)
COSTS WITH EQUITY (•10,615) 135,622 131,650 28,475 24,647 32,631
DEDUCTION 1,040,615 (91,622) (75,630) (24,975) (21.|47) (29,131)
No. Hectares 40 6 7 1 1 1
PEN HECTARE 
TOTAL CASH COSTS 11,640 6,003 2,612 _ 10,647 18,631
FAMILY HAN-DAYS/ 5.2 23.5 69. - _ _
HECTARE
IMPUTED COST 624 2,820 8,280 _ _
FAMILY LABOR
CASH FOR INPUTS 1.890 1,166 530 - 2,547 4,731
WITH DEPRECIATION^ 11,937 7,526 2,727 - 10,647 18,631
WITH EQUITY. 
DEDUCTED5
$ 26,015 $ 22,603 $ 18,807 24,647 32,631
For footnotes, see NOTES, Table 8
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TABLE 9 . ALL FARM PRODUCTION COSTS ON HIRED-LABOR-BASED CACAO FARMS, 
1979-80 *
INPUTS Prado Farm Ramirez Farm Gomez Farm
Labor $ 965,000 $ 33,600 $ 17,250
Cacao - 25,920 14,575
Cattle - 7,680 1,600
Maize - - -
Cacao chemicals
and mlsc. 39,600 7,000 2,715
Vehicle—^ 133,000 1,200 1,500
Cattle Feed, etc. 755,000 1,800 5,460
Veterinary services
and medicines 60,000 - 2,000
Equipment - -
Cattle purchases 50,000 - - .
Interest on loans 170,000 14,000 ' -
Rent land, equip. 177,000 5,300 -
b/Mlscellaneous-- - - 1,125
CASH COSTS 1,405,600 62,900 30,050
Depreciation 288,000 37,500 4,100
Cacao 11,000 9,145 800
Cnttle - 18,366 300
Maize, etc. - - -
Presents of
products - 12,000 -
FULL COSTS 1,693,600 112,400 34,150
Equity capital costs 1.050,000-1,775,795 210,207-294,557 86,800-147,770
Cacao 353,115-563,115 48,457- 90,457 56,560-112,560
Cattle 747,425-1,044,925 
Plgs-27,055-34,055 
+ animals - 481,000
117.450-159,800 6,860- 8,960
Maize, etc. - - -
COSTS WITH DEDUCTION
OF 71 ON EQUITY 2,743,600-3,469,395 312,607-396,957 120,950-181,920
' CAPITAL
*Author, Cacao Farm Budget Studies, 1979-81, Tabasco, Mexico, 
a/— This value includes tractors, trucks,
— F. = fuel; T. = transportation.
etc
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Full-time wages varied considerably from $40 for a young person 
for milking cows twice a day, to $700/week ($116/day) plus $10 per pig 
produced, for the pig manager. Part-time workers are paid $70/half-day 
and $120/day to work from 8:00 to 4:00. This is the going rate for Teapa 
fieldworkers, but rather low for cacao harvesting.
Sr. Prado's priority until very recently was cacao, but he has 
been steadily expanding cattle operations and is presently putting 
most of his resources into the pig operation. It is very hard to 
interpret his labor use, since our statistics only include labor 
hired, and many man-days are of dubious productivity. He has "abandoned" 
his cacao plantations due to high labor costs and applied very few 
inputs.
During the past twenty years, cacao production varied widely.
When prices were very low in the early 1960's, Sr. Prado renovated 
most of his plantations. In the mld-1960's, he only harvested and 
gave minimum maintenance to his cacao, emphasizing banana production 
then. He also sold a lot of cacao land to build up his cattle herd.
But he cut down ten hectares of bananas in the early 1970's to replace 
with cacao as prices rose. He increased pest control and new 
plantings, reaching maximum production in 1978, but since then pig 
production, labor problems and lower cacao prices have led to diminished 
attention to cacao. Maintenance operations continue, to prevent 
infestation or deterioration of the plantations. Should prices go up 
again sharply, he might try to set up an irrigation system which has 
intrigued him recently and renew extensive use of chemical inputs.
Meanwhile, well over half of all farm production cash costs go to 
cattle enterprise expenses.
Measuring Farm and Family Income. Table 10 shows gross household 
income. This is measured in three ways: "cash income," the cash
value of farm products marketed; "total farm labor earnings," which 
include an imputed value of farm produce consumed, and any change in 
the livestock inventory; and "total income" which adds to these any 
income from off-farm sources. Although these hired-labor-based 
producers denied any off-farm income, it is possible that in fact 
there was some investment or financial income (which was common among 
other HLB producers interviewed).
Table 11 provides the most important financial statistics - net 
family and farm income, measured by a number of alternative methods. 
The principal measures show net cash income, labor earnings disregard­
ing invisible equity costs, and labor earnings after deduction of 
equity costs.
Values are given for the principal farm enterprises and off-farm 
Income sources. Then the average value of labor in the enterprise is 
computed - both to all labor used (i.e., an implicit wage, though not 
equivalent to marginal costs, only to average costs), and specifically 
to family labor used. These were used to compare income-earning 
alternatives for the families between farm enterprises and between 
farm and non-farm income sources. The final variables reported are 
the proportion of labor costs in cacao and whole farm expenses.
TABLE 10. HIRED-LABOR-BASED CACAO FARM HOUSEHOLD GROSS INCOME, 1979-80*
SOUR C E P r a d o  F a m i l y R a m i r e z  F a m i l y G o m e z  Fami l y
C a cao (14.6%) $ 6 26,728 (80.0%) $31 1 , 0 7 0 (80.4%) $16 2,156
P o u l t r y - - -
C a r d e n - - -
C a t t l e 6 b u l l s  0 $20 , 0 0 0  
50 cows 0 50 kg 
® $22 kg
150 calves 0 6 , 500 
20 h e i f e r s  0 7,000
120 , 0 0 0
165 . 0 0 0
9 7 5 . 0 0 0
140.000 
$1 , 4 0 0 , 0 0 0
35,000 10,0 0 0
R ent P a s t u r e - - -
P i g  Sales 6 0 0  0 9 0  k g  0 
$ 3 6 / kg 1, 9 4 4 , 0 0 0
5,000 1,750
Cattle - - -
Ml Ik 120,000 - -
P e p p e r - - -
Ban a n a s - - -
Zapote 7,000 - -
W ood 120 , 0 0 0 - ' -
Coc o n u t - - 5 , 000
O r a n g e s - 1,600 -
Car Rent a l - - 1,250
Hlsc. - - -
T O T A L  F A R M  
C A S H  INCOME $ 4 , 2 89,728 352,670 $ 1 80,156
F a r m  P r o d u c e  
C o n s u m e d
Products
House
50,000
150.000
200.000
1,000 Pigs 500 
House 10,000 
C a c a o , c o c o n u t ,
C h a n g e  in L i v e ­
stock. I n v entory
Misc.
Pigs
Cattle
+ 1 5 , 0 0 0
+ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0
- 5 0 0 . 0 0 0
- 2 8 5 , 0 0 0
Cattle + 3 7 , 5 0 0  
- 2,500 
35,000
b a n a n a
Cat t l e
1,000
11,500
+ 1 0 , 0 0 0
T O T A L  FARM
L A B O R  EA R N I N G S $ 4 , 2 74,728 $388,670 $201,656
O f f - F a r m  A g r i ­
cul t u r a l  W o r k - - -
O f f - F a r m  N on- 
Agri. W o r k
-
L o ans - - -
T O T A L  INCOME $ 4 , 2 74,728 $ 3 88,670 $201 ,656
* Author, Cacao Farm Budget Studies, 1979-81, Tabasco, Mexico.
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________ _________________________ _ ____________ (RESULTS)_____________
TABLE 11A. FAMILY AND FARM INCOME ON TABASCO CACAO FARMS,
1979-80, PRADO FARM*®/
a/Income Measure—' b /C a a h  I n c o m e - Labor E a rn ings- (w/oE q u i t y  R e t u r n  D e d . ) Labor Earnings- (v/ Equity Return Dad.)
a. N e t  E a r n  ____
b. N e t  o f f - f a r m  a g r i c u l t u r a l  ____
c. N e t  n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l  ____
6 /d. N e t  t o t a l  ____—
a. N e t  f a r m ____ p e r  h e c t a r e
f/f. N et f a r m    p e r  m a n - d a y  o n  f a r m -
g. N e t  f a r m ____  p e r  f a m i l y  m a n - d a y  o n
farm^
h. Net n o n - a g r l c u l t u r a l  ____  p e r  f a m i l y  .
m a n - d a y  w o r k e d  o u t s i d e  a g r i c u l t u r e * '
1. N e t  a g r i c u l t u r a l  o f f - f a r m  ____  p e r
f a m i l y  m a n - d a y  w o r k e d ^
J. N e t  t o t a l  
k. N et c a c a o
p e r  f a m i l y  m a n - d a y  w o r k e d ­
. j f/p e r  m a n - d a y  in c a c a o —
f/
|A/
1. N e t  c a t t l e  ____  p e r  m a n - d a y  in c a t t l e —
m. N e t  p i g  ____  p e r  m a n - d a y  in p i g  w o r k — ^
n. Net p e r  m a n - d a y  in t j
o. Net c a c a o  ____  p e r  f a m i l y  m a n - d a y  in
ca ca o ^
p. N e t  c a t t l e  ____  p e r  f a m i l y  m a n - d a y  in
cattle^
q. N e t  p i g  ____  p e r  f a m i l y  m a n - d a y  in p i g s ^
r. Net
a, % l a b o r  i n  c a c a o  e x p e n s e s
p e r  f a m i l y  m a n - d a y  in 
h/
&/
t. % l a b o r  i n  w h o l e  f a r m  e x p e n s e s h/
$ 1 , 9 3 9 , 1 2 8 . 0 0
1 , 9 3 9 , 1 2 8 . 0 0
6 , 7 8 0 . 1 7
3 1 1 . 2 5
3 , 0 0 6 . 4 0
3 , 0 0 6 . 4 0
1 4 4 . 4 8
1 4 5 . 9 7
3 , 9 6 7 . 6 6
4 9 7 . 8 6
9 5 6 . 0 0
3 0 , 9 0 0 . 0 0
81%
36%
$ 1 , 4 4 6 , 1 2 8 . 0 0
1 , 4 4 6 , 1 2 8 . 0 0
5 , 0 5 6 . 3 9
1 6 1 . 6 7
2 , 2 4 2 . 0 6
2 , 2 4 2 . 0 6
1 2 3 . 8 5
8 6 . 4 3
4 , 1 0 2 . 3 4
1 7 4 . 7 9
1 1 2 . 3 6
3 2 , 3 8 2 . 8 0
8 2 %
325
- $ 3 2 9 , 6 6 7 . 0 0
- 3 2 9 , 6 6 7 . 0 0
-  1 , 1 5 2 . 6 8  
- 7 1 . 0 3
-  5 1 1 . 1 1
- 5 1 1 . 1 1
2 1 . 8 2  (38.86)J-/
- 9 2 . 7 2
( - 2 0 2 . 7 1 ) 1 '
4 0 3 5 . 0 0
( 3 9 6 3 . 0 0 )i /
- 1 4 2 3 . 0 2
- 2 1 5 1 . 0 0
3 0 , 8 4 1 . 0 0  
(30, 356.00)
4 7 %
23%
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TABLE 11B. FAMILY AND FARM INCOME ON TABASCO CACAO FARMS,
1979-80, RAMIREZ FARm W
Incoae MeaBure--^
a. Net fata
b. Net off-fara agricultural ___
c. Net non-agricultural ___
d. Net total ____ —^
e. Net fa ra ___per hectare
JtNet fa ra ___ per aan-day on faro
Net fa ra ___per faaily sen-day on fare^
Net non-agrlcultural ___ per faaily nan-®^
day worked outelde agriculture
Net agricultural o f f-fa ra ___per^
faaily nan-day worked
Net total 
Net cacao
per faaily sen-day worked^
f/per aan-day In cacao-
1/Net ca tt le ___ per nan-day In cattle-*'
f/
Net pig 
Net
per nan-day In pig work
per aan-day ln_ f/
o. Net cacao___per family aan-day in cacao*^
p. Net ca ttle ___per family aan-day in
cattle^
q. Net pig ___ per faaily aan-day In  p ig *^
r. Net________ _ per faaily aan-day I n ^
a. X labor In cacao expenaea-1h/
h/t. Xlabor In whole fara expenses^
9X89,770
289,770
6,036
573
988
988
685
180
1,185
478
711
531
Labor larnloge^Aw/o
S b ISUSEH IOH aL
$276,270
276,270
5,755
549
942
942
664
396
1,146
1,758
571
211
Labor B antin g*^ ,,/  
Eaultv Return Dad.)
-$8,289 ( 79,063)
-$8,289 (76,063) 
- 172 ( 1,584) 
44 ( 194)
-  28 ( 259)
-  28 ( 259)
458 ( 55'4)
1,128 (-1,671)
756 ( 937)
-  7,276 (-10,534)
19-27X
8-10%
For footnotes, see NOTES, Table 11.
TABLE 11C. FAMILY AND FARM INCOME ON TABASCO CACAO FARMS,
1979-80, GOMEZ FARM*
flWWrTH -------------------- 77----
Income Measure^ Caefc Inca— ^
larnlnga- («/a
touitr totem Pad.)
labor Earning*^' (*/ 
Roulty totura tot.)
a. Met fara ____ $137,186.00 $111,286.00 $10,786 (-1 0 .1 8 ^
b. Net off-farm agricultural ___ - - -
c. Met non-agrlcultural ___ 1,210.00 1,210.00 1,210.00
d. Net total —^ 138,836.00 112,136.00 12,036.00
a. Net fara ___ par hectare 11,287.00 16,809.00 1,642 (-1.131)1/
f. Nat farm___ per man-day on ffarm^ 218.11 222.94 78.28 <-23.34)l/
g. Net fa ra ___per faaily aan-day on fa ra^ 314.16 361.43 122.67 (-24.60)1/
h. Nat non-agrlcultural par family man-^
day worked outalde agriculture 116.21 116.23 116.23
la Net agricultural off-farm ___per^
family man-day worked - - -
j. Net to ta l___par family man-day worked*^ 329.00 361.46 123.31 (-21.17)1/
k. Nat cacao ___ per man-day in cacao^ 272.37 271.63 167.86 ( 61.10)1/
1. Net cattle ___ per man-day in cattle^ 1.87 211.27 99.01 ( 12.86)1^/
a. Nat p ig ___ per man-day in pig work—^ - - -
n. Net per aan-day in —^ - - -
o. Nat cacao par family aan-day in 314.14 313.08 203.46 ( 51.31)1/
cacao®^
p. Net cattle per family aan-day In -46.81 222.64 80.69 ( 22.36)1^
cattle*^
q. Net pig ___per family aan-day in pige*^ - - -
r. Nat per family aan-day in ^ - - -
a. Z labor In cacao expenaee^ 12Z 10Z 17Z (lOZ)^
t. Z labor in whole farm expenaea—^ 42Z 36Z 13.7Z (9.3Z)1/
For footnotes, see NOTES, Table 11
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Prado Family Income Analysis
Sr. Prado's farm "cash income" per family man-day worked was 
$3006, with $497 per family man-day in cacao, versus $956 in cattle 
and $30,900 for pig farming. Inventory changes in cattle, non-cash 
payments to workers and depreciation caused "labor earnings" to 
decline - to $174 per family man-day over-all. Adjusted for equity 
return, this gave a negative farm income and a loss of over $1000 per 
hectare per year. Only in hog production were returns to family labor 
positive.
The main constraint on cacao production was difficulty finding 
dependable labor, almost certainly a result of his reluctance to pay a 
"competitive" wage. This is so even though it would almost certainly 
be profitable to hire more, even at the higher wage, and retain 
the old workers. The principal reason that he does not do so 
is that the hog operation is so very much more profitable, without 
requiring the always difficult labor management of cacao.
Sr. Prado considers that his children's most important inheri­
tance is their education. One son is interested in cattle, and one 
in the pig operation, but neither cares about the cacao - a personal 
disappointment for their father who has been active in cacao politics. 
This succession problem is probably an important reason why the 
plantations have been neglected.
Ramirez Family
Sr. Ramirez, 54, was born in Cunduacan town, where he worked in 
accounting and business. At age 22, he and his wife moved to Huimango 
1° to open a store, the proceeds from which were invested seven years 
later in two hectares of cacao land. Ten years later he gave up the 
store to concentrate on cacao production and ranching, after adding 18 
hectares of pastureland, and hi6 wife's inheritance of four hectares 
of cacao. In 1978, he bought another 24-hectare ranch. The couple has 
11 children, of whom three are married and in urban occupations; three 
are in professional schools and five are school-age.
The Ramirez assets are estimated to be worth around US$130,000­
180,000, again around 3/4 in land. The family cattle herd includes 67 
animals. There are no longer any significant off-farm assets.
Sr. Ramirez works without any full-time assistance, despite time­
consuming involvement in community and cacao politics. For four months 
of the year, the farm requires less than one full-time worker. During 
May, July, October, November and April, two are required for at least 
part of the month. But January through March, the farm is a four- 
worker operation; fifty per cent of all labor is performed at this 
time. 42 per cent of all labor involves cacao harvest or post-harvest 
operations, for which most labor is hired.
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All family labor, except for the wife's minimal participation In 
pod-breaking, takes place in the afternoons or weekends, secondary to 
other activities. Note the very large number of hired laborers used 
(20), most of them yearly, and for a relatively high wage ($20 per 
hour at the lowest level). Relations between Sr. Ramirez and his 
workers are the most "business-like" of the three farmers.
He also fertilized and used insecticides more heavily than the 
others. The Ramirez farm came closest to fulfilling Flan recommenda­
tions. Net cash farm earnings were high: $1699 per family man-day 
(US$75) versus $1003 over-all on the farm and $478 in cattle. Labor 
earnings were $977 per family man-day; $1644 in cacao, $1758 in cattle. 
With equity included, the average family man-day earned between 
$27 and $315 over-all, $1099-1352 for the cacao enterprise. The cattle 
operation showed a loss, mainly because building up the herd permitted 
few sales.
Sr. Ramirez' main temporary constraint is lack of capital, as he 
went into debt to finance the expanded cattle operation. But after 
cattle sales begin in earnest, finance should not be a problem. The 
cacao operation is pretty efficient, and he claims to need no more 
labor.
But when the college-age boys are out of school, only two sons 
will remain to help out part-time. Taking a long view, it seems that 
hiring a full-time assistant would be worthwhile. Even with social 
security, an assistant's pay would not be above $42,000 per year; 
extra harvest labor would also be needed in January-March, assuming 
higher yields. Total costs would increase by $20,000, but by so doing, 
calving care could be given, and cattle and cacao would not compete 
for attention during the cacao harvest. It would take the marketing of 
only two extra steers per year, or an increase in cacao yields of 
200 kilos (three per cent), to justify the expense.
The family might also consider renting pasture in the dry months 
to supplement their own, and hence increase the carrying capacity of 
their land.
This farmer supported ten people, at an average expenditure of 
$31,568 per person (two to three times subsistence levels). 44 per 
cent of the budget went for food (clothes were not included, because 
almost none were bought that year); educational expenses followed in 
importance.
Like Sr. Prado, Sr. Ramirez considers that his children's chief 
inheritance will be their education. Indeed, none seems interested in a 
career farming the land. While the father would like to buy more 
land, the lack of labor and of children's interest restrains him.
Sr. Ramirez is very sensitive to issues of alternative in­
vestments and profits* which is indicated in his historic response to 
cacao conditions. He acquired his cacao land in 1955 and 1962; since 
then he has concentrated on increasing production by renovation. He 
replanted three hectares around 1965 and another in 1976. During the
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1960's, he says that he produced less, but that goods were less expen­
sive; and he supplemented production with Income from the store.
As cacao prices rose, he got rid of the store; in 1975 he ceased 
maize production. If consumer prices continue to rise and cacao prices 
fall, he would seriously consider opening a modern butcher shop. He 
says he would abandon his plantation if the price went as low as $30 
per kilo. If cacao prices increase, he plans to add more chemicals and 
do more careful pruning, and particularly, renovate his drains.
Gomez Family
Sr. Gomez is 78, with no formal schooling. He is the son of one 
of the first campesinos to settle in Huimango 2°. While single and a 
young married man, he worked primarily as a jornalero. When he was 
forty, he received his share of eight hectares of his father's land, 
of which he sold the four hectares of pastureland. When he married, 
his in-laws gave one, and later sold eight hectares to him. In 1972, 
he bought another one-hectare parcel, which he sold in 1978.
Sr. Gomez and his wife have six children, none living at home.
The four daughters married young and are housewives. Both sons work 
in cacao; the youngest, Antonio, with his father. None has formal 
schooling past the third grade.
Sr. Gomez' assets were worth nearly US$90,000, nearly all in 
land. He had a small herd of cattle, and assorted small livestock. His 
farm was a one-man operation May-August, two-man September and January, 
required three men in March and April, four in December, and five 
full-time workers in the high harvest months of October-November.
Only Antonio was fully employed on the farm. Sr. Gomez was semi­
retired; he worked only 2/3 of the year and admitted his productivity 
was only half that of his son. Yet only in October, November and March 
did Antonio work a longer-than-usual (25-day) month, under pressure.
For five months of the year, he worked less than 15 days per month.
In addition to farm work, he rented out their truck about eight times a 
year for trips to Cunduacan and Comalcalco.
Sr. Gomez hired 13 different men, half of whom had some blood or 
social relation to him. One old man who cleaned drains, his compadre, 
was offered work more out of charity than necessity. His wage was 
approximately $16 per hour for a long day. For digging drains or weeding 
pasture the wage was much higher, but paid for a completed job, not 
by the hour. During 1980-81, when yields went down significantly due 
to the weather, the amount of labor hired dropped, despite the fact 
that the father's worsening physical health meant that his participa­
tion stopped. Sr. Gomez feels he has no control over wages, 
particularly at harvest; he absolutely must have the assistance, so 
he pays the price.
Sr. Gomez' cash income in 1979-80 was $137,586, or $332 per 
family man-day worked, with the cattle business operating at a loss.
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Labor earnings were about $365 per family man-day, and cattle returns 
were healthily positive. With a low estimate for equity return 
deduction, returns were $123 per family man-day - barely the going 
minimum wage, although the cacao enterprise earns $203 per family man- 
day. Because of a high equity estimate, returns were negative over-all 
and only $55 per family man-day in cacao. These negative values were 
mostly attributable to four hectares of land underutilized in maize, 
an expensive house and a truck.
For Sr. Gomez, labor is a significant constraint, because only one 
full-time worker is available for a plantation which half the year 
requires over three full-time people. The family would like to find a 
permanent worker, but is unwilling to pay the necessary cost. They 
would still need part-time labor at harvest, and the man would be 
extraneous for four months. Now, they cannot find "reliable” labor, 
witness the fact that for a total of under one man-equivalent, 13 
workers were hired in the year, half of whom had never worked there 
before. Given the very high returns to labor in this operation, it 
seems that Sr. Gomez would be wise to offer higher-than-competitive 
wages to attract steadier workers.
Capital is also a constraint for the Gomez family. For two years 
in a row breeding stock was sold to pay for medical care. But Sr. 
Gomez' credit is very good and investment potential high. His budget 
supports only himself and his wife, spending $41,500 per person, apart 
from recent housing investments. Even if Antonio gets paid out of farm 
earnings, there would be sufficient income for savings and farm 
investment.
Sr. Gomez substituted Guayaquil for Criollo on the cacao land he 
received earliest. After 1500 cacao trees began to produce in the 
late 1960's, he ceased maize production to concentrate on cacao. His 
production steadily increased over the next ten years. During the low- 
price years of the mid-1960's, he claims that he just worked a bit 
harder and depended on subsistence production.
He believes that even if the price of cacao should drop to above 
$20 per kilo, he would still produce, but with fewer inputs. Antonio, 
on the other hand, would probably go to work elsewhere if the price 
dropped much at all. While Sr. Gomez feels that it is "better to be 
working than to put your money in the bank" and would not consider 
other investments outside agriculture, Antonio clearly has a more 
"business-like" attitude about future investments and diversification.
Sr. Gomez, who is now retiring, has strained relations with most 
of his offspring. If Antonio keeps working with him and they get on 
well, chances are that he will get the remaining undivided land, and 
the other children will receive money as their principal inheritance. 
Already two sons have been given use rights over one hectare each. If 
Antonio left, Sr. Gomez would be tempted simply to give each child a 
hectare and sell the rest. He considers retiring to town. Note that 
in the 1970's, nearly all of net income went to consumption, rather 
than new investment.
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Summary of Case Studies
The HLB families' capital assets were comparable in value to a 
middle- or upper-middle class U.S. home. The buildings and other 
infrastructure represent substantial investment. The average farm 
size is 14 hectares, and on average, the HLB farm produces two to 
three times more cacao than do family-based farms and more than eight 
times as much as the minifundia. Cacao is usually the principal 
activity. Fourteen per cent of the farms in the SST sample included 
livestock production among the two most important activities.
Production conditions are similar among hired-labor-based farms.
It is remarkable that per hectare imputed cash costs (valuing family 
labor at $120 per day) were nearly the same for all three of our case 
studies. Also, they compare roughly to the $10,647 per-hectare cost 
estimated by the Cacao Plan as "traditional production without rehabili­
tation."
This is despite a relatively low level of chemical input use per 
hectare ($530-1890 compared to the recommended $4731). This low level 
is surprising given that this group has the greatest access to 
capital, and was paying inflated prices for chemicals. According to 
the CCT, HLB farmers tend to have more spraying and other types of 
cacao equipment and use more fertilizer than do other farmers. More 
farms had their cacao and shade trees in good condition than the 
minifundia, though not as many as among family farms. The critical 
limiting factor appears to be labor costs or availability for chemical 
application and cultivation care.
Except for Sr. Prado, depreciation costs were not high relative 
to total costs. But costs for the use of equity capital, estimated at 
a very low seven per cent (banks are now paying 15-25 per cent on 
simple deposits) accounted for 2/3 to 3/4 of all costs not relating to 
family labor use for the three producers. Including imputed costs of 
family labor, the figure was 40-50 per cent, approximately that in the 
"recommended" budget.
None of the farmers had a major cash flow problem, largely due to 
diversification of farm enterprises. All three case study producers 
covered cash costs and depreciated costs and still showed cacao ear­
nings. Sr. Ramirez and Sr. Gomez both covered equity cacao costs as 
well, earning $8.43 and $7.24 on every peso invested. Even Sr. Prado 
earned $2.50 per peso invested. Cacao was in fact extremely profitable 
for these farmers.
Hired-Labor-Based Family Economic Strategies
The HLB farm families share a number of common production, 
investment and employment strategies, and tend to have very specific 
responses to the economic changes brought about by the petroleum boom. 
Their basic goals are: to maximize profits, minimize labor supervi­
sions and promote upward mobility in family employment.
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Profit Maximization
The hired-labor-based producers seek profit maximization in a 
conscious way and are not excessively risk-aversive. The farm is 
managed in such a way as to produce as much cacao as possible with the 
fewest inputs. The cacao enterprise must produce profits comparable to 
or greater than the average farm or non-farm alternative in terms of 
returns to capital invested and returns to family labor to justify 
farmer interest in improved productivity. Also, if returns to cacao 
are less than those in other farming or off-farm activities, the 
farmer will respond by transferring resources to those activities. 
Return to family labor is a much less important consideration than 
return to capital.
Mobility of Assets
The families have sufficient assets that they are not, for rea­
sons of security, or access to cash or means of production, restricted 
from entering alternative occupations or investments. A notable 
feature of this group has been the transfer of resources out of cacao 
in recent years, in favor of cattle production or non-agricultural 
investment. Despite the profitability of cacao indicated above, these 
other activities are more attractive to farmers. The phenomenon is 
especially interesting, since several years ago the trend was for 
businessmen (successful outside of agriculture) to purchase cacao farms 
with their non-farm incomes and profits.
Minimizing Labor Supervision
Another factor pushing these farmers away from cacao is the 
desire to minimize their use of hired labor. This is not due to 
unusually high costs. Labor earnings per man-day in cacao were greater 
than the typical wage paid for cacao work, and except for Sr. Prado, 
far higher even than the highest quoted wage for harvest, drain­
digging or other higher-paid work. Rather, unwillingness to supervise 
labor, the costs involved in search time, and uncertainty about stabili ty, 
' mean that labor will rarely be hired to the point where marginal 
returns equal the wage. Indeed, the marginal value product of hired 
labor is impossible for farmers to estimate, even roughly, given the 
multitude of factors which affect yields.
In the days when labor costs were quite low and fairly stable in 
Tabasco, before the 1970's, considerations of labor use in enterprise 
decision-making were minimal. Labor demand was directly related to 
cacao prices and yearly harvest levels. This relation no longer holds.
Yet many employers are philosophically outraged at the evolution of 
high labor payments, which are felt to be undeserved or likely to be 
wasted. They are averse to dealing with large numbers of workers 
whose bargaining position is suddenly strong, while their own social 
control has weakened.
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And unlike other types of farm families in which total family 
income is in part derived from off-farm wages, increased labor prices 
are always negative for the hired-labor-based family. Higher general 
wages may improve the internal family bargaining position of sons who 
work on the farm, however.
There is a clear inverse relation between access to capital and 
use of family labor. Cash costs per hectare on the Gomez farm were 
only half that of the Ramirez farm and a quarter that of the Prado 
farm. Family labor as a percentage of total labor was 2/3, 4/9 and 
1/20 respectively. Under conditions where the wage is extremely low, 
hired labor would substitute for family labor almost entirely.
Otherwise, family and hired labor are to a certain extent comple­
mentary. Even minimum maintenance on these larger plantations requires 
use of hired labor. Increased producer family-labor use, over a wide 
range of inputs, implies greater demand for hired labor - at least 
during the harvest period. Similarly, increased use of hired labor to 
increase production may increase the demand for work from family women 
and children who do pod-breaking, washing, drying or sorting activities.
Family Employment Strategy: Upward Mobility
The HLB farm households are socioculturally less tightly bound to 
the farming way of life than are the campesino types of producers for 
whom the land represents security in a very fundamental sense. HLB 
family employment strategy, even when families are dedicated to farming, 
includes a continual search for improved personal and family options.
On the typical HLB farm, the farmer and his family perform nearly 
half of the required farmwork. The exact proportion is deter­
mined by the demographic stage, and related issues: number of older 
sons available, the sons' decision to work on or off the farm, total 
labor demanded on the farm, and the degree of farmer participation, 
i.e., his choosing to work on the farm rather than in alternative 
businesses.
On smaller farms, family women participate in cacao production, 
but this activity is minimal and rarely includes physically demanding 
activity, which might be seen as a sign of diminished family status.
On the other hand, many educated daughters seek employment in services, 
commerce or the professions, which confers considerable status.
Fifteen per cent of heads of household on HLB farms do cacao 
farming as a secondary occupation. These heads of household tend to 
have a diverse employment background. Those who did not recently 
enter farming were jornaleros in their early years. But today one 
rarely sees a HLB farmer over 30-40 working as a low-status jornalero.
A high number of older sons do agricultural and cacao wage labor, 
but it tends to be on the family farm, rather than on other properties. 
A tension exists between father and sons about the role of sons 
on the farm. After age 16 or so, sons become concerned with earning 
their own incomes and determining future professions, and we see the
development of multiple Individual strategies rather than a single 
"family strategy" of Investment and employment. According to the SST, 
18 per cent of the total EAP from HLB farms - nearly a quarter of non­
head of household EAP - worked outside of agriculture in 1979.
Basically, HLB farmers and their families consider their principal 
role on the farm once reaching their mid- to late 20's to be that 
of manager rather than worker. As a result, few family members not in 
a managerial role will remain on the farm. Those HLB workers who left 
cacao farming usually changed to skilled trade occupations or employ­
ment in commerce and services.
Those farmers who did very well financially have encouraged their 
children to seek a future off the farm, and become upwardly mobile.
But as a result, they became totally dependent on hired labor. To some 
extent, this has reduced the pressure to sub-divide properties. On the 
other hand, the greater independence of sons caused by the changing 
economic environment has forced many families who need and want 
children's participation on the farm to depend instead on hired labor.
Hired-Labor-Based Farm Household Response to Change 
Price Response
The petroleum boom appears to have disrupted the cacao economy in 
ways that are likely to permanently reduce production by HLB farmers: 
the economic position of cacao relative to other economic activities 
in the state has declined, and the cost and availability of labor 
greatly constrain the potential for growth for farmers dependent on 
hired workers.
Hired-labor-based cacao producers are quick to increase produc­
tion when real prices increase and also quick to reduce their efforts 
when prices fall. In the past, if the future price of cacao relative 
to other potential products looked positive, the hired-labor-based 
producers continued basic maintenance operations, despite low prices; 
but otherwise they were strongly tempted to replace plantations with 
pasture, given the less demanding labor requirements of cattle-raising.
Wage Response
If wage rates do drop, hired-labor-based producers would 
definitely wish to increase their use of labor in cacao production, 
assuming stable cacao prices. But although profits would improve, it 
is unlikely that there would be a corresponding improvement in 
productivity (i.e., use of more inputs) given the importance of labor 
costs in most alternative enterprises.
If wages continue to rise, very large landowners would likely 
abandon plantations and turn to other activities. The "farmers" would 
probably reduce cultivation care and yields. Should cacao prices
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increase, labor use would increase, but not at as fast a rate as 
general input use.
Appropriate Policy Toward Hired-Labor-Based Cacao Farming
Technical assistance programs are helpful for hired-labor-based 
farmers, but the types of research done now in Tabasco assume 
unrealistic access to labor, as do the present recommended farm budgets. 
The profit level needed to inspire hired-labor-based producers to add 
new inputs is greatly underestimated.
The Plan and the UNPC should work together to try innovative 
solutions to labor scarcity. Some possibilities might be the organiza­
tion of traveling work units (composed of landless and minifundia 
workers) which charge normal wages, but guarantee high quality work. 
Should HLB producers find themselves tempted to move out of cacao 
farming altogether, arrangements might be made to transfer property 
and cultivation rights temporarily or permanently to smallholders or 
landless workers, or for a fair rental system to be institutionalized.
The HLB family tendency to move many or most children into non­
farm activities dovetails nicely with long-term Tabasco State Plan 
employment objectives. But the Plan must not lose sight of the poten­
tial danger to agricultural production of a generalized preference 
against agriculture and cacao farming by the hired-labor-based sector, 
which is after all still responsible for a large share of state 
production.
The Role of HLB Producers in Agricultural Development
The very source of the capitalist farmer's advantage in stable 
economic conditions - rapid and extensive response to price incentives 
- is the source of poor performance in difficult times or under 
uncertain economic conditions, such as the petroleum boom in Tabasco.
In Tabasco, the response to relative price changes in wages and in 
crops and farm/urban price relationships led to a large-scale decline 
in production and transfer to urban investments.
Because wage labor is such a large part of farm costs, HLB 
farmers are extremely responsive to real wage-level changes. Hence 
increasing wages may lead to a big drop in local employment and 
investment strategies to substitute for labor in the long term, 
regardless of the short-term nature of the wage changes.
An increase in the proportion of cacao farming by hired-labor- 
based producers at the expense of the campesino type farmer - as is 
sometimes recommended - would probably lead to an over-all reduction in 
employment. This group is the least labor-intensive at all but very 
intensive levels of production because the internal rationality of 
entrepreneurial farming continually pressures the farmer to reduce his 
wage burden.
CHAPTER 6. FAMILY FARM CACAO PRODUCTION STRATEGY
The "Campesino": Focus of Recent Development Efforts
The Tabascan family farm producer represents the "campesinado," 
or smallholder population, with sufficient land to support the family. 
They account for over a quarter of all cacao producers in the state, 
and a third of all production - and that proportion is growing.
This type of farm family has very modest means, and thus gives high 
priority to ensuring the family subsistence. This frequently means a 
large percentage of farm production goes to family-consumed goods.
Strategies of agricultural development all over the world have 
consistently been oriented toward encouraging a shifting balance on 
such farms toward greater commercial production and marketed 
surpluses. Most programs aimed to convert them - if not replace them - 
with the "profit-motivated" type of farmer.
In earlier years this population group was felt to have an 
important role in general economic development - that of increasing 
productivity so as to release labor for use in other sectors. Today, 
under conditions of slow employment growth even in rapidly developing 
economies, this goal has been reversed to foster retention of labor on 
farms. Under the best of conditions, this assumes increased produc­
tivity to ensure reasonable returns to such extra labor.
Unfortunately, most new farm technology development has been 
oriented to increase labor productivity in ways that are labor­
replacing. Technical assistance programs for hired-labor-based 
producers do not address the special needs of campesino-type families.
But farm families for whom survival strategy demands guaranteed 
employment for family members and maximizing returns to the family 
would be theoretically amenable to this new policy objective. And 
there is increasing evidence that under specific conditions, campesino 
farming has these characteristics. This is in fact the justification 
for new international programs focusing on peasant farming, despite 
the considerable rhetoric emphasizing welfare consideration for the 
"marginados."
Apart from their potential for achieving acceptable levels of 
production and employment growth, the campesinado plays a complex role 
in times of economic stress. With farm systems evolved specifically , 
to protect the family and keep the farm going under adverse 
conditions, they tend to weather economic storms with impressive results. 
The gist of the debate raging in Mexico over the existence or not of a 
tendency for the campesinado to disappear hinges precisely on the 
question of capitalist and campesino performance and interaction 
during periods of expansion versus periods of stress.
The striking case of the Tabasco family-farm cacao producer 
affirms the particular advantages of campesino farming in times of 
stress and rapid change. The degree to which these conditions were
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unique to the cacao farmer in this specific time period and the degree 
to which the experience represents the real potential of the 
campesinado will be discussed in the concluding Chapter 10. .
Family Farm Production in Tabasco
Family-farm cacao production has probably been the predominant 
historical form of cacao production since the time of the Mayas.
Given the relative abundance of land, there was no reason why 
producers could not plant as much cacao as family labor resources 
would permit.
The area today where this type of farm predominates is in the 
zones newly opened up late last century, in areas of colonization, and 
where land was granted to ejidos. The most common story told in the 
regional survey was that parents or grandparents moved from an area of 
dense population in the Old Chontalpa to frontier areas where they 
cleared land, planted subsistence crops, and then established cacao 
plantations - on all land that could be opened through use of family 
labor.
Because these areas were sparsely populated, there were few 
landless laborers for hire. Community mutual aid patterns between 
families, compadres or neighbors developed to meet labor peaks. The 
typical lack of schooling for children meant that, at a young age, 
they participated in cacao harvest and pod-breaking.
In the past several decades (with increasing population density, 
the rise of minifundia and improved communication) relations between 
the three types of producers have increased markedly, including the 
use of hired labor on the family farm, and hiring out to largeholders 
when cash is short.
The family farm mode of cacao production is closest to the 
conceptual "peasant mode of production" which posits the family as the 
basic unit of both consumption and production. The family economy 
changes over time with the demographic cycle.
For Tabascan cacaoteros, the paradigm must be adjusted for 
active labor and product markets. Concern for subsistence and the 
secure reproduction of family and farm is paramount, but the last 
generation of farmers found these conditions satisfied through 
combined production for home use and commercial cacao. Hired labor is 
used, but only when family labor is temporarily insufficient.
Demographic and employment traits are tightly interwoven; Chart 
27 summarizes the relevant data from the SST. The demographic cycle as 
it operates among Tabascan cacao farming families can be summarized as 
follows. Young men, sons of cacao farmers, still single or newly 
married, work on their father's plantations, but also as jornaleros to 
earn cash for future investment or setting up a household. Their 
sisters also help on the farm and may earn cash washing, sewing, or 
providing other services.
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At marriage, the son receives his own parcel of land to use. As 
soon as it provides sufficient income to support his family, he 
ceases jornaleando except as a source of emergency money*1/ He may 
continue to help his own father in these early years. As soon as his 
own children are old enough to help in the fields, farm production 
goes up markedly, and so does the need for and ability to afford hired 
labor.
When sons are in their late teens, the need for hired labor 
goes down. The trade-off between sons working for the father or 
off-farm depends on relative earnings, desire for independence, and 
family ties. As children grow older and devote more attention to 
their own affairs, the farmer must again seek supplementary hired 
help. The SST shows a high incidence of migration for these families, 
particularly for individuals aged 16-20. If, over the years, the 
family acquires considerably more cacao area via inheritance or 
purchase, or the combining of assets, it may emerge as a hired-labor- 
based farm.
Thus we see the family farm household typically headed by a 
middle-aged couple with several children out of elementary school, 
just breaking the severe cash constraint caused by a large number of 
dependents per family worker, blessed with many willing hands whose 
labor need not be paid. On average, the family farm has more working- 
age members than other family types. Just over six per cent of heads 
of household in the SST sample were female.
Typical Family Farm Households: Case Studies
The three farm households studied in detail belonged to Sr. Luna 
and Sr. Sandoval, ejidatarios in Huimango 2° in Cunduacan, and Sr. 
Rama, a private property owner newly turned ejidatario in Galeana 2° 
in Teapa. Data collection for another family in Quintana Roo was not 
completed. Tables 12 through 14 summarize management data for these 
family cacao farms.
Luna Family
Sr. Luna, 76, was born in Jalpa town. He lives with his wife 
Elena, two sons and two daughters ages 17-26. Three married sons, ages 
35-43 work with their father on the land; the fourth son has a small 
plot of his own. The three married sisters who live nearby are house­
wives. All the children were born in Huimango 2°; none has more than 
a third-grade education.
1/ The pattern has changed slightly from the days when most 
young men were establishing new plantations, rather than improving 
established ones; there is not the same need for supplementary income 
while waiting for trees to first produce.
TABLE 12. INPUTS FOR FAMILY CACAO FARMS, 1979-80*^
S a n d o v a l  F a r m L u n a  F a r m R a m a  F a r m R E C O M M E N D E D :  y  W / 0  R ehabil. W i t h  R e h a b
P R O D U C T I V I T Y
# T r e e s 2 , 5 0 0  (435/h) 3 , 500 ( 500/h) 3 , 0 0 0  (500/h) 6 0 0 /h 6 0 0 /h
A g e  1 A O  y e a r s  - 1A00 25 y e a r s  - 1 200 1 5 - 2 0  yrs - 2 000
A g e  2 20 y e a r s  - 500 2 8  y e a r s  - 1000 1 0  y e a r s  - 5 0 0
A g e  3 
P D N / T r e e
16 y e a r s  - 600 
.68 - .77
35 y r  - 1000, 2 y 
- 3 0 0
.557 -  .675 
( $ 1 3 , 9 3 0 - 1 5 , 4 3 5 )
r 6 - 7  y e a r s  - 500 
.346 k i l o s Avg. 1 . 3 / t r e e -  
(Ca c a o  Cene
1.3
P D N / H e c t a r e 340 ($17,000) 2 7 8 . 6 - 3 0 8 . 7 1 7 3  ($8650) Avg. 5 3 8  k i l o s / h
6 3 7  835 k g / h
M a n - D a y s / H e c t a r e 1 35(163) 2 7 . 3 5 9.1 8 1.5 130
Pru n i n g ,
c l e a r i n g
2 8 . 8 4.5 23 21 24
D r a i n s 1.8 .5 11 3 6
F e r t i l i z e r 7.1 - 1 0.6 2.5 10
I n s e c t i c i d e .5 1.2 .6 12 20
F u n g i c i d e 2 8 . 8 ( 5 7 . 6 ) 1.1 1.3 15 30
H a r v e s t  & P o d ­
B r e a k i n g
68 20 12.6 28 40
I n p u t s / H e c t a r e
F e r t i l i z e r
U r e a - 2 X / y e a r - - 2 X / y e a r
1 8 - 9 - 1 8 - - 1 X / y e a r - -
1 5 - 1 5 - 2 3 - - - - -
F l o r e n 2 X / y e a r 2 X / y e a r - - 1-2 X
N u t r i s o l - - - - -
G r o - G r e e n - - 1 X / y e a r - -
C r e s c a l - - - - -
I n s e c t i c i d e s
T r i d e n t - ' - - - -
M e t i l i c o 2 X / y e a r 1 X / y e a r 2 X / y e a r - 2 - 3  X
F o l e y - - - - -
F o l i d o l - 2 X / y e a r - -
F o l i m a c I X / y e a r - - - -
P o l i d o r - 1 X / y e a r - - -
F u n g i c i d e
L i m e  & S u l f a t e 8 X / y e a r 4-6 X / y e a r 3 X / y e a r - 5 - 8  X
C u p r a s o l - - 2 X / y e a r - -
P r u n i n g 1 X / y e a r  m a j o r  1 X / y e a r  m a j o r  
* f r e q u e n t  m i n  1 m i n o r
+  1 X / y r  m a j o r  +  
f r e q u e n t  m i n o r
2 - 3  X
*Author, Cacao Farm Budget Studies, 1979-81, Tabasco. Mexico, 
a/ kg = kilograms; yr = year; h = hectares; X = times, 
b/ These data are from estimates in the SARH, Plan de Cacao, 1979.
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TABLE 13. COSTS OF CACAO PRODUCTION ON FAMILY CACAO FARMS, 1979-80*
( K E C O f l E W D E D ) - ^
INPUTS tuna Fare Sandoval Pam C rila lv a^
Plan . . 
Unrehab.-'
Plan . 
Rehab
LABOR $ 1,000 $ 12,550 $ 7,200 8 9,400 $ 8,100 $13,900
Interest - - 12,000 - - -
INPUTS: 9,360 13,290 8,598 5,075 2,547 4,731
Hisc. - 8,000 (rent, 4,000 (equip. - - -
1 /
transport) transport)
Fertiliser 100 2,860 3,200 1,500 2,366
Urea - - (960) - - ■ -
lfi-9-18 - - (1.480) - - -
FLoren - (100) - - - -
Cro-Creen - - (420) - - -
Nutrisol - ' - - - - -
Insecticide 4,800 540 1,600 675 1,047 2,365
Foliaac - - (880) - - -
Tridente - (380) - - - -
Hctilico (I) (160) - - - -
Methyl - - - - - -
BHC - - - - - -
Foley - - (720) - - -
Polidor (4.800) - - - - -
Folldol - - - - - -
Fungicide 4,560 4,650 2,638 1,200 - -
Line (960) (150) (138) - - -
Sulfate (3,600) (4,500) (2,500) - HI. * - -
CASH COSTS 10.360 25,840 30,198 14,475 10,647 18,631
DEPRECIATION 3,000 - 1,000 - - -
FULL COSTS 11,360 25,840 31,198 14,475 10,647 18,631
EQUITY DEDUCTED^ 50,076 36,127 44,033 14,000 14,000 14,000
(10,500) (10,500) (10,500)
COSTS WITH EQUITY 61,436 61,967 75,231 28,475 24,647 32,631
DEDUCTION (24.975) (21.147) (29,131)
No. Hectares 7 5 6 1 1 1
PER HECTARE 
TOTAL CASH COSTS 1,480 5,168 4,616 _ 10,647 18,631
FAMILY MAM-DAYS/ 32.7 95 83 - _
HECTARE
IMPUTED COST 3,925 11,400 9,960 - - -
FAMILY LABOR
CASH FOR INPUTS 1,337 2,658 2,058 - 2,547 4,731
WITH DEPRECIATION^ 5,547 16,568 15,159 - 10,647 18,631
WITH EQ0I7I, 
DEDUCT! IF1
* 12.701 * 23.793 8 22,497 24,647 32,631
For footnotes, see NOTES, Table 8
TABLE 14. ALL FARM PRODUCTION COSTS ON FAMILY CACAO FARMS, 1979-80*
INPUTS Luna Farm Sandoval Farm Rama Farm
Labor $ 1,000 $ 12,550 $ 17,200
Cacao - - 7,200
Cattle - - 10,000
Maize - - -
Cacao chemicals
and mlsc. 9,360 5,290 4,818
Vehicle^ - -
Cattle Feed, etc. 14,000 5,250 -
Veterinary services
and medicines 1,500 - -
Equipment - - 3,000
Cattle purchases - - -
Interest on loans - (47,500) 12,000
Rent land, equip. - 1,000 sprayer -
Miscellaneous — ' 585 T. 7,000 T. 150 T.; 1,000
CASH COSTS 30,145 32,090 (78,590 ) 37,948
Depreciation 3,000 -  . 2,666
Cacao - - —
Cattle - - —
Maize, etc. - - —
Presents of 
products — _ _
FULL COSTS 33,145 32,090 40,614
Equity capital costs 66,213 36,127 84,533
Cacao 50,076 - 44,033
Cattle - - -
Maize, etc. - - -
COSTS WITH DEDUCTION 
OF 7% ON EQUITY 99,357 68,217 125,247
CAPITAL
*Author, Cacao Farm Budget Studies, 1979-81, Tabasco, Mexico.
a j This value includes tractors, trucks, etc. 
b/ F. = fuel; T. = transportation
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Initlally landless, Sr. Luna was one of the original settlers on 
the ejldo in 1939, receiving rights to six hectares in 1943. During 
the Trujillo administration, he received help from the Ejidal Bank to 
plant cacao. Maize for subsistence was produced until around the mid- 
1960's, and rubber and coffee in the late 1970's. The three married 
sons who help Sr. Luna received land in Huimango 1° ten years ago, but 
it was of low quality, unsuitable for cacao.
Total capital on the Luna farm was valued at nearly $1 million 
pesos (US$42,000) mostly in the value of the cacao trees. The ejidal 
land does not "belong" to the family, therefore only improvements 
count as assets. If land value were included, his total assets would 
increase to $1.2 - 2.0 million pesos. The small herd of livestock was 
worth $91,000.
The percentage of hired labor in farm production for Sr. Luna was 
only two per cent, yet this expenditure accounted for 32 per cent of 
cacao and 45 per cent of total costs. Most hired workers were related 
to the family and lived on the ejido.
Farm labor needs are unevenly distributed: May-October, the farm 
supposedly requires only half a man-month equivalent; November-April,
1/2 to 2 1/2 man-month equivalents. The 24 hectares jointly operated 
by the three men thus seem underutilized. Sr. Luna is semi-retired and 
is now active mainly in farm administration.
Cacao yields in 1979 were lower than normal, because the farm had 
suffered a severe insect infestation. The family had not fertilized, 
and the time spent in general spraying was much less than recommended. 
Cash seemed to be the most important constraint to increasing 
production.
Assets were tied up in cattle and land, and the sons were for 
some reason unwilling to pay more attention to cacao - causing a labor 
shortage either for lack of inputs, or because they had some alter­
native employment undisclosed (or unknown to) their father. Cacao 
played only a minor role in individual family strategies. To reach 
recommended levels, cash for inputs would have to increase five-fold.
Family cacao farm income data are shown in Tables 15 and 16. Sr. 
Luna and his sons sold their cacao jointly and he distributed one 
tenth of the proceeds to each son, retaining the rest for himself. 
Returns per hectare were $6650, giving a value per family man-day worked 
of $136-174. This value jumped to $150-192 when simple labor earnings 
were computed; labor earnings with equity return deducted reduced the 
value of the family man-day worked to only $29-71. This does not 
include potential income from selling steers in the near future, 
despite half of cash costs going to the livestock operation.
The Luna family's consumption during 1979/80 amounted to $61,010, 
for six people, or an average of $10,100 per person.
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TABLE 15. FAMILY CACAO FARM HOUSEHOLD GROSS INCOME, 1979-80*
SOURCE Rama Family Sandoval Family Luna Family
Cacao
Poultry
$61,480 $22,158 (direct sale) 
15,000 (sale to creditor)
$128,866
Garden 10,000 - -
Cattle - 1 - 8,000
Rent pasture 11,520 - -
Pig sales 3,000 -
Milk _
Pepper - 540 -
Bananas - 2,400 —
Misc. - 138 -
TOTAL FARM
CASH INCOME $83,000 $43,236 $136,866
Family pro­
duce consume
1,300
3
8,400 2,040
Change in 
livestock 
inventory
- - 12,700
Misc. - ■47,500^ -
TOTAL FARM
LABOR
EARNINGS $84,300
$99,136 $151,606
Off-Farm - 1,200 -
Agricultural
Non-agricul­
tural
96,000 Store 
(net)
16,200 -
Loans — —
TOTAL INCOME $183,300 $116,506 $151,606
*Author, Cacao Farm Budget Studies, 1979-81, Tabasco, Mexico. 
a j Additional worth of cacao sold to creditor (see text).
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TABLE 16A. FAMILY AND FARM INCOME OF FAMILY CACAO FARM HOUSEHOLDS,
1979-80, LUNA FAMILY*
Income Measure^ Cash Incoaa^
Labor Earnlnga^-' (w/o 
Equity Return Dad.)
Labor lemlmge^' Vw/ 
Equity Return Deg.)
a. Nat f a r * ___ $114,911 $126,651 $ 60,438
b. Net o ff-fa r* agricultural. ___ - - -  '
c. Net noa-agrlcultural ___ - . - -
d. Net total —^ 114,911 126,651 60,438
e. Net fa re ___ per hectare 6,550 7,036 3,357
f . Net fa re ___ per man-day on fare^ 174 190 91
g. Net f a r * ___per faally nan-day on
far**^ 174 192 92
h. Net noa-agrlcultural ___per family .
aan-day worked outside agriculture*-' - - -
1. Net agrlculturel o ff-fa te___per
f sa lly  man-day worked*^ - - -
J . Net total ___ per family aan-day worked^ 175 192 9:
k. Net cacao ___per man-day in  cacao^ 208 205 i i ;
1. Not cattle ___ per man-day In  ca ttle^ - - -
e* Net p ig ___par man-day la pig work— ^ - - -
a. Net per maa-dav In  — _
o. Net cacao per family man-day la 
cacao^ 210 207 118
p. Net c a tt le ___ per family man-day in
cattle^ _ _ _
<|. Net pig ___ par family man-day in p lge^ - - -
r. N et________per family man-day In ^ - - -
a. X labor In cacao expenses^ 8.7 7.7 : 1.6
t. X labor In whole farm expenses^ 3.3 6.9 1 " 2
*For source and footnotes, see NOTES, Table 11
TABLE 16B. FAMILY AND FARM INCOME OF FAMILY CACAO FARM HOUSEHOLDS,
1979-80, SANDOVAL FAMILY*
(RESULTS) p /_______________________ g/
Income H e u u t ^ Cub Income^
Labor Earulnge^ (w/o 
Koulty Retura Dad.)
Labor Eartlnga2  (w/ 
Equity Return Ded.)
a. Net fern $ 12,146 $ 20,546 (60,046) $-15,631 (31,869)
b. Net off-farm agricultural 1,200 1,200 1,200
c. Net uon-agrleultural ___ 16,200 16,200 16,200
d. Net total __— 29,546 37,946 (85,446) -31 (49,269)
e. Net farm___ per hectare 2,112 3,573 -  2,718 (11,834)
f. Net farm___ per man-day on farm^ 17 28 (93) -  25 (43)
g- Net farm___ per family man-day
on farm®^ 19 33 (108) -  25 (51)
h. Net non-agrlcultural ___ per family
man-day worked outalde agriculture®^ 120 120 120
1. Net agricultural off-farm ___ per family
man-day worked®^ 180 180 180
i■ Net total ___ per family man-day worked^ 41 53 (119) 0 (69)
k. Net cacao ___ per man-day In cacacr 17 17 (85) -  34 ( 34)
1. Net cattle ___ per man-day In cattle^ - - -
tn. Net pig ___ per man-day In pig worfc^ - - -
a. Net per man-day In — _ _ -
0. Net cacao per family man-day In 
cacao® 20 20 (99) -  39 (40)
P* Net cattle ___ per family man-day
In cattle®^ - -
q* Net pig per family man-day in piga®^ - - -
r. Net per family man-day In ®^ _ _ _
s. Z labor In cacao expenaes^ 49.2 49.2 (49.2) 20.7 (20.7)
c. Z labor In whole farm expenses^ 40.4 40.4 18.9
*For source and footnotes, see NOTES, Table 11
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TABLE 16C. FAMILY AND FARM INCOME OF FAMILY CACAO FARM HOUSEHOLDS,
1979-80, RAMA FAMILY*
(RESULTS)
Income Measure^ Cash IncoM—^
Labor Et.rninge^(w/o 
lauitv taturn Dad.)
Labor Earning*^ («/ 
Eaultv Return Dad.)
a. Net farm __ $ 42,552 $ 41,186 8-43,447
b. Net off-farm agricultural ___ - - ' -
c. Net non-agrlcultural___ 96,000 96,000 96,000
d. Net total — 138,552 137,186 52,553
e. Net farm___per hectare 2,836 2,745 -2,896
f. Net farm per man-day on farm^ 71 69 - 73
g. Net farm __  per family man-day
on farm^ 85 82 - 87
h. Net non-agrlcultural ___ per family , 
man-day worked outside agriculture^' 333 333 333
1. Net agricultural off-farm ___ per
family man-day worked^ - - -
J. Net total per family man-day worked^ 156 155 59
k. Net cacao per man-day in cacao—^ 68 66 - 32
1, Net cattle per man-day In cattle^ - - -
m. Net pig ___ per man-day in pig work—^ - -
n. Net per man-day in —^ _ _ _
o. Net cacao __  per family man-day in
cacao^ 82 79 - 39
p. Net cattle per family man-day 
in cattle^ - - -
a/
q. Net pig ___ per family man-day in p igs* - - -
r. Net per family man-day in ^ . .
a. X labor in cacao expenaes—^ 29.7 28.8 12.1
t. X labor in whole farm expenses^ 42.5 39.9 13.5
*For source and footnotes, see NOTES, Table 11.
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Sandoval Family
Sr. Sandoval, 50 years old, was born in Rancheria Huimango 2°.
His parents received land (5 3/4 hectares) on the ejido when it was 
formed to meet the needs of Huimango's expanding population. Sr. 
Sandoval inherited the land in 1969. The family initially planted maize, 
soon after planting shade and cacao nursery trees. By 1960, 1800 trees 
were planted; by 1970, 2500; by 1979, 100 banana trees and forty 
pepper trees had been added on remaining vacant land. The family had 
eight head of cattle which died during the hoof-and-mouth disease 
epidemic in 1952.
Sra. Sandoval, 48, was born nearby. Three of their ten children 
are married (ages 20-24) and live on the ejido. The two sons work for 
PEMEX and help their father on the farm. A nephew lived with the 
family until a year ago; he is now occupied in construction. Of the 
seven children residing at home, the eldest sons help their father, 
the eldest daughter her mother. Three, aged 10-14 are in school; the 
two youngest are pre-school. The older children did not attend school 
beyond the fourth grade.
Sr. Sandoval's cacao plantations comprise his entire assets, 
which are worth $.5 million. Were he a private farmer, the land value 
would add another $.5 million. The family also has a small number of 
small livestock.
Of total gross income for the family in 1979, the farm provided 
3/4, almost all from cacao. $1200 was earned from infrequent off-farm 
jornalero work by sons Pascal and Guadalupe; $16,200 was earned by 
the sons working for PEMEX.
Hired labor on the Sandoval farm performed 14 per cent of the 
work, and was responsible for 48 per cent of cacao and 40 per cent of 
all farm costs. The family's farm used one man-equivalent for the 
months of May, July and August; two for September and March; three to 
four for the rest of the year.
Sr. Sandoval faced two major problems during the 1979-80 seasons.
A cacao fungal infection was luckily treated at negligible cost by a 
Cacao Plan/Cacao Association special spraying squad. Worse, illness 
forced the family to borrow a large sum of money from a local 
merchant, with the condition that they sell a certain amount of the 
cacao harvest at an extremely low price.
Under these conditions, only 41 per cent of income was from the 
farm; labor earnings with equity return were negative; and labor 
earnings per family man-day worked in cacao were only $20; for hired 
labor, $ 17."Interest" on the borrowed $15,000 was 300 per cent.
By contrast, valuing all cacao produced at market figures, 80 per 
cent of family income came from the farm; the labor earnings value of 
a man-day in cacao was about $85 and of a family man-day, $40.
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The main production constraint for the Sandoval family is cash. 
Their technology seems to be good, and Sr. Sandoval consulted with all 
the scientific people in Tabasco, listened faithfully to the Cacao 
Plan's radio program, and attended a special cacao class. He received 
bank credit for five years, until 1978-79 when a bumper harvest made 
it unnecessary. He planned to seek credit again in 1980, to cover 
fertilizer and hired labor expense. He needs to improve drain 
control, increase weeding, begin soil fertilization - which he dearly 
wants to do - and improve labor efficiency in fumigation and harvesting.
In the medium-term, his sons could provide more labor, but the 
elder may well decide to devote more time to PEMEX activities. A 
severe labor problem could develop unless Jose remains full-time. Yet 
presently Jose brings in more cash income ($180/day) from his off-farm 
job than he "produces" in farm work.
Total consumption expenditures for the Sandoval household in 
1979-80 were over $100,000, but a third of this represented unusual, 
emergency medical expense. The rest went to support the family of 
nine, at $7,333 per person.
Rama Family
Sr. Rama, 57 and Sra. Rama, 51 are native Teapanecos, originally 
from town, who worked full-time in their dry goods store until 1976.
At that time, they bought three hectares of land on a rancheria, which 
they sold in 1978 to buy six hectares of rundown cacao land, and eight 
hectares of pasture on the ejido. They live on the farm now with Sra. 
Rama's mother (79) and two sons, Sergio (27) - a full partner with Sr. 
Rama in the farm - and Javier (13). Four other children 21-29 were 
scattered throughout the state and northern Mexico. Two are studying 
agronomy; one is an accountant; another an architectural assistant. 
Sra. Rama and Sergio work full-time on the farm.
Land improvement assets for the family (mainly cacao trees) were 
worth $670,000 pesos in 1980. The house and other constructions were 
worth another $181,000. With equipment, total assets were worth 
US$38,655. Were the property private, the land assets alone would be 
worth between $875,000 and $1.29 million.
Of the family's gross income, worth US$23,209, only 11 per cent 
was from cacao; only 15 percent from the whole farm. The rest still 
came from the family store in Teapa.
Sr. Rama hired 16 per cent of farm labor, representing a third of 
cacao costs. This was primarily for non-production operations, 
construction, machine work. None of the hired laborers was a relative. 
Note that Sra. Rama performed a very large share of the work, 
including much heavy labor.
Two workers were needed on the farm in all months except July, 
August and September (which required one) and February, March and 
April (requiring 4-5 workers). Sr. Rama is presently giving a great 
deal of attention to basic activities such as storage and drain
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construction which took time away from cultivation. But given that, he 
did well, and is obviously interested in reaching "recommended" levels 
of input use as soon as time and complete plantation rehabilitation 
permit. He already uses both soil and foliar fertilizer.
Of net total cash income for the Rama family, a third is farm 
income from cacao. The value of a man-day of work on the farm was only 
$75 which rose to $90 per family man-day - still hardly competitive 
with agricultural labor rates in the area. Even if Sra. Rama's labor 
is counted half as productive as the son's, the value of the family 
man-day rises to only $108. By contrast, Sr. Rama's work in the store 
was worth $333 per day.
However, if we deduct the long-term investment work (a third of 
all cacao labor for 1979), the value per man-day rises to $103 and the 
family man-day to $106. Labor earnings including deduction for return 
to equity, show a negative return, although only slightly so for 
cacao. In order for the value of a family man-day to rise to $100 per 
day, cacao yields would have to double.
The Rama farm's main constraint was labor - hired labor was not 
yet profitable, yet family labor had to be directed to renovating the 
farm. Because there was little cash flow yet from the farm, Sr. Rama 
planned to remain with the store for a few more years; after that his 
labor will be fully available. The main jobs which need to be done 
more intensively are pruning, shade clearing and spraying - all of 
which are supposed to take place during the family's busiest months.
Knowledge is probably also a constraint, since Sr. Rama and 
Sergio have limited practical experience with cacao. They are eager to 
be educated and have the advantage of two family members who are 
agronomists. The cash constraint - caused primarily by building their 
new house - will be relieved soon and presumably more hired labor and 
more inputs will be purchased.
During 1979/80, the Rama family spent almost $64,000 for 
consumption. Of this a third went to support children in school. The 
rest was for the family of five resident in Galeana, an average 
expenditure of $8394 per person. Total consumption was actually higher 
than this; access to wholesale goods at the store kept total food 
expenditures extremely low.
Summary of Case Studies
As a result of the availability of family labor, these family 
farm households showed more intensive use of purchased inputs and of 
cacao cultivation than did the hired-labor-based farmers with their 
high labor costs. On our three case study farms, the relatively low 
yields were a result of infestation, and lower than desired quantities 
of chemicals due to cash shortage. Imputing a value of $120 per family 
man-day, expenditures were midway between the Plan's "traditional" and 
“recommended" levels.
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Cacao is the pivot of farm production for these households, but 
economic diversification is fundamental. Note that for all our case 
study households, whole farm costs were far above cacao costs. Cacao 
income helped to subsidize Sr. Luna's growing livestock enterprise,
Sr. Sandoval's pig feeding, and Sr. Rama's new farm infrastructure.
Depreciation costs - the costs of replacing buildings and equip­
ment - were negligible on the farms, but interest on equity represented 
nearly half the total costs for Sr. Sandoval and Sr. Rama, despite 
their being ejidatarios.
None was covering equity costs for production, although labor 
earnings were comparable with market wages for family labor. But this 
was not a source of concern to the family, which does not base its 
economic strategy on returns to capital. The wage paid to hired workers 
was generally higher than their average product, which implies 
that workers were employed only to break bottlenecks in family labor.
Family Economic Strategies
The basic goals of family farmers are: meeting family subsistence
requirements; ensuring perpetuation of the farm to subsequent generations; 
maximizing inheritance to children; cooperation among the extended 
family; risk reduction; and maximization of returns to family labor.
A family production strategy to meet these goals can be hypothe­
sized wherein on-farm agricultural and non-agricultural production, 
off-farm wages and other activities of all members are coordinated to 
maximize the "implicit wage," family labor earnings. This goal is 
constrained by some considerations of risk, and minimal demands for 
farm reproduction.
It is quite distinct from an objective strategy to maximize 
"profits", or return to investment or capital. It is also distinct 
from the simple Chayanov model of fixed cultural aspirations. Tabasco 
cacao farmers who have lived through the economic growth period of the 
past twenty years are oriented to improve the family's standard of 
living. The greater economic security of having a crop much more 
remunerative than subsistence crops, with price guarantees, has at 
least temporarily relegated subsistence farm production to a sideline.
Living Standards
Cacao family farm households had unprecedentedly high incomes in 
the late 1970's compared to the very modest, near-subsistence 
conditions obtaining before. Expectations of material standard of living 
have risen tremendously. The most common use of cacao profits for this 
group of farmers is for brick house construction. Embarrassed at still 
living in a thatched home, Sr. Sandoval apologized: "We're not in the 
sticks anymore; Huimango 2° is getting citified; we ought to have a 
more civilized house." Income changes have led not to incremental
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change, but to transformation: the first use of home appliances, the 
first generation of children educated; the first bus and transport 
service.
Will this new consumerism be a drain on potential farm invest­
ment, or a stimulus to increasing farm productivity? Family cash 
incomes are still very low; for our three families, US$2000-3500 in 
1980 dollars. This is not very far above minimum subsistence require­
ments. They will not easily face reversion to subsistence. If cacao 
prices should plunge, they may be expected to seek alternatives very 
actively, particularly a younger generation less tied to the land. The 
subsistence role of the farm would again be enhanced.
Maximizing Returns to Family Labor
The family-based cacao farm requires one to two persons working 
year-round and three to five during peak times of the year. Where 
those extras can be gathered from a large family (in the middle and 
later stages of the demographic cycle), resident children are unpaid; 
older children share in income. Non-resident children are usually 
paid if they provide a large share of the work. But for short periods 
- especially at harvest and pod-breaking time - work is more of a 
family ceremony, and there is no pay.
Young sons are rarely available now for full-time farmwork. They 
are in school or sometimes in petroleum work, but they still usually 
partipicate in the cacao harvest. Few family members now work for 
largeholder cacao producers, because of the good return for work on 
the family plot. Heads of family farms practically never work as 
jornaleros. If no sons are available to help, the farmer may "adopt" a 
young man as junior partner, who will later inherit part of the land.
Women participate in pruning and weeding, as well as harvest and 
pod-breaking, but not in heavy work such as spraying, ditch-digging, or 
tree-felling. In the early years of marriage, they may provide a large 
share of total labor. They are also generally responsible for small 
livestock care.
The most striking aspect of family labor use for these farm 
households is its fluidity. The supply of family labor is extremely 
elastic. Sons hold a wide variety of jobs on and off-farm. On the 
Huimango ejido, there were many families whose young men had travelled 
to the U.S., Yucatan, and northern Mexico in search of jobs, as well 
as other parts of Tabasco. Many worked for PEMEX. New small-scale 
enterprises, such as cattle-raising, can be undertaken, dependent only 
on labor available on the weekends or late afternoons, when children 
are home from school or work. At critical points in the farming 
calendar, the family farm has priority. At other times, family members 
choose jobs which provide greater return for their work time.
Under such conditions, the warmth and loyalty in the parent­
offspring relations determine availability of family help. Due to the 
transformation of the Tabascan economy, sons can no longer be forced
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to obey their fathers, as they could in the days when farm inheritance 
was the most promising - or only - future. Today fathers pay their 
sons generously, support them in seeking outside training or work, and 
actively woo them for partnerships.
Statistical employment trends are seen quite clearly in the 
SST employment statistics. Of all cacao farm heads of household, 
those from family farms had the lowest rate of participation in the 
agricultural sector, as a principal occupation, though they were 
nearly always self-employed.
Relative to other cacao families, this group had the lowest 
proportion of jornaleros and high proportions of paid and unpaid family 
workers, and the lowest over-all participation in commerce and the 
skilled trades. 95 per cent of cacao workers were aged 9-30; between 
ages 20-40, family workers included a very high proportion of skilled 
tradesmen.
Activity rates in PEMEX were similar to those of minifundistas 
and non-farm workers. Female participation in the work force was over 
ten per cent, mainly in agricultural and unskilled work.
One third of all the EAP - a very high proportion - had a 
secondary occupation, predominantly in cacao farming for heads of 
household working in other sectors. Only a fifth of secondary jobs 
were for agricultural wage work.
There has been a slight increase over time in the proportion of 
cacao landowners doing cacao farming as a principal occupation, as 
would be expected. But there was a steady increase in the percentage 
of all individuals working outside agriculture (especially in skilled 
trades and the tertiary sector), from 2.5 per cent in 1965 to 9.8 per 
cent in 1979.
Farm Inheritance
The sensitivity of parent-child ties carries important 
implications for farm continuity and inheritance. Traditionally, land 
rights passed from father to son at the father's death. Today fathers 
who want their sons to be farmers must respect their new independence 
and offer land rights much sooner.
But land succession has long been associated with family feuds, 
occasionally resulting in violence - which all parents fear. It is 
rare that there is a single child interested in cacao farming, with 
siblings totally uninterested and the farm succession clear. Given the 
predominance of assets in land, there is little else left to divide 
among siblings who forfeit the land. Even on ejidos, where legally the 
land cannot be broken up, the "heir" usually just represents the 
flock, who may or may not work the parcel as a single unit.
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This sub-division threatens the future of the family farm and 
threatens to turn the mass of Tabascan cacao farms into minifundia, 
which the next chapter will show are far less likely to provide stable, 
high-input cacao production than are family farms. Perhaps the 
greatest advantage of the new high cacao prices for these families has 
been the opportunity for parents to offer some sons an alternative 
inheritance to farming - an education, an apprenticeship, a help in 
business. Continuation of a healthy off-farm labor market is thus 
critical to maintenance of economically viable cacao production units.
Managing Risk
The insecurity in cacao farming, of depending on a volatile 
international trade good when one's family is not far from subsis­
tence, is high and has been made higher by the petroleum boom. 
Insecurities mentioned in Chapter 2 (pollution, expropriation) have 
made investment look less promising and agriculture generally look less 
profitable. Community support networks have been weakened, and most 
farmers claim that only their family (or occasionally the Cacao Asso­
ciation or some local businessmen)could be depended upon to respond to 
a family emergency or sudden economic disaster.
The family response has been: to renew family maize production 
and production of other goods for home consumption; to transfer 
resources from cacao to cattle or off-farm investments; to educate 
children for non-agricultural careers. Unlike hired-labor-based farm 
households, however, the family-farm households will continue to rely 
very heavily on cacao to meet cash needs.
In the SST sample, 78 per cent of family-farm producers had cacao 
as the principal product; only six per cent had maize. Three quarters 
of the farms had some secondary product, generally cacao, maize,or 
livestock for fattening.
The farmholding is itself the most important source of long-term 
family security; and will be guarded jealously. These families have a 
heavy stake in improving incomes and income security by increasing 
cacao yields, more so than any other group of farm households.
Family-Farm Response to Economic Change
Family-farm households respond to changes in cacao price, input 
prices, and wages differently than do hired-labor-based producers.
Price Response
The most severe constraint to production for these farmers is 
lack of cash, and,hence,restricted ability to purchase chemical 
inputs. For this group, input subsidies on insecticide, fungicide and 
fertilizer can be expected to induce sharp increases in their use. 
Because they are "chemical-hungryi' their level of input application
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has more do with income received in the prior year (i.e., availability 
of cash) than with the present price of cacao. The relatively low cost 
of marginal inputs of family labor for input applications means that 
these will be more intensively used on family farms than on hired- 
labor-based farms.
If the price of cacao should rise, farmers would, for the reasons 
explained above, use many more inputs, and, hence, increase production 
significantly. Should the price decline, farmers would restrict input 
use, and after a point, start looking for supplementary off-farm 
employment. Indeed, during the period of low cacao prices in the 
1960's, almost all family-farm workers earned a large part of their 
income off-farm. Their supply response to declining prices is slower 
than hired-labor-based producers, but faster than minifundistas 
because they have more alternatives.
Wage Response
The response to changing wages differs between those families 
with temporarily little available family labor and those with sub­
stantial family labor resources. Both types differ from hired-labor- 
based producers in that most increases in production will come through 
a high ratio of labor to purchased inpu i.
The short-handed household has a fairly straightforward response.
If wages decline (relative to the value of family labor on the farm), 
they hire much more labor per unit of land than do hired-labor-based pro­
ducers under similar conditions, because they do not have the latter's 
problems with labor management. If wages go up, family finances may 
suffer at harvest time, but as this is critical to their own income, 
they will not reduce their hiring. Investments in drains or other 
infrastructure projects may diminish with a wage increase.
Families with many able hands have a much more convoluted response 
to wage changes, because they both employ and are employed. If the 
wage decreases, sons will be willing to work more on the farm, and 
farmers will correspondingly need to hire less labor, and be even less 
likely themselves to seek short-term wage labor. During the past 
decade, heads of family farms rarely worked off-farm in agriculture, 
which contributed greatly to labor scarcity for largeholders.
If wages increase (relative to the value of family labor on the 
farm), sons will be induced to work more off-farm; total family income 
may not change and basic family labor resources will still provide for 
farm production at lower levels, but the composition will differ. At 
very high wage levels, of course, producer family labor on the farm 
will diminish to mere maintenance operations, then increase slowly as 
wage rates fall. Once rates approximate the level of return to family 
labor for cacao, family participation on the farm will increase sharply 
- it is preferable to work for oneself than as a jornalero. As wage 
rates fall further, off-farm work will drop off until diminishing 
returns set in on the farm.
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Appropriate Policy Toward Family Cacao Farming in Tabasco
A modest program of technical assistance is potentially quite 
relevant for this category of producer, who has a fair amount of 
resources for investment, plenty of labor, and lots of interest in 
cacao. The policy of price stability has met an enthusiastic response 
in terms of production and new investment, despite threatened tenure 
security in petroleum zones.
The central problems not really satisfactorily dealt with in the 
present program are the cash constraint and the threat of minifundiza- 
tion.
There is little official appreciation of the cost effects on a 
family-based operation of a jump in use of hired labor for increased 
input applications and harvest. Family strategies to meet this cost 
may be quite diverse - including, perhaps, an increase in off-farm 
employment in order to come up with the needed cash. Provision of small 
amounts of short-term consumption credit to cacao farmers needs to be 
encouraged. This would get them over the troughs in cash flow, and 
allow greater input appplications even in cash-short months. The 
production credit now supplied is of such a large amount relative to 
family cash expenditures and incomes that many interested producers 
must refuse it.
The legal changes in land ownership patterns for Tabasco just 
introduced in 1980 were intended to combat minifundization in the 
state. But they were designed as though for maize-farming in the 
Central Plateau, not the tree crop farmland of Tabasco. Projected 
minimum plot size is too large. The five-hectare cacao farm is a 
highly viable production unit; in light of recent experience, far more 
stable than a 20-hectare farm. The ejidatario with six hectares of 
cacao must be legally allowed to employ workers on his farm. What are 
needed are accepted systems to reduce the number of land managers, and 
provide alternate recompense (apprenticeships and scholarships, perhaps) 
to family members who are bypassed.
In cacao production, and other intensive crop production, this 
family farm - big enough for diversified production, and for adequate 
investment resources, small enough to induce intensive crop care, 
snugly intermeshed in the state's labor market as an important source 
of both workers and employment - seems to be the best hope for a 
lasting Tabascan agriculture in the current and future petroleum 
economy.
The Role of Family Farms in Agricultural Development
The family-farm sector can be a very stabilizing factor in 
agricultural economies. Such households lack sufficient resources to 
provide sharp increases in production when prices increase, but they 
also refrain from major farm disinvestment under almost all circum­
stances, including very low relative prices. Under the frequent
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conditions of abrupt regional economic change or recession, policies 
oriented to support and promote this type of fanning may be very 
wisely directed.
In Tabasco, family farm employment characteristics were the key 
to the stability. These characteristics will differ from area to area 
depending upon the demographic characteristics of the campesino group; 
participation in off-farm labor markets; labor demand characteristics 
of the principal farm products; and other factors. So these positive 
results are by no means guaranteed.
But the Tabascan case shows the potential of the family-based 
campesino farm with moderate level resources. The multiple employment 
and high temporary migration levels of the Tabascan family farm house­
holds did not seem to signal deterioration; if anything they offered 
hope that minifundization could be stemmed.
Their story is also positive regarding the questions we posited 
earlier regarding the development of the campesinado. This campesino 
group underwent the stress of economic dislocation fairly successfully; 
experienced a net reversal in the direction of accumulation between 
their sector and other regional economic sectors; and showed a signi­
ficant capacity for technical change and productivity increase.
CHAPTER 7. MINIFUNDIA CACAO FARM PRODUCTION STRATEGY
The Minifundia: Perennial Problem for Development Policy
The cacao minifundia of Tabasco represent nearly half of the 
state's cacao farmers, and their numbers grow steadily, mostly at the 
expense of the family farm sector. In 1978, they accounted for about 
thirty per cent of cacao production and were stable producers in the 
past decade.
We define the minifundia as the type of campesino holding which 
has a resource base too limited to provide for family subsistence. 
Obviously, in parts of Asia the 1-2 hectares we deal with in Tabasco 
minifundia would represent average paddy producer farm size. But in 
the Mexican context they are truly minifundia; indeed, rainfed-maize 
producers consider a much larger plot to be too small for subsistence.
Minifundistas must by definition seek part of the family income 
off-farm, but that does not necessarily reduce the importance of the 
farm plot in the family strategy, for both economic and social 
reasons.
Traditionally, the minifundia have been relatively ignored in 
agricultural development programs. Mexico has bemoaned the processes 
of minifundization in the Central Plateau for decades, without 
devising serious policy to offset the trend. Ejidalization has 
probably been the single most important brake on minifundization in 
the country, but even on ejidos, plot division is common and the 
reduction of the average farm family resource base is a serious 
constraint on production.
Minifundia in Mexico tend to be basically subsistence producers; 
the small home plot provides a source of maize and beans for the 
family, while wage labor is utilized to provide other consumption 
items. The plot rarely covers total consumption requirements, but 
rather acts as a sort of insurance policy for the family. Under 
conditions of severe economic stress, such families tend to increase 
the search for wage labor, or intensify subsistence production, or 
both.
In Tabasco, cacao, which had long been an integral part of the 
Tabascan subsistence farmers' activities, became transformed into a 
cash crop more valuable than ever before. Minifundia response to this 
situation, in the midst of an unprecedented wage labor market, 
provides a very provocative case study of the production potential - 
however limited relative to other types of farmers - of the minifundia. 
It brings to the fore questions of precisely where the weaknesses 
of the minifundia mode of production lie - whether within the 
family structure, the farm structure, the relationship with the wage 
economy, or relative prices.
- 1 4 9 -
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Minifundia Cacao Farming in Tabasco
The existence of large numbers of farms with too few cacao trees 
to support a farm family seems to be a relatively recent phenomenon.
It probably dates from the 1940's population Increase and ejldal 
settlement, after which land hunger could not be satisfied through 
cheap land purchase or colonization. Instead, land was sub-divided 
within families to provide the needs of the younger generation. This 
occurred earliest in Comalcalco and Paraiso, the most densely populated 
cacao zones, but has since increased throughout the cacao-producing 
area of Tabasco. Because of legal impediments to sub-dividing 
on ejidos, 84 per cent of minifundia farms are private properties.
Chart 28 summarizes the demographic attributes of minifundia 
cacao households in Tabasco. Most families have 4-6 members, as do 
family farm households, but they tend to be much younger, with 
predominantly school-age children. Only a quarter of the families were 
composed of young married couples with no or a few young children. 
There were more families with 3-4 working-age members (hence a low 
average potential dependency ratio), but where economically possible, 
children were in school.
The demographic cycle in minifundia farming is slightly different 
than for the family farm. The young single person travels constantly 
looking for work; once married, there is a period of very intense work 
as jornalero or piecework-type jobs with high focus on cash avail­
ability, and if possible, renting land for maize production. Once land 
control is achieved, some time is spent on farm, with increasing 
employment of children as soon as they reach productive age. Once 
children can largely support themselves through jornalero work, the 
parents give full attention to the farm, and retire from the off-farm 
labor market.
The long period when farming must be sacrificed to cash income 
increases the intergenerational family ties. Sons are more dependent 
on working with their fathers. Older sons can experiment with or 
prepare for different careers, falling back on the family farm in ebb 
work times and emergencies.
This brings up an important question about the minifundia in 
Tabasco. When land was more available in the state, the minifundia were 
for many merely a stage in the demographic cycle, representing a 
period of limited personal resources and dependence on wages. With 
savings, family inheritance, and some time, they would generally 
evolve into family farms.
This can no longer be the case for most minifundistas, as the land 
market has become almost inaccessible to individuals with limited 
means. Hence the minifundia become a permanent condition, to which the 
family moving through its own demographic stages must adjust. Wage 
employment will probably be important for most of the lives of 
minifundistas, at least until children help with family support.
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CHART 28. DEMOGRAPHIC AND EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF MINIFUNDIA CACAO FARM HOUSEHOLDS
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Typlcal Mlnlfundla Cacao Farm Households: Case Studies
Our two case study mlnlfundla provide examples of the younger 
farmer - Sr. Galvez - still tied closely to his "family farm" producer 
father; and the older farmer - Sr. Aleman - who Is now watching his 
own sons seek their way in a land-short world. Tables 17, 18, and 19 
summarize farm production and cost data from the case study field 
analyses.
Galvez Family
Sr. Galvez, 20, comes from a family of ten children, all of whom 
live nearby. His father has five hectares of cacao. Sr. Galvez is 
married to 20-year-old Adelina, daughter of a cacao producer, and they 
have two children. In 1973, Sr. Galvez' father bought him two hectares 
of grazing land, which the father has since utilized for pasturing his 
own cattle.
In 1975, Sr. Galvez bought the two hectares of land on which the 
family now resides. It was already planted to cacao, but in poor 
condition. He replanted 200 trees in 1978. In addition, he planted 
four "manos" of maize in Pechucalco, on land belonging to his father.
Capital on the Galvez farm was worth M$270,000-500,000 (over 
US$10,000) in 1979. But there was very little non-land capital or 
livestock. Gross farm labor earnings were $15,972, of which 78 per 
cent was from cacao.
In no month did the Galvez farm use a full man-month equivalent. 
Yet Sr. Galvez was fully occupied, as most of his time was spent 
working for pay for his own father. During peak periods in August, 
February and March, he worked very long days in both places, requiring 
help on the farm from young Jose Dolores, whom he paid $100 per day. 
Adelina worked at home nearly all the time, rarely leaving even to 
shop. September through April she helped in the cacao harvest several 
afternoons and in the Saturday pod-breaking.
Tables 20 and 21 show mlnlfundla income data. For the Galvez 
family, net cash income per family man-day of work in cacao was $204; 
per general man-day $131. If a deduction for equity was made, however, 
these values plummet into the red. Cash income for the farm as a 
whole, meanwhile, was $173 per family man-day and $103 per general 
man-day. Nevertheless, total cash income per family man-day worked, 
including non-farm sources, was only $129 - approximately the going 
local wage - because of Sr. Galvez' work with his father. Immediate 
returns from this latter work are not competitive with returns on work 
at his own farm.
Sr. Galvez experienced cash deficits in April, June, July, September 
and December, but they were not major, and were interspersed between 
surplus months. This was due entirely to his access to unlimited 
employment opportunities with his father to make up any deficit.
A subsistence level income estimated at $25,000-30,000 for his family
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TABLE 17, INPUTS FOR MINIFUNDIA CACAO FARMS, 1979-80*
G a l v e z  F a r m
---------------------------- 1-----
A l e m a n  F a r m R E C O M M E N D E D :  J»/ W / 0  Rehabil. W i t h  Rehab i l ,
P R O D U C T I V I T Y
# T r e e s 1,250 (625/h) 1, 2 0 0  ( 1000/h) 60 0 / h 6 0 0 / h
A g e  1 2 y e a r s  - 250 8-10 y e a r s  - 700
A g e  2 10 y e a r s  - 1 000 20 y e a r s  -  500
A g e  3 - -
P D N / T r e e .283 kil o s .376 k i l o s  (.452 for 
trees i n  full prod.)
Avg. 1 . 3 / t r e e -  
( Cacao Cens.)
1.3
P D N / H e c t a r e 170.2 k i l o s  ($8500) 301.4 k i l o s ($15,070) Avg. 5 38 k l l o s / h
637 835 k g / h
M a n - D a y s / H e c t a r e 40 50 81.5 130
Pruni n g ,
c l e a r i n g
13 2 21 24
D r a i n s 1 29 (and shade) 3 6
F e r t i l i z e r 1 10-20 2.5 10
I n s e c t i c i d e 1 6-11 12 20
F u n g i c i d e 1*5 6 - 1 1 15 30
H a r v e s t  & P o d ­
B r e a k i n g
16*3 (or 22, if d i v i d e d  
by l*a)
5*5 28 40
I n p u t s / H e c t a r e
F e r t i l i z e r
U r e a - - - 2 X / y e a r
1 8 - 9 - 1 8 - - - -
1 5 - 1 5 - 2 3 - - - -
F l o r e n 2 X / y e a r 2 X / y e a r - 1-2 X / y e a r
N u t r i s o l - - - -
G r o - G r e e n - 1 X / y e a r - -
C r e s c a l - 1 X / y e a r - -
I n s e c t i c i d e s
T r i d e n t - 2 X / y e a r - -
M e t l l i c o 2 X / y e a r - - 2-3 X / y e a r
Fo l e y - - - -
F o l i d o l - - - -
F o l i m a c - - - -
P o l i d o r - - - - ,
F u n g i c i d e
L i m e  & Sulfate 1 X / y e a r 4 X / y e a r - 5 -8 X / y e a r
C u p r a s o l - - - -
P r u n i n g 1 X / y e a r 1 X / y e a r “ 2-3 X / y e a r
* Author, Cacao Farm Budget Studies, 1979-81, Tabasco, Mexico.
a/ kg = kilograms; yr - year; h - hectares; X - times.
b/ This data is from estimates in the SARH, Plan de Cacao, 1979.
-154-
TABLE 18. COSTS OF CACAO PRODUCTION ON MINIFUNDIA CACAO FARMS, 
1979-80*
(KECOWEHDED)—^
INPUTS Calvez Fan Alaaan Fan G rijalva^
Plan .. 
Unrehab.—
Plan . 
Rehab
LABOR ) 2,700 - $ 9,400 $ 8,100 $13,900
Interest - 200 - - -
INPUTS: - - 5,075 2,547 4,731
Mlsc. - - - -
Fertilizer - - 3,200 1,500 2,366
Urea - - - - • -
18-9-18 - - - - -
Floren 720 - - - -
Gro-Green - 120 - - -
Nutrisol - - - - -
Insecticide i - - 675 1,047 2,365
Foilmac - - - - -
Trldente - 200 - - -
Hetilico 480 - - - -
Methyl - - - - . -
BHC - 240 - - -
Foley - 80 - - -
Polidor - - - - -
Folldol - - - - -
Fungicide - - 1,200 - -
Lime 5 - - - -
Sulfate 40 200 - - -
CASH COSTS 3,945 1,040 14,475 10,647 18,631
DEPRECIATION 168 382 - - -
FULL COSTS 4,113 1,422 14,475 10,647 18,631
EQUITY DEDUCTED^ 28,000 (14,000) 14,000 (7,000) 14,000
(10,500)
14,000
(10,500)
14,000
(10,500)
COSTS WITH EQUITY 
DEDUCTION
32,113 (18,113) 15,422 (8,422) 28,475
(24,975)
24,647
(21.147)
32,631
(29.131)
No. Hectares 2 14 1 1 1
PER HECTARE
TOTAL CASH COSTS 5,700 21,440 - 10,647 18,631
FAMILY MAN-DAYS/ _
HECTARE
IMPUTED COST 4.822S 14,293 _ _ .
FAMILY LABOR
CASH FOR INPUTS 622'} 56l> _ 2,54 7 4,731
WITH DEPRECIATION^ 2,056‘j 948 - 10.647 18,631
WITH EQUITJfy 
DEDUCTED-'
16,056 (or 
9,056)
**“------- —Tfc----------
10,281
(5,814)
24,647 32,631
*For footnotes, see NOTES, Table 8
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TABLE 19. ALL FARM PRODUCTION COSTS ON MINIFUNDIA CACAO FARMS, 
1979-80*
I N P U T S Galvez Farm Aleman Farm
L a b o r $ 3, 2 0 0 -
Ca c a o 2,700 -
C a t t l e - -
M a i z e 500 -
C a c a o  c h e m i c a l s
a n d  mlsc. 1,245 8 40
V e h i c l e ^ - -
C a t t l e  Feed, etc. 1,560 4, 3 2 0
V e t e r i n a r y  s e r v i c e s
a n d  m e d i c i n e s -
E q u i p m e n t _ 500
C a t t l e  p u r c h a s e s -
I n t e r e s t  o n  loans - 200
R e n t  land, equip. - -
M i s c e l l a n e o u s — ^ - -
C A S H  COSTS 6 , 0 0 5 6, 0 4 0
D e p r e c i a t i o n 348 752
C a c a o - -
C a t t l e - -
Ma i z e ,  etc. - -
P r e s e n t s  of
p r o d u c t s - -
F U L L  COSTS 6 , 3 5 3 6, 7 9 2
E q u i t y  c a p i t a l  costs 1 7 , 5 0 0 - 3 5 , 0 0 0 9 , 5 9 0 - 1 7 , 6 4 0
C a c a o 1 4 , 0 0 0 - 2 8 , 0 0 0 -
C a t t l e -
Ma i z e ,  etc. - -
COS T S  W I T H  D E D U C T I O N
O F  7% O N  E Q U I T Y 3 0 , 2 0 6 - 4 7 , 7 0 6C A P I T A L 1 6 , 3 8 2 - 2 4 , 4 3 2
* Author, Cacao Farm Budget Studies, 1979-81, Tabasco, Mexico.
a/ This value includes tractors, trucks, etc. 
b/ F. = fuel, T. = transportation.
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TABLE 21A. FAMILY AND FARIT INCOME ON MINIFUNDIA CACAO FARM HOUSEHOLDS, 
1979-80, GALVEZ FAMILY*^'
(RESULTS) 37=
Income Measure^ Cash Incot b/
Labor Earning#— (w/o. 
Equity Return Ded.)-^
Labor Earnings— (v/ 
Equity Return Ded.)3/
a. Net farm ___
b. Net off-farm agricultural
c. Net non-agricultural ___
e/d. Net total ___—
e. Net farm___ per hectare
f. Net farm ___ per man-day on farm-'ft
ft- Net farm___ per family man-day on
farm®^
Net non-agricultural ___ per family ^
man-day worked outside agriculture®
Net agricultural off-farm ___ per
family man-day worked®^
Net total ___ per family man-day worked®^
Net cacao __  per man-day in c a c a ^
Net cattle ___ per man-day in cattle®^
Net pig ___ per man-day in pig work— ^
n. Net per man-day in f/
Net cacao 
cacao®^
per family man-day in
Net cattle ___ per family man-day in
cattlie*'
0/Net pig ___ per family man-day In pigs“
ft/Net per family man-day in
h/s. % labor in cacao expense^—'
% labor in whole farm expenses-h/
$ 8,217.00
26.400.00
34.617.00 
2,054.00
103.35
172.99
120.00
129.41
131.42
204.26
68.4
53.3
$ 9,619.00
26.400.00
36.019.00 
2,404.75
120.99
202.50
120 .0 0
134.65
128.82
200 .21
6 5 . 6
50.4
-$31,734 (-14,234) 
26,400
- 5,334 (12,166)
- 7,933.50 (-3558.50
- 399.17 (-179.04)
- 668.03 (-299.66)
120.00
-118.63 (-53.21) 
-305.29 (-68.23)
-474.48 (-137.13)
8.4
6.7
*For source and footnotes "a" through "h", see NOTES, Table 11. 
SPECIFIC NOTES:
q/ The value in parentheses reflects lower estimated value of land 
resources.
s/ Irregularities in the Galvez budget include:
a) Uncertain fungicide use;
b) Exact number of days worked for his father unkno™:
c) Uncertainty about the level of maize purchases in 1979-80.
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TABLE 2IB. FAMILY AND FARM INCOME OF MINIFUNDIA CACAO FARM HOUSEHOLDS, 
1979-80, ALEMAN FAMILY*
1 ,
Income Measure^ Cash Incoia*^
Labor U m ln iA '- ^ / o  
faulty Raturn Dad-)____
Labor Earning*^ 
(w/Boultv Return D*4.)
a. Net farm ___ $ 20,348 3 26,248 -$15,218 (2282)
b. Met off-farm agricultural ___ 13.920 13,920 13,920
c. Net non-agricultural ___ 63,740 63,740 63,740
d. a/Net total __ ~ 98,208 103,908 62,442 (79,942)
e. Net farm ___ par hectare 10,274 13,124 -  7,609 (1141)
f. Net farm ___ per man-day on farm^ 136 (or 120) 200 |152) U 6 (881 (17(131)
8* Net farm par family man-day on
farm^ 136 (or 120] 200 |152] 116 (88) (17(131)
h. Net non-agricultural ___ per family .
man-day worked outside agriculture* 166.80 166.B0 166.80
1. Net agricultural off-farm per
family man-day worked^ 102.30 102.30 102.30
j- Net total per family man-day worked^ 150.3 (or 
141.2(
159.12 (149 51] 95 [B91 (122^1141)
k. Net cacao per man-day in cacao^ 241 (17 31 196 |150j 79 [611 (133i/ [ 102 ])
1. Net cattle ___ per man-day in cattle^ - - -
m. Net pig per man-day in pig work-^-^ - - -
n. Net per man-day in - - -
o. Net cacao per family man-day in
79 (61) ( 1 3 ^ 1 102|)cacao^ 241 [173| 196 [150j
P- Net cattle per family man-day in
cattle^ - - -
q -
oj
Net pig per family man-day in pigs* - - -
r. Net __ per family man-day in ^ - - -
s . X labor in cacao expenses-^ 0 0 , 0
t. X labor in whole farm expenses—^ 0 0 • 0
*For source and footnotes "a" through "h," see NOTES, Table 11. 
SPECIFIC NOTES:
j_/ The value in parentheses represents the higher of two cost esti­
mates for cacao production.
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- or $2100-2900 per month - could be earned In 18-25 days at $120 per 
day of full or near-full off-farm employment. Farm Income was largely 
supplementary.
Aleman Family
Sr. Aleman, 54, has a 1.5-hectare cacao farm in Huimango 2°.
He also rents three "manos" of milpa nearby "al tercio:” by working 
the land, he receives a third of the harvest. He lives on the farm 
with his wife Josefa (52) and seven of their children, aged 6-24.
Another three children, aged 18-26, are married and live nearby. 
The children over 20 studied only through third grade; the five 
younger were in secondary school or planned to go there when of age. 
Two married and one unmarried sons were masons; another unmarried son 
was a carpenter, and another had his own cacao plantation. The married 
daughter was formerly a nurse, but now is a full-time housewife.
Sr. Aleman's father was a jornalero who, through savings, 
managed to acquire four hectares of land when his son was 12. When Sr. 
Aleman married at age 22, this land was divided between him and a 
brother, and the father bought three hectares elsewhere, where he now 
resides. The Aleman's sold one "rial" (10 "manos”) fifteen years ago, 
but otherwise there have been no land use changes.
His capital was worth between M$137,000 and $252,000 in 1979, 
depending on land valuation. His non-land capital was six times greater 
than Sr. Galvez'. Gross total farm labor earnings were $32,488, of 
which 80 per cent was from cacao sales, and almost 20 percent from 
family use of farm production.
Sr. Aleman worked primarily in cacao; he no longer does jornalero 
work, which in earlier years kept him busy. The others did cacao work 
on weekends. Yet of all the children, only Santo (the carpenter) and 
Salomon (part-time cacao worker, part-time mason) seemed to work full­
time. Only a quarter of all family work for cash income was directed 
to the farm.
Josefa used to be active in cacao production. But since her older 
daughter married in 1978, she has been quite overworked. She cooks, 
washes and cleans for four working men and three students, with only 
occasional help from her sons.
The net cash farm income per man-day worked was $120-156; $173­
241 per man-day in cacao; $141-150 per family man-day for all 
activities, including off-farm agriculture and non-agricultural work 
($102 and $166 respectively). It is not clear economically why more 
time was not spent on the farm relative to off-farm agriculture. It may 
be because cacao income is for the most part shared among the family 
while the sons' off-farm work is claimed primarily by themselves.
Perhaps cash flow constraints are to blame. Total income varied 
from nearly $15,000 in December to $5000 in May, although average
-160-
monthly family and farm expenses were $8000-9000 (including sons' per­
sonal expenses). From February through July there was a cash deficit, 
only partly relieved by a $3000 personal loan in February.
Summary of Case Studies
Cacao yields for both Sr. Galvez and Sr. Aleman were well under 
state averages, even though they used recommended levels of foliar 
fertilizer and insecticide. Sr. Galvez used an unsually low level of 
fungicide. Input costs per hectare were only a quarter to a fifth 
those of Plan "traditional" levels; only 1/7—1/9 of the "recommended" 
level.
The most notable departure of cacao production systems from both 
"traditional" and "recommended" systems was the far lower labor input, 
most surprisingly for those items requiring least associated cash 
input: fungicide application, pruning, desmamone, drain and shade 
control. This is so despite the fact that minifundista farmers rarely 
pay family members for their share of cacao work, beyond room and 
board. Even when the head of household works full-time off-farm and 
installs his son as main producer, the son may be paid a share of the 
proceeds, rather than a daily wage.
Whole farm costs were considerably above cacao enterprise costs, 
due to the large amount of purchased feed for domestic livestock. As 
this was mainly for their own use, it should perhaps be accounted for 
under consumption rather than production. Depreciation costs were 
negligible because of the lack of fixed capital; but costs with equity 
return deducted were 1.5 to 5 times greater than full costs.
Due to Sr. Galvez' hiring labor, his cash costs were nearly four 
times those of Sr. Aleman, for only a third more cacao land. However, 
if we add imputed family labor costs at $120 per man-day, then 
Sr. Aleman "spent" twice as much as Sr. Galvez, and nearly three times 
more per hectare of cacao, yet his yields were only 77 per cent higher 
per hectare.
Note that these two families were at points in their life-cycle 
when the home farm held especially low priority among the family 
income-producing options. The yield evidence from the CCT, which 
showed higher yields for minifundia than for larger holdings, are 
probably due to two factors (apart from Census-takers' excessively 
high expectations). First, most minifundia probably fall in a range 
between Sr. Galvez and Sr. Aleman's families, when much more family 
labor is applied to cacao; secondly, off-farm wage opportunities were 
fewer two years earlier, and hence competition for labor was less.
Minifundia Family Economic Strategies
The basic objectives of the minifundia family seem to be the 
following: 1) maintenance of long-term income at or above subsistence
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and redaction of risk to that income; 2) use of land as a family 
economic and social "base;” and 3) maximization of returns to labor 
from all sources.
Subsistence Concerns
The family consumption budgets reveal how very close to subsistence 
these families live. The hospital visit by Adelina could only be paid 
for by her father-in-law's generosity, not the family's own resources. 
Fifty to sixty per cent of the budget was spent for food. Thus the 
importance of on-farm production; were this included in the budget, 
the proportion spent on food would be even higher.
A continuing balance between on-farm subsistence production, farm 
production for cash and off-farm cash employment is made by these 
families to keep real income - and particularly food consumption - 
above the subsistence line. Not unexpectedly, the main evidence of 
improved standard of living is more diverse diets, and an increase in 
meat consumption to once or twice a week in recent years.
In the SST sample, 84 per cent of minifundia had cacao as the 
primary product; an additional 11 per cent had maize or coconut as the 
principal crop. (There are more maize and coconut farmers among mini- 
fundistas than any other group.) Because of space limitations and the 
recent option of a high value cash crop, over a third of the farms had 
no product other than cacao. A fifth had maize as a secondary crop.
Many more plant small amounts of maize as a tertiary product, but this 
was not picked up in the SST.
Subsistence concerns are made even more important because of the 
demographic composition of most minifundia households. Despite fewer 
resources than family farm households have, the dependency ratio is 
higher, imposing greater burdens on workers.
Minifundia have female heads of household somewhat more frequently 
than do other family types. But over-all, female economic partici­
pation rates are low because so many are mothers with many young 
children. Half of those women who did work were heads of household.
Land as a Family Economic and Social Base
This generation of minifundistas does not view the land as a 
marketable item. It is not capital, not a redeemable asset, except 
under the most extreme of economic emergencies when land must be sold 
for lack of other recourse. Nor can they hope to increase their 
holdings when cacao land costs $200,000 per hectare.
"Returns to the land" or "capital" is therefore not a part of 
their economic calculations. Estimates of labor earnings with equity 
deducted are simply not relevant to their calculus, and they are 
perfectly content to have "negative" incomes by this criterion.
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Apart from its role as security, the land provides the potential 
to revert to home production of a considerable part of the family food 
needs in case of economic upheaval or cacao bust.
The land is not seen as the principal economic support of the 
family. It is certainly not a form of long-term security for younger 
members of the family. Land cannot be passed on to a child for use 
before the parents' death, unless the parent has alternative retire­
ment support, which is very unusual. Even the heir's future would be 
precarious, much less that of siblings. Where parents feel obliged to 
sub-divide the land further, the resulting fractions can be only 
marginal to the family economy.
But the land has another role as well. Presently there is 
extremely high job mobility among the younger generation of cacao 
producer families, though mobility is of a diferent type than their 
parents'. Few individuals had a history of permanent migration, 
according to the SST; those who did were largely over 40 years old. 
(That age group had experienced more migration than any other farm 
type.)
The younger generation nearly always returns to settle near home - 
for cultural reasons, for the lower cost of raising very young families 
under an in-law's roof, the lower cost of building a house on family 
property, and the availability of family help in erecting a home.
As off-farm income increases and the variety of income sources 
increases, many of these farms acquire the characteristics of a home 
base for circular migration, rather than a productive unit (179, pp. 
17-19). Thus, even the tiniest cacao minifundia can be important in 
population settlement.
The Role of Off-Farm Employment
In traditional agricultural studies, off-farm employment by 
farmers is associated with proletarianization and with farm neglect. 
Griffin states (186, p. 198):
minifundias have little land, often are unable 
even to produce the subsistence requirements of 
the family and thus are forced to derive a sig­
nificant proportion of their income from hiring 
themselves out for wage employment and engaging 
in other off-farm activities.
De Janvry and Deere suggest that the profit rate for these 
farmers is close to zero and at the extreme, explicit wages are the 
dominant source of income - suggesting a continuum leading to near­
complete proletarianization (21, p.19).
These explanations are highly misleading for the case of Tabascan 
minifundia producers. They first assume that production of a cash crop 
replacing a subsistence crop is a sign of the breakdown of the subsistence
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orientation of the family. They next assume that off-farm 
employment is necessary because on-farm production will not provide 
subsistence requirements, and that off-farm employment is a sign of 
deteriorating economic conditions for the family.
Unlike all hired-labor-based producers and some family farmers, 
minifundista families have maintained and for the foreseeable future 
will maintain a subsistence-oriented economic strategy; they must 
because of the scarcity of their means. But the very size limitations 
which define them make an autarkic "subsistence” farm impossible. 
Indeed, the true, diversified, self-sufficient "subsistence" farm of 
the literature is the family farm (described in Chapter 6)until a 
decade ago.
The minifundia family of today must guarantee both a minimum food 
supply and a minimum cash supply for non-food and bought-food needs. 
Trade-offs between farm maize and cacao production on the one hand, 
and between cacao production and off-farm employment on the other have 
been made in this context for decades. The decisions depended histor­
ically in part on relative crop prices, in part on the availability 
of off-farm income supplements and in part on the on-going historical 
increase in area of established cacao plantations. Family labor power 
can be re-allocated easily to cause major shifts in farm cost and 
income structures.
Diversity of income sources is also a means of spreading risks, 
although the short-term non-contractual nature of most off-farm jobs 
means this source is not always dependable and valuable time may be 
lost in searching for jobs. Sons are far more willing to do this than 
are their fathers, because few of them foresee an economic future on 
their father's farm.
Effect of Off-Farm Employment on Farm Production. Off-farm employment does 
not always mean an abandoned farm. Martinez and Rendon assert (21, p.669)
Forgetting that real income is not always equal 
to the cost of farm reproduction and that paid work may 
fulfill different functions according to how different 
types of campesinos carry them out, leads to the 
erroneous conclusion that the greater the quantitative 
importance of wage income, the greater the tendency to 
proletarianization.
Wage labor may even be complementary with on-farm production. Sr. 
Aleman had a long-term relationship with a neighbor whereby he sprayed 
her cacao trees and received, in addition to a wage, free use of her 
sprayer for his own trees. When she died and he couldn't find a 
similar arrangement, he went to work in PEMEX construction for a year, 
to make enough money for his own sprayer, at which point he returned 
to full-time farm work.
This utilization of non-farm employment for specific cash goals 
is very widespread. Repayment of debt is a common reason, as is
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purchase of livestock. Farmers' sons may work off-farm to earn cash 
to set up a carpentry shop or pay for an apprenticeship,.to assert 
Independence or learn to manage their own budget, or because their 
parents are unwilling or unable to continue to support them.
Off-farm employment does not even necessarily mean less attention 
to the cacao plantation. With few trees, family members can readily 
replace much of the labor at certain demographic stages. This is so 
particularly when children are in their early to mid-teens: the mother 
is free from infant care and sons are not yet anxious to earn money 
off-farm, or indeed may still be in school or apprenticeship. This was 
the case for Sr. Aleman several years ago.
Also note that to the extent off-farm employment is used to meet 
critical cash constraints, higher wages and increased off-farm employ­
ment opportunities may increase the number of days available to the 
farmer for working in cacao, or his level of cash for investment on 
the farm.
Implications for Cacao Production. Both cash and labor are important 
constraints to increased cacao production on minifundia farms, and 
they are intimately intertwined.
Let us assume the "recommended" techniques of the Cacao Plan - 
achieving yields of 825 kilos per hectare by using $5000 per hectare 
of purchased inputs and all family labor - are to be applied on the 
1 1/2 hectares that both Sr. Galvez and Sr. Aleman had in production. 
The total family cacao income would be $54,375 - four times that of 
Sr. Galvez, twice that of Sr. Aleman.
Yet this would require a doubling or tripling of family labor use 
on the farm and an 8-10 fold increase in cash costs. This income would 
be delayed until harvest, and would carry enormously greater risk. If 
the extra 50-90 days of work required for intensification were instead 
spent in off-farm employment, the family would earn far more.
Instituting the Cacao Plan recommendations on a "typical Tabascan 
farm" would require an extra 57.5 days of labor, resulting in 
additional cacao income of $1015. If the same number of days were 
worked off-farm at the given wage of only $83, income would increase 
by $4772. At 1980 wage levels of $120, the difference is even greater; 
and the minifundia farmers must work an additional 90 days on their 
farm in order to reach recommended levels.
Since family savings are usually ear-marked for long-term invest­
ment or large consumption items, cash for purchase of new inputs which 
markedly increase productivity must be acquired elsewhere. The risks 
are substantial. Sr. Aleman had the opportunity to borrow $18,000 from 
the bank for 1 1/2 years to cover cacao costs (his credit is very 
good), but was too afraid of the consequences of a poor harvest and 
future debt.
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On the other hand, it did not make sense to work an extra 40 
days off-farm specifically for purchase of additional cacao chemicals. 
For to the $5000 in chemical costs, must be added the opportunity cost 
for the extra sixty days of work required to apply the inputs. Yields 
would have to increase 340 kilos per hectare just to break even.
Sr. Aleman instead borrowed $3000 as a personal loan during his 
low income months, mainly in order to purchase chemicals 
through March with his income from the harvest. It was preferable to 
raise investment funds through a small loan; interest payments were 
far less than the opportunity cost of the extra labor.
Statistical Employment Trends
Chart 28 provided data on the employment characteristics of the 
minifundia, which largely correspond to the strategies sketched above.
It showed a high percentage of farmers with their principal occupation 
off-farm. A quarter of these farmers had a secondary occupation, most 
commonly as jornaleros.
Minifundia owners were more likely than other farmers to work in 
skilled trades and construction. Minifundia families had the highest 
over-all employment in unskilled work and very high participation in 
non-agricultural work (20 per cent of males). Because of the 
importance of stable off-farm employment, they had the lowest proportion 
of agricultural workers.
Only ten per cent of those who did work as jornaleros were heads 
of household. 84 per cent of these workers were under 30 years old; 
most were under 20. On the other hand, a high proportion of 
individuals over fifty years old were jornaleros, relative to other 
cacao groups.
Nearly a quarter of the EAP ever in cacao had left cacao work. 
Nearly a third were no longer working; a third were in non-cacao 
agricultural work; and nearly a third in skilled trades.
Between 1965 and 1978, there was little change in the number of 
minifundia farm owners working outside agriculture as their principal 
occupation, but between 1978 and 1979 there was a big increase. But 
note that there was no change between 1965 and 1979 in the proportion 
of minifundistas whose principal occupation was agricultural worker.
Minifundista Response to Change
The response of minifundia farm families to changes in input 
subsidies, cacao prices and wages differ from the other two types of 
producers primarily due to the importance of off-farm wage employment 
in the family strategy.
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Prlce Response
As cacao prices Increased, farmers planted land formerly In 
maize to cacao, and Increased Input applications. Land availability Is 
the main factor restricting total production as the price rises. 
Minifundia are capable of greater labor intensity and hence higher 
productivity because of the higher average worker / land ratio, but 
this is so only at stable wages lower than the value of a family man- 
day in cacao. Otherwise, family farms will generally outproduce them.
If the real price of cacao goes down, there will be a doubly 
negative effect on minifundia family workers. To maintain incomes, 
they would have to increase work off-farm; this very addition to the 
labor force, coupled with reduced labor demand from larger-scale cacao 
producers, would be likely to reduce the average wage and further 
increase the number of days that must be worked to maintain the 
standard of living.
But the cacao plantations would not be abandoned until the price 
went considerably lower than the level at which other producers would 
stop, particularly if the wage level declined leaving few alternative 
sources of cash.
Wage Response
The wage response of minifundistas is complicated, as implied 
above. But there are several clear differences between minifundistas 
and other types of producers. First, unlike on the family farm, the 
labor use function does not include number of family members available 
to work (since there are by definition enough), and does not include 
the wage for hiring cacao workers.
The family standard of living is always improved by an increase 
in the wage rate. All increases in cacao production will be associated 
with more labor than cash (chemical) inputs, although the rate will 
depend on the ratio of workers to dependents, as it does for family 
farms.
If the wage increases, there may be a decrease in the number of 
days worked off-farm to meet specific cash needs, and a corresponding 
increase in labor on the farm at least for the principal farmer. 
Younger sons may still prefer to work with "faceless" corporations or 
as city employees, where they have more independence and status, 
rather than work under an overseer on ranches and large cacao farms.
If the availability of off-farm, non-agricultural employment 
decreases (or the wage decreases) workers will return to the hired- 
labor-based producers if they still need cash, and increase attention 
to their own cacao.
Should both off-farm wages and the price of cacao decline, the 
minifundista may revert to old subsistence patterns, with greater 
emphasis on maize, greater sibling rivalry over who gets access to the
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plot; and the consequent likelihood of increased permanent(as opposed 
to the now-frequent temporary)migration.
Appropriate Policy Toward Minifundia Cacao Farmers
Increased cacao prices have led minifundistas to adopt foliar 
fertilizers and increase insect and fungal control to an unappreciated 
extent. However, levels used are pitifully low due to the cash con­
straint on production. For financial reasons, the Cacao Plan program 
is simply out of reach for most of these producers - both the costs of 
inputs and the opportunity cost of their own labor.
A number of approaches could be tried. The present practice of 
providing some input subsidies is effective for this group of farmers. 
More cacao associations should be encouraged to provide inputs on 
loan, their costs to be deducted from the pay at harvest time. But 
loans made entirely in the form of inputs would possibly lead to the 
family's selling off inputs to meet consumption needs at critical 
times.
The program of producer loans needs to be adjusted substantially 
for the minifundistas. They cannot responsibly take on the large sums 
loaned by the banks for cacao production. But loans for much smaller 
amounts, perhaps distributed by the cacao associations, would be 
useful, and definitely encourage greater production and input use by 
removing cash constraints during periods of input application or 
plantation maintenance. These sums should not be restricted to use 
directly in cacao production, but be applicable to personal needs as 
well.
Minifundistas in the Petroleum Boom
The most important effects so far of the petroleum boom on mini- 
fundista families have been the sharp increases in cash needs due to 
inflation, and in the number and quality of jobs available for mini­
fundistas outside agriculture. In the short run, the availability of 
petroleum-related employment has not reduced cacao production by this 
group of farmers, because of the seasonal nature of the jobs, and 
because most families can easily find substitute or assistant cacao 
labor. Cash transfers from petroleum and construction work for 
investment in cacao sprayers or inputs is widespread in what is so far 
basically a complementary relationship.
Further sub-division threatens to turn those plantations into 
mere garden plots. Such a system could come to resemble the 
lucrative, intensive Japanese garden plots tended by families of city 
workers. Or it could lead to the disappearance of commercial cacao 
production over a large area.
In the long run, the coupling of high cacao prices and ample non­
agricultural employment could slow down the sub-division. Where the 
family farm child can aspire to a college education, the cacao mini-
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fundista's offspring can aspire to mastery of carpentry, masonry, 
mechanics - all skills urgently needed for Tabascan economic develop­
ment. The State Plan and the Cacao Associations should encourage this 
trend, while simultaneously encouraging minlfundlsta managers to 
consider farming a priority.
Meanwhile, the mlnlfundla plays a critical role In retaining 
population in the countryside and preventing excessive rural-urban 
migration. A principal state policy goal should be to ensure that 
these holdings remain cacao producers as well as bedroom communities 
for PEMEX.
The Role of Mlnlfundla in Agricultural Development
The Tabascan study brought up a number of points which have bearing 
on the potential role of minifundia in agricultural development. First, 
the evidence reinforced the position that there are quite severe 
constraints on minifundia as regards technification that requires 
significant cash inputs. Credit is a poor solution, given the high 
costs of providing small amounts of credit, and the minifundistas' 
incapacity for absorbing or risking larger amounts.
What the story did show, however, was the potential for stable 
and slowly rising production in response to positive price incentives, 
via greater family labor investment on the farm. This was particularly 
provocative in Tabasco because the slight cacao production increases 
were accompanied by substantial increases in the amount of off- 
farm employment by minifundia families. Certainly under conditions 
of good agricultural prices and good off-farm wages, the minifundia 
mode of production can be quite a stable one.
An additional point is that when wage levels decrease substan­
tially, rather than result in greater commercial farm production among 
these families, there is a real possibility that the family will be 
forced for reasons of security to revert to greater subsistence 
production on the farm.
It Is important to look at minifundia - as well as the other 
types of farms - from the perspective of demographic stage in deter­
mining their response to economic conditions. The production system 
varies more than for other farm types over the life-cycle of the 
family. Although the minifundia farm is almost by definition a labor- 
surplus unit, there may be specific periods of time when labor 
scarcity will be a constraint on production.
Regarding our earlier questions about the future of the campesi- 
nado, the minifundia present a perplexing picture. Their numbers are 
likely to increase continually In the future without major land tenure 
controls. Even should a great many "disappear," their numbers will 
remain high and hence the sector must be treated seriously as a 
permanent part of the agricultural scene.
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Any trend toward "disappearance" will come from long-term condi­
tions of very low agricultural prices relative to high off-farm wages. 
Under conditions of either low prices and wages or high prices and 
wages, there will be a tendency for mlnifundistas to maintain the farm 
as a central part of family economic strategy. Similarly, the degree 
of "exploitation” of minifundia families depends equally on relative 
wage conditions and relative prices.
CHAPTER 8. COLLECTIVE FARM HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION STRATEGY
In Tabasco, collective cacao production is responsible for a 
small, but rapidly growing part of total state production, with about 
eight to ten per cent of the total area planted to cacao. It is an 
important source of ejidal employment and income. Experience and 
policy on the collectives, furthermore, have important lessons for the 
rest of the cacao sector regarding appropriate development policy.
Collective ejidal production in Mexico dates back to some of the 
earliest ejidos organized in the country in the 1930*8. Collective 
organization was seen by many as the only practical way to restructure 
the large private holdings which had been expropriated complete with 
central machinery plants or processing units.
Others in favor of collectivization stressed social continuity 
with Indigenous collective production forms; still others supported 
collectives on the basis of socialist ideology.
A considerable literature on collective production has built up 
over the past fifty years, and the fortunes and numbers of collective 
ejidos themselves have fluctuated considerably from one presidential 
sexenio to another. The periods of greatest support for them occurred 
during the Cardenas years and more recently during the presidential 
term of Luis Echeverria Alvarez (1970-76). (Particularly good 
references on collectivization are Eckstein and Reyes Osorio et al.
(22, 139).) '
The theoretical production advantages of collectives principally 
involve issues of scale. Larger scale permits more mechanization, 
risk-sharing, better access to credit, more efficient marketing systems, 
more efficient use of labor, and easier application of scientific and 
mechanical methods developed for large-scale private agriculture.
The results of collectivization, however, tell a mixed story, not 
only in Mexico but throughout the world. Criticism of collective 
farming takes a number of forms. Some maintain that private, individual 
control of property leads to more effective farmer management and 
greater incentives for responsible work and higher returns. Others 
emphasize the potential political and economic problems of direct 
government control over production decisions. Not only may profitabi­
lity and efficiency take second place to political expediency, but 
central control may deprive farmers of any real voice in production 
decisions - effectively turn them into state workers - and hence 
defeat one of the purposes of collectivization.
Finally, many observers are cynical about the workability of the 
democratic forms required to maintain collective decision-making. 
Systems may lend themselves to manipulation or corruption, resulting 
in poor farmer morale and consequent declining production.
Collectivization received much less attention in the Lopez 
Portillo administration, a situation which is likely to continue into
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the de la Madrid administration. Nevertheless, all of the above issues 
relating to collective farming have bearing on Mexican agricultural 
development.
Policies to promote farmer cooperation, credit societies, rainfed 
and irrigated agricultural district organization must deal with similar 
problems, particularly the proper degree and type of government 
intervention, maintenance of democratic decision-making, improving 
efficiency of bureaucratic decision-making, farmer organization, 
morale and incentives. The case study of Ejido C-29 of the Chontalpa 
Plan and the evolution of cacao production there provide a practical 
look at the working out of these problems and some lessons for 
agricultural development projects in general.
The advantages and disadvantages of being part of a major govern­
mental development scheme in a petroleum region also highlight some of 
the political choices which can or should be made in resolving 
agriculture-petroleum conflicts.
The Chontalpa Plan
Nearly all of the collective cacao production in Tabasco is 
located in the "Chontalpa Plan” ejidos, an area drained in the 1960's 
as part of the state's first agricultural project under the auspices 
of the Grijalva River Basin Commission.
The original "Plan Limon" was organized in the early 1960's to 
increase agricultural production in a major subsistence area, and 
increase real incomes and living conditions for smallholders through 
drainage and irrigation on about 40,000 hectares. In 1965, an 
enlarged project called the "Chontalpa Plan" was funded by the Inter­
American Development Bank for 6000 families. The following year the 
Commission began to expropriate land (eventually from nearly 7000 
individuals) for the project. This land was organized into new 
ejidos, based on individual plot control, and credit through "Solidarity 
Groups."
Drain construction was finished by 1970. A year earlier, 
production was undertaken by "Local Societies for Collective Ejidal 
Credit" and the 15 hectares of land earmarked for each family was 
henceforth divided into two hectares for a family private plot and 13 
hectares for the collectively-run plots.!/
In mid-1972, the Fideicomiso Plan Chontalpa was set up to reorga­
nize the ejidos financially, with the Grijalva Commission still 
chargedwith technical and social assistance. By 1975, over half the 
planted land was in pasture, and a large part in cane. By this time,
J_/Presidential Resolutions legislating collectivization were 
passed in 1971 for Cardenas municipio ejidos and in 1973 for 
Huimanguillo.
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all 22 "poblados" had been set up, complete with paved roads, brick 
housing, bus service, medical care and schools for ejidatario's 
children. Numerous professionals such as social workers and crop 
technicians were active in attempting to smoothe the transition from 
dispersedsubsistence production to highly controlled, collective 
"modern" agriculture and "town" living patterns. Between 1959 and 1975 
infrastructure investment in the Plan as a whole was M$l,150,825,615, 
or an average of $52.3 million per ejido (approximately US$4.2 m).
In 1977, another reorganization gathered all responsibilities for 
the collectives under a single "Promotora del Complejo Agro-industrial 
de la Chontalpa," which answered directly to the President. Its 
mandate was to increase production and industrialization, and to work 
with the "Union of Ejidos" - the ejidatarios’ organization - gradually 
including them in decision-making until full self-management was 
achieved.
Land Use Changes in the Chontalpa Plan
Throughout the 1960's the project emphasized intensive agri­
cultural production. When President Echeverria came to power, several 
factors led to a change in orientation: 1) national presidential 
priority for increasing ejidal yields; 2) a crisis in the national sugar 
sector requiring increased area in cane and improved productivity; 3) 
a national beef shortage arising from large-scale beef exports to the 
U.S.
Production was radically reallocated to pasturing cattle and 
planting cane, with the erection nearby of a cane mill. Herd size in 
the Chontalpa rose from 1042 in 1969 to 41,930 in 1975. These 
decisions were reinforced by poor initial production results in agri­
culture and a belated recognition that Chontalpa soils, with the 
exception of some alluvium, suffered permeability problems. Given very 
high rainfall, tractor use was extremely problematic and is still a 
very high-cost input.
In 1980 and 1981 there was again a push to produce subsistence 
crops, particularly maize, as part of the Sistema Alimenticia Mexicana. 
Heavy losses in these years due to extremely high rainfall and 
consequent flooding finally led to the initiation of parcel-level 
drainage construction, which has long been needed for more precise 
water control.
Chart 29 illustrates land use changes in the Chontalpa since 
1965. Thousands of hectares of cacao were cut down in the early years 
when emphasis was on annual crop production; cacao prices were low and 
division of land into large blocks of monocultivated plots was 
technically appealing. Area in cacao dropped from 6150 hectares in 
1965 to a low of 2535 hectares in 1971.
As cacao prices rose, plantings began anew, reaching 3835 
hectares in 1975 and by 1979, 3337 hectares on communal land. Individual 
plot cacao plantings also increased. 500 hectares were planted on
CHART 29. LAND USE CHANGES IN THE PLAN CHONTALPA, 1965-1979
□  fma1nTy°cocoo ana b o n o n o s lE I Crop
li:;:;:;:;! Sugor Cane 
Pasture
Ind iv idua l Plots 
Urban /  in d us tr ia l Use 
Uncleared
19 7 9  ^
aj Rosario Casco Montoya, Manejo del Agua en un Ecosistema Tropical: El Caso de La Chontalpa,
Centro de Eco-Desarrollo: Mexico, 1979.
b/ Rene Barbosa-Ramirez, La Ganaderia Privada y Ejidal: Un Estudio en Tabasco, Centro de
Investigaciones Agrarias: Mexico, 1974.
c/ "Promotora del Complejo Agro-Industrial de la Chontalpa: Programa Para 1979" (pamphlet),
PCAIC: Cardenas, Tabasco, 1979.
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collective plots in 1979-80; about the same on private plots. Fifteen 
Chontalpa ejidos today produce cacao; on ten,over 100 hectares are in 
production or development.
In 1980, the ejidos planned to plant 1015 hectares of new cacao; 
by the end of the sexenio in 1982 they expected to have planted a 
total of 3500 new hectares.
History and Description of Ejido C-29
C-29, or as it is formally, but rarely called, Ejido General 
Vicente Guerrero, covers approximately 5000 hectares in the south­
eastern part of the "Plan." Maps 10 and 11 show land use changes on 
the ejido between 1965 and 1980. The ejido is entirely agricultural, 
with no agro-industry but the washing and drying of cacao.
The zone was originally one of small ranches and minifundia, with 
at least 1000 hectares planted to cacao on over half the Individual 
holdings. In 1979 the ejido had 600 hectares of cacao plantations 
(two thirds on communal land), 80 of sorghum, 1100 of sugar cane and 
850 of pasture. Its cattle herd numbered 1660; 526 were cows producing 
milk for Nestle.
The collective ejido has two entirely separate production systems 
for the communally-worked fields and for the two-hectare private plots 
per family.
By far the largest capital asset of C-29 is land, which legally 
belongs to the government, not the ejidatarios. At 1980's inflated 
prices, the land was worth $420 m. pesos. Equipment was valued at 
under half a million pesos. The 160 ejidatarios with rights generally 
own concrete block houses, but the "libres" and poorer ejidatarios 
without rights still have homes of guano.
In 1972, the ejidal population was estimated to be 700 individuals 
in 121 families (6, p.145). The total population in 1976/77 was 
1220, of whom 650 were men and 570 women. 357 of these were school-age 
children. Literacy rates for the parental generation were relatively 
high, although the average schooling for heads of household was only 
two years. Nearly all children aged 9-16 were in school; some older 
students had reached university level.
29 of the families living in the poblado of C-29 were interviewed 
by the Sociodemographic Survey in January 1980; see Chart 30.—'
All the collective families in that sample were young, most with 
school-age children, and the dependency ratio was thus very high.
21—  Approximately ten per cent of poblado families were random­
ly chosen, but they are unrepresentative of the ejidal population 
as a whole, as the sample did not Include the "libres" who live 
mostly outside the poblado center.
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MAP 10. LAND USE ON EJIDO C-29, 1965*
*Mexico, SARH, 
"Uso de Suelo C-20,
Promotora de Complejo Agroindustrial de la Chontalpa, 
1965" and "Uso de Suelo, C-29, 1980."
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CHART 30. DEMOGRAPHIC AND EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF COLLECTIVE CACAO FARM HOUSEHOLDS
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Most ejidatarios were original Inhabitants of the area, whose 
land was expropriated for the project. Of the original ejidatarios in 
the entire Plan, some twenty per cent had emigrated and been replaced 
by landless workers; this estimate probably applied to C-29 as well. 
At least fifteen ejidatarios there still owned outside properties, and 
hence worked only part-time on the ejido, compared with 20-25 per cent 
Plan-wide.
Collective Cacao Production
Table 22 shows the 1980 agricultural program planned for C-29. 
Cacao provided half the value of total agricultural production (itself 
97 per cent of all production value), while accounting for only a 
quarter of ejidal costs and capital. Three quarters of ejidal profits 
came from cacao; a quarter from cane.
Most of C-29's collective cacao had been planted in old maize, 
banana and cane fields. There was no credit available for cacao until 
1972, but between 1972 and 1975, $12 m. was borrowed to meet variable 
costs for cacao and $4.0 m. for investment. In 1980 however, only C-40, 
C-26 and C-17 used cacao credit. This was due both to greater 
capacity for self-financing and resentment of the tight production 
controls required by credit agencies. In 1979, the collective sector 
of C-29 had 179,993 mature cacao trees on approximately 280-300 
hectares, and 9749 trees on 56 hectares of newly established cacao.
Cacao Technology
The ejido did not apply insecticides, and only recently began a 
good program for pruning; very little fertilizer and fungicide were 
used. The cacao tecnico complained of a 20 per cent loss of pods on 
the tree from rodents, although cacao bean storage losses were low.
Since they began fertilization, the C-29 growers claim that 
yields have responded vigorously. 20-30-10 is used for flowering and 
54-27-54 (scantily) for the soils. Weeding was done three times a year 
and fumigation twice, but during 1980 the collective was far behind 
the recommended schedule on these activities, due to preoccupation 
with cane.
Shade used in the Chontalpa was predominantly mote. There was 
growing interest in replacing Eyrthrina valutina, which is subject to 
many pests and diseases, with Erythrina glauca. Chipilin was used only 
for temporary shade. Most planting was on a 4 x 4 grid, but some areas 
had triangular or other spacing.
The Cacao Plan tecnico attributed the poor technology to lack of 
funds, particularly the distribution of profits rather than their 
reinvestment; and also to competition with cane for labor. The 
ejidatarios were not particularly interested in increasing inputs
TABLE 22 . 1980 AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM FOR EJIDO C-29*
Sorghum Cacao New Cacao Sugar Cane Livestock— ^ TOTAL
Land Area 100 579 21 1166 589 2455
% Area 4.1 23.6 .9 47.5 24.0 100.0
% Agricultural 
Capital 3 26 1 71 _ _ $19,825.9
% Value of
Production 2 49.5 _ 45.6 3 100.0
% Cost of Production 2.9 24.7 - 67.5 5 100.0
% Expenses of Costs 9 67 - 43 48 -
// Man-Days 546 36,773 799 65,692 10,886.7 114,696
% Man-Days .5 32.1 .7 57.3 9.5 100.0
% Profits 1.0 72.5 - 24.5 2 100.0
Net Income (inclu­
ding labor payments) $173,432 $19,151,516 — $11,413,064 — —
Value per Man-Day 
Worked $317.64 $520.80 - $173.74 $37.00 -
* Source: Promotora del Complejo Agro-Industrial de la Chontalpa, "Programa 1980," 1980, Ejido C-29.
a/ The program for livestock had the following characteristics:
Number of head - 1660 Number steers sold: herd - 1:23
Cows: heifers - 1:.72 Cows: calves - 1: .8
Culling rate - 1:8.77 Number animals sold: herd - 1:12.6
Bulls: cows - 1:20
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for cacao, rather in stabilizing inputs to keep cash investment 
relatively low.
Production data are not very reliable, but records show that in 
1978-79, a very good cacao year, the ejido averaged over a kilo per 
tree, 657 kilos per hectare, which is fairly good. By historical 
comparison we find that overall Chontalpa Plan cacao productivity 
rose from 150 kilos per hectare in 1965 to 320 in 1970, dropped to 
around 190 kilos in 1971-73, and rose to 370 kilos in 1975 (94).
Due to the heavy rains in 1980-81, there was a 30 per cent decline in 
cacao yields from the 1979-80 period.
Only about 60-70 per cent of C-29 cacao was sold through the 
Collective Ejidal Cacao Association #23. Producers preferred to send 
cacao where they were paid in cash, rather than by check. Sales to 
Associations 23 and 2 were frequent. The multiple outlets make data 
on monthly production difficult to collect.
In 1975, the first collective fermenters were installed in neigh­
boring C-28, but C-29 did no fermentation and sold all its beans 
sun-dried. This was ostensibly due to lack of warehouse space, labor 
shortage and uncertainty about price differentials. There was talk 
about the Union of Ejidos erecting another fermenting plant on a 
collective ejido, but details have not been worked out.
Production Costs
Chart 31 shows costs of cacao production on C-29. In 1978-79, the 
ejido earned nearly $11 m. from cacao. Of this, a third went to labor 
costs; half of which was paid to ejidatarios with rights. An additional 
38 per cent went to pay profits to the ejidatarios with rights, 
proportional to number of days worked. A fifth of the proceeds was 
reserved for a capital fund which pays labor costs for the following 
year and provides investment capital.
Of cash expenses 1978-79, a fifth was for non-labor inputs, a 
third for harvest labor and nearly half for non-harvest labor. Cash 
expenses were highest in February, September, October and December (over 
$500,000), and lowest from April to July. Non-labor costs were greatest 
in February and March during fertilization and October for chemical 
spraying. Overall, in 1979, C-29 had higher costs and income than any 
other collective ejido.
The proportion of labor in total costs was high, even considering 
the low level of inputs. Even if input costs were to triple, the labor 
share would decline only to 67 per cent. This compared to a labor 
share in cane production of 43 per cent, for sorghum of 9 per cent and 
for cattle operation (not investment) of 86 per cent. Nevertheless, 
corresponding cost estimates for 1972 show salaries as 99.5 per cent 
of costs.
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CHART 31. CACAO PRODUCTION COSTS ON EJIDO C-29, 1979*
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* Tabasco, Ejido C-29, "Libro de Contaduria, Cacao, 1979."
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Organization of Labor on C-29
As the population density of the Chontalpa rose with ejidal 
settlement, a chronic labor surplus developed. Early agricultural 
efforts largely failed, and the movement to cattle did not, after the 
first infrastructure investments, provide adequate employment.
During the late 1970's, however, a number of factors led to a 
labor shortage: increasing capitalization, increased land in use, the 
predominance of labor-intensive cane and cacao production, and an 
active off-farm labor market. These factors were particularly marked 
on C-29, and acted as a major constraint on ejidal production.
Historical Labor Use
In 1972, C-29 ejidatarios worked only 18 man-days per month and 
216 days per year. At that time, the value of cacao production per 
man-day was only $19 vs. $184 in sugar cane (8^, p.143). Labor use that 
year was only one quarter the level projected for 1980, although 
there were 121 ejidatarios then, only a quarter less than at present 
(5, p.148). Nevertheless, C-29 had the highest level of employment in 
the Chontalpa Plan at that time.A/
In 1976, two thirds of the labor for collective production were 
provided by ejidatarios, 28 per cent by libres and six per cent by 
women. Labor requirements varied from 4700 to 10,000 man-days per 
month. Between 1975 and 1980, the amount of labor generated by the 
ejido rose 29 per cent; labor demand in the peak month of February 
rose 40 per cent (8).
In 1976, 14 types of workers in the Chontalpa^/ included (8^ ):
1) directors (political, administrative, foremen);
2) representatives of support institutions (e.g.credit);
3) specialists such as machine operators, cattle managers;
4) ejidatarios working year-round in stable jobs such as 
storehouse caretaker or cowboy, for wages and a share of profits;
5) ejidatarios doing jornal work on their own ejidos, under 
the supervision of zone chiefs, for wages and a share of profits;
3/— 'Average employment at this time was 11 days per month and 140 
per year (j^ , p.148).
A/prior to collectivization, there were other types of work 
relations, such as the tequio and convite. Because of the earlier 
scarcity of labor and difficult access to peons, even largeholders were 
involved in shared work. There has been a steady decline in the use of 
tequio and convite, and a subsequent rise in importance of compadrazgo, 
involving mutual work obligations and favors, usually on private plots.
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6) ejidatarios' sons over 16, who were paid an established 
wage, but no profits, and who worked on the family plot as well;
7) non-ejidal jornaleros used as substitutes, who were paid 
wages and sometimes a share of profits (especially by the female 
ejidatarios);
8) ejidatarios working as jornaleros outside their own ejido, 
who got priority over libres, but no profit share;
9) "enganchadores" who arranged for groups of jornaleros to 
work, especially in the cane harvest;
10) "libres" who may or may not live permanently on the ejido, 
who received wages but no profits or social security;
11) jornaleros (usually ejidatarios or their sons) contracted 
by institutions especially for machinery operation, who got no 
profit share, but did receive room, transport, tools and a wage 
much higher than minimum;
12) jornaleros contracted by individual ejidatarios for work 
on the private plots;
13) women working in the women's collective plot, on collective 
work operations, or at the banana packing plant;
14) technical personnel paid by the ejido, but usually con­
tracted by institutions (such as teachers).
Labor Patterns in 1979-80
On C-29 in 1979, the labor force included the 161 ejidatarios 
working full-time (or hiring replacement labor), perhaps 100 sons of 
ejidatarios without rights, 40-70 resident libres (of whom 30 work 
permanently in cacao, receiving housing and social security as well as 
a wage); and 10-20 "eventuales" living near the ejido who came 
regularly for work. This local pool satisfied the ejido's labor needs 
six months of the year; In December-March, August and October, large 
numbers of outside workers were needed.
Total labor used by ejidatarios with rights in 1979 was 38,572 
man-days. Monthly labor use ranged from a low of 2656 in December to 
a high of 3692 in October. See Chart 32. The average number of days 
worked per year by ejidatarios with rights was 241; of these almost 
two thirds were in cacao, filling half the cacao labor requirements. 
Over-all, cacao accounted for 40 per cent of all labor use.5/
5/Note that labor-use data for 1979 for all 22 ejidos 
showed at most 1,067,250 man-days worked by ejidatarios with 
rights, and at least 3,769,480 worked by others - over 3/4 non- 
ejidatarios.
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Employment for most ejidatarios varied through the year. First 
cacao harvest, then pruning occupied January-March, at which time 
the ejido employed outsiders for the cane harvest. When the latter 
returned to their own subsistence farms for the maize planting, ejida­
tarios completed the rest of the cane liarvest, which lasted through 
June. Cacao work at this time was often done by outsiders. Beginning 
in August, there was a sharp and steady increase in cacao activity by 
ejidatarios and by many hired workers.
Ejidatarios and even local libres were reluctant to cut cane - 
an extremely disagreeable job - despite a premium wage. Ejidatarios 
with rights in 1980 were required to cut 200 tons of cane each, at 4 
to 5 tons per jornal. They were allowed to employ others to meet 
their quota. Canecutters came from Michoacan, Guatemala, Guerrero, 
and from Jalpa and Cupilco locally. In 1979, 100 people came 
from Michoacan to assist some 70 socios and a few local jornaleros. 
Because of a ten per cent loss in cane production due to heavy rains 
in 1980-81, the ejido did not hire contracted cane laborers that 
season. The price of cane was such that the higher wages needed to 
induce workers to cut cane would effectively wipe out operating 
surpluses.
The main employer of women on all the ejidos was the banana 
packing plant. The season was January-August with a maximum number of 
days worked in 1975/76 in July (1553) and a minimum (242) in August. 
Unfortunately, at the end of 1981, the packing plant was shut down. 
Whether there is alternative employment on the ejido for these women - 
mostly single mothers - is unknown.
Labor Use in Cacao
Until 1980, cacao plantations on C-29 were typically organized 
into seven divisions, each with a chief chosen by the ejidatarios and 
a supervisor over them all. The chief daily chose the men who would 
work with him for a given chore; at harvest each managed a group of 
12- 20 .
Of all man-days dedicated to cacao, illustrated in Chart 33, 
a third were spent on the harvest, nine per cent in processing (pod­
breaking, drying, sorting, carrying); a quarter in pruning; 14 per 
cent in weeding, and six per cent each in administration and chemical 
spraying. Because there was no month when ejidatarios with rights were 
unemployed, there was little internal pressure to add activities such 
as improved pruning, because the labor would have had to come from 
hired workers.
The lack of individual responsibility for the condition of the 
plantations led to disappointing production results, even with the 
addition of new inputs. Cacao is not mechanized, so cultivation is 
dependent on careful hand work; the collective system was not tailored 
to this type of production system.
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CHART 33. LABOR USE IN CACAO ON EJIDO C-29, BY TYPE OF WORKER, 1979*
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In 1980, the system was changed experimentally to one used earlier 
in C-09 and C-10, in which each ejidatario was given responsibility 
for a particular area in cacao. Plantations were divided into 
areas of 4800 trees between four ejidatarios with rights, with each 
responsible for 1200 trees. They did not receive a jornal, but were paid 
for the harvest. The ejido provided urea (charged at the harvest); 
the other inputs farmers bought from their own income. Farmers hired 
whomever they wished to help with the cacao. A chief cacao manager 
checked the plantations to ensure that production was going forward as 
it should. If certain technical requirements were not met, the farmer 
would be relieved of his plot.
According to the agreement with the Secretaria de Reforma Agra- 
ria, whose job it is to assure compliance with national regulations 
governing ejidal organization, the farmers must rotate plots every 18 
months. Gariy results from the new program were promising.
Off-Farm Employment
Ejidatarios with rights did very little work outside the ejido, 
even where such work might be well paid (with the exception of those 
who still own agricultural land outside the collective). There were 
strict rules against work outside the ejido for them; permission from 
the ejidal assembly is required and the ejidatario loses all rights to 
profits. If he continues such activity for a longer period of time, 
he may lose his position as an ejidatario with rights. There were 
similar restrictions for the resident libres. In 1979, six or seven 
libres had taken leave to work full-time for construction companies; 
they had to pay house rent - which is usually free of charge - during 
that time.
Wives of ejidatarios did not seem to be as active either in 
outside work or home work for pay as they were in other types of 
producer families. The hunting, fishing and gathering activities 
prominent as supplemental income sources before the Chontalpa Flan 
began had slackened considerably.
The sons of ejidatarios did seek work in a wide variety of 
occupations, but were far less likely to work as jornaleros in 
agriculture outside the ejido. The Benito Juarez sugar cane mill began 
to hire many sons of C-29 ejidatarios around 1976-78. They earned $165 
per day as a part-time libre, more if they were unionized and had 
permanent work.
Some were employed in the technical education centers within the 
collective ejidos; a few in ejidal administration. The rest were 
employed on private ejidal plots.
Between 1978 and 1980 many sons of ejidatarios (one estimate is 
about half, or 100 individuals) turned to work in petroleum boom- 
related construction. But this was certainly not true of the core 
population of the ejido poblados. In 1979, of the 47 economically 
active individuals in C-29 surveyed in the SST, only two worked
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outside agriculture, one in tire-making, the other in house construction. 
Only four individuals had ever worked outside agriculture in the past 
- and that was in 1965.
Earnings and Income
Sources of earnings for C-29 residents included wages for 
labor, profits for ejidatarios, remaining indemnification payments, 
off-ejido work activities and properties, private parcel product 
sales. Wages in 1979 were $70-75 per day, with pay for piece-work of 
$25 per sack of broken pods, $1 per tree weeded. Pay rose to $92 per 
day in 1980. This was the same for all workers (except enterprise 
managers) for a day lasting from 7:00-12:00/12:30. In addition, some 
resident libres received Social Security benefits (as did all ejida­
tarios), plus a house (worth at mimumum $5000) and the right to a 
maize plot (estimated worth $50,000).
Imported laborers earned $120 daily for cane-cutting, as well as 
housing and a maize ration. If there was no work on a given day, the 
latter still received $50 and the maize ration. (Alternatively they 
received a straight $50 per ton cut. )
Almost all the Indemnification money had been used up or invested 
by 1980, but the properties outside the ejidos probably brought in 
more money than what the owners earned as ejidatarios. Incomes from 
private plots ranged widely. For the plot with only maize and some 
home vegetables, the total value of production was only a few thousand 
pesos. For those ejidal families lucky enough to have cacao land 
and whose trees were in full production, additional family income 
could amount to $20-30,000.
Until 1976, only cacao production had shown any profits project­
wide. In 1979 it was certainly the best earner in C-29, as $5,256,000 
were distributed as profits. Cattle operations also distributed 
profits, but much less. Each product was considered a separate "line;" 
those in charge may decide to distribute profits one to four times a 
year. Barkin wrote in 1976 of the importance of profit distribution (6) :
The socios are always anxious for the distribution 
of profits; they await it so desperately that on various 
occasions the Fideicomiso has made the distribution 
without there having been any profits, charging the sum 
to the standing debt of the ejido.
The total level of profit distribution throughout the Chontalpa 
ejidos was $38 m. for 1978, $80 m. for 1979 and $118 m. for 1980. On 
C-29, in 1980, $3 m. of profits were divided among 162 ejidatarios.
Note that of the ejido's $4 m. cattle debt, half had been paid off, 
and some forgiven by the government, leaving C-29 in a fairly enviable 
financial position as of the early 1980's.
In 1980 the average Chontalpa Plan family earned $54,000 (94), 
$27-28,000 per worker (personal interview, director of Promotora). The
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directors of C-29 estimate that the average earnings for an ejidatario 
with rights was $50-60,000 per year in profits and $25,000 in labor, 
giving an income of $75-80,000, roughly comparable to many family 
farm households. Incomes on C-29 were probably higher than on any 
other collective ejido.
Private Plot Production Strategy
Although they belonged to a collective that many strongly believed 
in, the ejidatarios operated also as Independent families. That 
Independent life was centered on the use of the private plot.
The plots originally emphasized subsistence crops such as maize 
and bananas; others produced some cane, coconut, cacao, cattle and 
small livestock. But in 1980, according to the directors of C-29, 40­
80 per cent of the ejidal private plots had cacao. From no more than 
thirty hectares in 1975, there were almost 200 hectares in 1980.
The cacao tecnico estimated that the age distribution of private 
ejidal cacao plantations was similar to that in general in the Chon- 
talpa project: 30 per cent of trees in production, 40 per cent a year
old, 30 per cent 1-3 years old. In general, yields on private plots 
were higher than on collective plots. Many families even use 
fertilizers bought from FERTIMEX now and buy insecticides from private 
stores.
The ejido gave credit for cacao produced on personal plots; 
four to five ejidatarios had to group together to receive it. But in 
1980, very little use was made of such credit.
The family has the following objectives:
1) Maximize returns to family labor from all sources;
2) Maximize use of the private plot land;
3) Maintain the position of official ejidatario in the 
collective;
4) Maximize protection for the family from economic swings 
in the collective.
There was a difference of opinion on whether the private plots 
competed with collective labor needs. The answer depended on how much 
access to family labor the farmer had. Under most conditions, the 
afternoon and a few weekends were sufficient for an ejidatario and one 
family member to complete all the necessary activities on the private 
plot. However, as of 1980, most of this cacao was newly planted and 
hence did not require harvest labor. Under the present collective 
schedule, the private cacao harvest would conflict with both peak 
collective cacao harvest and peak cane harvest.
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Costs of production and organization are very similar to the 
minifundista family farms. (The corresponding "off-farm activity" in 
this case is collective farming.) Regardless of family interest in 
increased chemical input applications, the cash constraint is 
significant. Farm management will always show a high ratio of labor 
used relative to cash inputs. The need for cash on private cacao plots 
adds to the unwillingness of farmers to re-invest profits in the 
collective plantations. They would rather receive the remanente to 
invest in cash inputs on their own family plantation.
Basic Strategies of Production on Collective Cacao Farms
Decision-making for the collective ejidos of the Chontalpa 
requires monumental trade-offs to work out economically and politically. 
There are five basic objectives:
1) Meet production goals for politically determined products;
2) Maximize land utilization on the collectives;
3) Pay back initial debt of the ejidos;
4) Maximize returns to the ejidatarios;
5) Maximize employment for ejidatario families.
These criteria rarely point to the same pattern of resource 
allocation; hence there is continual institutional conflict between the 
body of ejidatarios, their directives, the Union of Ejidos, the 
Chontalpa Promotora, the Banco de Credit Rural and the national SARH, 
over which activities will be promoted and how resources are to be 
distributed between wages, profits, investments, production costs, and 
social services.
Politics in Production Goals
As the history of the Chontalpa Plan land use (earlier in this 
chapter) shows, there has been continuous change in product focus. 
Decision-making about investments and land use has been almost 
completely bureaucratic, largely out of Mexico City. The huge invest­
ment made in the Plan Chontalpa could only be justified politically if 
the collective farms made a major Impact on national agricultural 
shortages. Thus the initial agricultural emphasis changed first to 
livestock and now is re-orienting itself to stress basic foods 
production, despite earlier failures.
Cacao is the only major exception to this. Along with melon, cacao 
is not a national priority, nor are there shortages. Its production 
has been encouraged due to its profitability, foreign exchange revenues, 
and farmer tradition. But the ejido must continue to be responsive to 
national needs, at least until most of the debt is paid off.
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Optlmlzlng Land Use on the Collectives
Again, the enormous cost of the project and its supervision by 
national leadership put pressure on the collective ejidos to intensify 
land use and maximize production as much as possible. The collective 
nature of the experiment, and the fact that most of its chief political 
backers are fond of collectivization, means that these pressures 
tend to sacrifice private plot production for collective production 
when there is a trade-off to be made. And because production goals are 
more visible and compelling than financial goals, there is a tendency 
for official tecnicos and directors to push for high production levels 
at the expense of profits. Due to increased ejidatario participation 
In the past several years, however, this problem is diminishing.
Paying Back the Initial Debt
Government and banking representatives have played an important 
role in organization and production decisions over the years. The 
Chontalpa ejidatarios are limited in their independent decision-making 
because of the large federal debt which they owe for ejidal develop­
ment - land clearing, drainage, other infrastructure, cattle 
development.
Cane profits and part of recent cacao profits have generally been 
directed to repaying past debt. Most cacao profits have gone to 
internal financing of cacao expansion. Earlier losses from the basic 
grains projects were absorbed by cacao and cane operations.
Many of the basic development loans have been forgiven the 
edjiatarios as being well beyond their financial abilities. But the 
ejidos have come quite a way toward paying off their cattle debt. If 
this can continue several more years, the credit crunch so severe in the 
early 1970's should ease. It will be interesting to see whether the 
national banking institutions will indeed permit the ejidos to become 
financially independent, as this will significantly reduce outside 
influence on ejidal production and investment decision-making.
Maximizing Returns to the Ejidatarios
Ejidatarios have sometimes complained that they do not feel like 
owners or farmers anymore; that effective decision-making has been 
wrested from them by the many institutions involved in the Chontalpa 
Project, and yet they are saddled with debt and most of the risk.
There is some basis for this in fact, and the resulting "worker" 
mentality of the ejidatarios is in large part justified. This attitude 
definitely hurts productivity and the long-run capitalization of the 
project.
Ejidatarios with rights expect a return comparable at least to 
that which they would have as an ejidatario with rights on an indivi­
dual plot ejido. On other case-study farms (with only one excep­
tion) such returns are certainly higher than $92 per day. Indeed, they
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ranged from $90 to $332 per day. Demands for remanentes are thus not 
unreasonable, particularly when we consider that the per capita land 
base for a Chontalpa ejidatario is much larger than his neighbors'. 
With the remanentes, the average income per day worked in cacao by an 
ejidatario with rights comes to $200. Gjidatarios are unwilling to 
sacrifice these profits to investment, whose returns may go to others, 
or which could be absconded by a dishonest leader.
Maximizing Ejidal Employment
As we have seen, there is presently no employment problem for the 
ejidatarios with rights, who have first priority on jobs. But they 
are now far outnumbered by their offspring, whose access to work is 
less certain. On C-29, a large number of them can be employed almost 
year-round^ but the wage is so much lower than the going wage in the 
surrounding area, that to achieve a comparable income, they need to 
work many more man-days.
But this ejido has certainly fulfilled the goal of producing 
jobs. Using 1980 project figures - which do not include labor used on 
private plots, nor employment of resident non-ejidatarios in Union 
industries - the number of man-equivalents per hectare for the entire 
5000 hectares was 12.2. If we estimate that indicator based on land in 
use (subtracting 1300 hectares of acahual), the figure drops to 9.0 
meq/ha; and subtracting all land not in commercial production (a total 
of 3320 hectares), it drops to 8.1. Considering the importance of 
cattle activities, this is a very commendable rate of labor intensity, 
though not as high as the minifundia cacao farms just outside the 
project limits, which of course have lower capitalization and lower 
incomes.
The ejido has been transformed into a large-scale employer, quite 
incongruent with the standards for individual-based ejidos, which are 
based on the concept "land to him who works it." There has been an 
attempt in the case of ejidatarios without rights and some favored 
libres to confer secure employment and extra benefits, to avoid the 
exploitation associated with capitalist employment, but the line 
between ejidatario and non-ejidatario is blurring, to the dissatis­
faction of those with nominal rights. The collective ejidos of the 
Chontalpa already operate essentially on the basis of corporate 
capitalism in their dealings with the rest of the economy, and the 
importance of non-ejidal workers is in direct contradiction to the 
precepts of ejidal development.
This is a critical issue, because labor is the principal 
constraint to increased production on C-29. Resolution of the labor 
constraint can only come from further incorporation of non-ejidatarios. 
If the Chontalpa ejidos are intended to be government projects to 
maximize economic and social benefits for the agricultural population, 
their employment policies will be different than if they are expected 
to maximize incomes to ejidatarios with land rights on the ejidos.
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Increasing Productivity
Experiments now with new cacao technology are Intended to reduce 
some of the above frictions by Increasing productivity. A major new 
item Is the cross between Guayaquil and Criollo to yield a variety 
which begins to produce at two years, and has experimental yields of 5 
kilos per hectare at 4-5 years. The Union has talked of aerial 
spraying for cacao, similar to that frequently used in Tabasco for 
large banana plantations, but such a technology requires compact 
squares of 100 hectares of trees to be profitable, and presently, 
most Chontalpa cacao is quite dispersed*
There is substantial interest in expanding cattle production 
because a relatively small increase in employment could yield signifi­
cantly higher profits. But it is limited now by a shortage of feed, 
especially in the dry season when fetle ejido must sell animals for this 
reason. The ejido plans to increase the area in improved pastures 
(African Stargrass, Aleman, Elephant Grass) from 380 to 880 hectares. 
There is a little supplemental feeding of animals with grains and cane 
by-products. Earlier experimentation with silage failed. The technical 
constraints for increasing the feed base are significant.
The collectives certainly have some potential advantages for 
implementing new technologies to improve productivity. But the organiza­
tional and employment problems must be dealt with first. The technology 
available is already far superior to that which is in use; Indeed 
family farm cacao technology is better than that used on the collectives.
Response of Collective Cacao Farmers to Change
The economic and social patterns of the Chontalpa ejidos have 
changed drastically in the past decade. Mid-decade studies Indicated 
little improvement in real living standards among collective ejidata- 
rios. But there is certainly much greater prosperity today than there 
was then, and greater contentment.
Price Response
Collective farmer response to changes in prices and wages, and 
the general reaction to the petroleum boom, were far different from 
those of other groups. Because of the capitalistic nature of the 
cooperative enterprise, the ejidatarios were extremely responsive to 
changes in product prices - once basic production requirements set by 
SARH or Mexico City had been met. If cacao prices continue to rise 
there will be a greater shift in resources to cacao production 
maintaining minimum levels of cane production. As it is, all land capable 
of transformation to cacao is now being planted.
If prices decline, however, the ejido will be under tremendous 
pressure to improve cacao productivity, which may not be possible 
without a several year period of declining profit distribution in
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favor of investment. Whether this is possible without coercion during 
a time of declining total incomes is debatable. There may be a strong 
temptation to transfer resources instead to cattle-raising and pasture 
care, particularly if labor scarcity continues. Since the ejidatarios 
do little work off the collective now, they would not be much affected 
by the decline in general cacao labor demand which would occur if 
prices decline.
Immediate investment plans indicate a balanced interest in diver­
sification. Cacao area is to increase by about 400 hectares. But much 
unused land will be cleared for pasture; land along the drains (whose 
use was formerly restricted) will be used for subsistence maize 
production, and the ejido will increase its investments in cooperative 
agro-industry within the Union of Ejidos. Betyeen 1981 and 1984,
Ejido C-29 plans to add a hog operation.
Response to Change in Off-Ejido Wages
With the large increase in cacao area, livestock enterprises, and 
subsistence production, there will be a sharply increased demand for 
labor on the ejido by 1984-85. The ejido hopes to mechanize more, 
particularly In cacao spraying and fertilization. But the demand for 
non-ejidatario labor will certainly continue to rise. The collectives 
as a whole promise to be among the principal employers in the region.
As such, they will be very sensitive to the going wage rate for 
agricultural and non-agricultural labor. And since it is unlikely that 
ejidatarios would ever submit to being paid less for a jornal than 
hired non-ejidal companions, any increases in the general wage will 
inflate labor payments to ejidatarios as well.
The increased demand from the collectives will itself push wages 
higher; if this combines with significant employment by PEMEX drilling 
on ejidal land, the ejidal budget could be sorely beset by labor costs 
- in a manner somewhat similar to the hired-labor-based producers 
today. There would likely be very strong pressure to reduce sugar cane 
production; more Intensive cacao technologies are unlikely to be 
successfully introduced in such a scenario.
The ejido's response to declining wages would also be similar to 
that of hired-labor-based producers - at least so long as hired non- 
ejidatario labor is important in breaking production bottlenecks. If 
wages went quite low, of course, ejidatarios without rights would 
probably demand greater employment on the ejidos, which would partially 
displace hired non-ejidal workers.
Impact of Petroleum Boom on Collective Farmers
As of 1981, there were 15 oil wells situated on C-29 land; some 
70 others were planned for some time in the future, probably not 
immediately. On each of these, the ejido loses the use of three to 
four hectares around the well; land cleared for road-building (even
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some cacao has been cut) and some land from clogged drains. Land 
tenure is secure, but Indemnification payments - like those to all 
ejidatarios - cover only land improvements, not land value lost to 
them.
Despite PEMEX employment of ejidatarios' sons, the self-contained 
internal economies of the collectives have been sheltered from the 
petroleum boom's effects. Only the cost of living impact has been 
marked, since nearly all commercial activity relating to ejidatarios 
takes place in Cunduacan and Cardenas, two of the most expensive 
places in Tabasco due to oil activities. It is not clear why there is 
not more resident commerce in the poblados; nor why farmers without 
cacao on their private plots do not supply more fruits, vegetables, 
root crops, or other products for sale within the collectives.
Role of Collectives in Agricultural Development
Agricultural production on the Chontalpa collectives is one of the 
few economic variables in the State over which the government has some 
control. Success in this project is desirable for several reasons: its 
controversial politics, its potential role in resolving local agricul­
tural shortages, its importance as a symbol of government competence, 
its role as example for tropical agricultural development.
Several conclusions seem clear from the study of C-29, regarding 
guidelines for tropical project development, the distribution of 
activities between private and collective jurisdiction, and the role 
of the collective in the labor market.
1) As has been often stated of tropical projects in Mexico - but 
cannot be stated too often - it is of fundamental importance to under­
stand the environmental characteristics and constraints of the land 
before undertaking expensive, semi-permanent infrastructure invest­
ments. Some land use changes in the Chontalpa were due to political 
priorities; too many were due to inadequacies of soil and water control. 
Production still suffers from the early decisions taken from mistaken 
agronomic Information. Precipitate action like the destruction of so 
many cacao plantations which represented years of investment is 
extremely unwise, particularly in a new project.
2) There are many activities which can be undertaken by 
collectives more efficiently, productively and equitably than by 
individual farmers. Large-scale infrastructure management and 
investment, input purchases, product processing, organization of schools, 
bus lines and other local services are examples.
However, basic agricultural activities and decision-making are 
much better left to the farmer. It is the essence of farming to make 
decisions on details. Success in farming, more than in most other 
productive activities, is dependent on constant care, day-to-day 
flexibility, and sophisticated management of micro-environments.
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Decentralized decision-making is essential to success, and any 
comparison of the successful smallholder cacao farmer with his 
collective counterpart - who has far more resources, but less production 
bears this out. Recent organizational changes in C-29 making individual 
ejidatarios responsible for specific cacao plots is certainly no 
betrayal of the community-based production system - rather a 
strengthening of it.
3) The role of the collectives in the Tabascan labor market has 
been ignored, largely because of ideological discomfort with the 
hiring of non-ejidatarios on the collectives. Ejidatarios on indivi­
dually organized ejidos are not allowed to hire workers full-time, yet 
the collective has been forced to do so, and will continue to expand 
such employment. This may require a complete re-thinking of the use of 
hired labor on all ejidos.
There are political problems which will need to be resolved about 
the status of these workers, their rights and rewards. But the solution 
certainly does not lie in restricting such employment; the positive 
benefits for landless workers in the state and for the general 
economy are overwhelming. It is also desirable to increase agricultural 
production on the collectives, without holding back due to labor 
constraints. That would be a tragic waste of opportunity given the long­
term national and regional thirst for jobs and agricultural production.
CHAPTER 9. FARMWORKERS IN THE CACAO ECONOMY AND LANDLESS
EMPLOYMENT
The composition of the labor force in Tabasco cacao production is 
undergoing fundamental changes as a result of both the petroleum boom 
and long-term trends within the cacao sector itself.
Participation of the landless in cacao production is surprisingly 
limited, underscoring the fact that Tabasco's heartland remains 
predominantly smallholder with proletarianization as yet not far 
advanced. This also suggests that landless workers are seeking 
employment elsewhere.
But on-going changes have important implications for state 
employment, in particular, the exchange of workers between the cacao 
and non-farm economic sectors. The cacao-growing families form a huge 
potential reserve of new workers for the general economy, yet under 
certain circumstances are also a potential sponge for absorbing excess 
workers.
This chapter briefly discusses the role in state cacao employment 
of farm family members from different types of households, then 
analyzes the state-wide supply and demand for landless agricultural 
workers as they relate to the cacao sector.
The Composition of the Cacao Labor Force
Chart 34 illustrates the total number of workers in the cacao 
labor force in 1979/80 estimated from the SST. Including secondary 
occupations, it numbers about 25,000 workers - some 16-20 per cent of 
the state's EAP in agriculture; and 35-45 per cent of the EAP in the 
six principal cacao-growing counties. Of this total, about 52 per 
cent were farmers (as either the primary or secondary occupation); 29 
per cent were farm family members (working either on their family's or 
others' farms); and only a fifth (perhaps more, if our figures are 
underestimated, as suspected) are workers from landless families.
Of the labor force from farm families, 39 per cent came from 
minifundia, 32 per cent from family farms, 19 per cent from hired- 
labor-based farms and 10 per cent from collectives. Note particularly 
that though the estimated 12,649 farms (including collective private 
plots) had under 23,000 active workers, the potential EAP from these 
families was 64,886. Even if children 8-14 are excluded, there is 
obviously considerable labor available over-all that could be tapped 
should labor returns warrant their employment.
Furthermore, a fourth of cacao farms have no worker whose primary 
occupation is in cacao farming. A quarter of the actual EAP on cacao 
farms work outside agriculture as their primary occupation, usually in 
skilled trades or in commerce and services.
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34. THE CACAO LABOR FORCE IN TABASCO, 1979/80* -
Occupat ion of Worker:
□  EAP FROM CACAO FARMS WITH NEITHER PRIMARY OR SECONDARY OCCUPATION IN CACAO
LANDLESS FARMWORKERS b/
f a r m w o r k e r - s e c o n d a r y
OCCUPATION
FARMWORKER- PRIMARY 
OCCUPATION
M  FARMING-SECONDARY OCCUPATION
FARMING- PRIMARY 
OCCUPATION
Fami ly of  W orke r :
CO = COLLECTIVE
HLB =HIRED LABOR BASED
FF = FAMILY FARM
MF = MINI FUND IA
3. /—  The total EAP in agriculture 
in 1970 was 116,147; thus cacao 
work accounted for 20% of agri­
cultural jobs. If only cacao 
municipios are included (Comal- 
calco, Cardenas, Cunduacan,
Jalpa, Huimanguillo, Paraiso) 
the agricultural EAP was 53,630, 
and cacao accounted for nearly 
half of all workers.
—^This figure actually 
ranges between 3700 and 4900, 
depending upon SST sampling 
interpretation.
*COPRODET and CONAPO, Encuesta Sociodemografica del Estado de Tabasco, 
Villahermosa, Tabasco, January 1980; extrapolations from Cacao Sub-Sample.
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These statistics clearly support our earlier impression that the 
family work force available for cacao production is extremely flexible. 
If half of each of these categories of individuals were to dedicate 
themselves to cacao farming, an additional 24,000 workers could be 
added to the available labor force - or almost two per farm in the 
state. This is obviously equivalent to well over ten per cent of the 
entire labor force in agriculture in Tabasco - enough to make a major 
impact on wages and the tightness of the agricultural labor market.
Characteristics of Cacao Farm Workers
The SST provides a profile of cacao farmworkers, summarized in 
Chart 35. Cacao workers tended to be from larger than average 
families, with more members of working age. They were more likely to 
come from hired-labor-based and family farm households, and less 
likely to be from minifundista families than was the typical worker.
Nearly a third were heads of households - but these came almost 
entirely from collective and non-farm households. The rest were 
children of household heads and, as would be expected, are young. About 
half of all cacao farmworkers were under twenty years of age.
But there was a big difference in age distribution by household 
type, with nearly three quarters of those from minifundia families 
under twenty; about sixty per cent from family and hired-labor-based 
farms, contrasting with only 23 per cent on collective farms and 19 
per cent in non-farm families. Only 2.6 per cent of cacao workers were 
also cacao farm owners in 1979.
The large number of workers from family farms and HLB families 
who were aged 21-30 is due to sons' seeking independence prior to 
receiving their share in land, as explained in Chapters 5 and 6. They 
worked off-farm even when their efforts would have been highly productive 
on the farm.
Changes in Employment for Agricultural Workers
There are four factors which have combined to change the employ­
ment patterns of landless rural workers in the past decade: increasing 
numbers and proportion of landless workers in the working population; 
tightening of the land market; increasing prices for local agricul­
tural products; and the great labor demand of the petroleum boom.
The "Supply" of Landless Labor in Tabasco
The EAP in Tabasco in agriculture grew from around 100,000 in 
1960 to 116,000 in 1970. The number of farmers alone grew by 10,000, 
accounting for most of the increase. During this period, most of the 
remaining frontier areas of the state were settled and the large 
family cacao holdings were first broken up to accommodate children who 
had no possibilities of settling on new lands.
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Ejidalization did not begin in force in Tabasco until the 1950's, 
and during the 1960's there were still many ejidal extensions 
being made. In the 1970's, by contrast, little land was distributed, 
despite the large extensions of privately-owned land in the southern 
and eastern parts of the state which could be so utilized. The petro­
leum boom reduced the urgency behind such action, by diverting 
landless workers to urban-type activities.
The 1970's again saw an increase in the number of farmers, but 
this was largely a result of minifundization, and thus there was a 
simultaneous large increase in the number of workers. For the first 
time in Tabasco, there existed a large group of landless workers who 
were not part of a landowner's immediate family, waiting to become 
landowners themselves through inheritance or eventual purchase of 
unimproved land.
Tabasco is making the transition from a state dominated by 
smallholder farms to one dominated by the landless. In 1960 and 1970, 
workers and unpaid family workers accounted for half of all agricul­
tural EAP. But whereas in 1960, farmers accounted for 34 per cent of 
all state workers, and in 1970 for 30 per cent of all state workers, 
in 1980, farmers accounted for closer to a quarter of the working 
population. The average farm size in the agricultural zone of the 
state had grown considerably smaller.
These same processes led to tremendous upward pressure on land 
prices, exacerbated by high agricultural product prices and PEMEX 
activity which led to speculation, greater urban demands for land, and 
general price inflation. A fundamental change in possibilities for 
the landless has taken place. Whereas in 1975 a hectare of unimproved 
land may have cost $15,000 in the petroleum/cacao areas, in 1980 it 
cost $80,000. Cacao land which formerly cost $25,000 per hectare 
cost up to $300,000.
This price increase has effectively destroyed access to land for 
agricultural jornaleros, who in earlier times could often look forward 
to purchasing their own land after years of hard work. This was one of 
the principal reasons for minimal class conflicts within the cacao 
sector. Land acquisition is now possible only for individuals who find 
non-agricultural types of high-paying work, for example in petroleum 
or skilled trades.
Trends in the "Demand" for Landless Labor in Tabasco
But economic conditions in the past decade have brought some 
compensation to the landless. The large increase in labor demand 
induced by the agricultural boom, state infrastructure development and 
the petroleum boom increased labor scarcity. As a result, the 
proportion of agricultural product price which goes to labor appears 
to have increased.
The agricultural minimum wage for Tabasco did not accurately 
reflect the market situation in cacao. The minimum wage was generally
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paid for a five-hour day, whereas a full day would cost closer to $150 
in 1980. By contrast, the wage in ranching was much lower, with ranch­
ers paying only $50-60 in 1979 for a five-hour day. The ratio 
between cacao farm wage and cacao price changed from $20/day:$30/kilo 
in 1970 to $40:$65 in 1975 and $150:$50 in 1980.
Also, the ratio between the agricultural minimum wage and wages 
for relatively highly-skilled jobs (Level VI) narrowed from only .43 
in 1970 to .47 in 1975 and .56 in 1980.
The effect of PEMEX activity was important, but should not be 
over-estimated. At its peak, over 50,000 workers were employed on 
PEMEX projects, but the majority of these were from out of state.
After a period of a couple years, most were gone and with them much of 
the urban bloat of Cardenas and Villahermosa. There was not much 
permanent migration to the state which would compete with local work­
ers. Many of those who did migrate had specialized skills which - 
had Tabascans been trained for them - would have been superfluous at 
the end of the "boom." Thus the influx did not have a depressing 
effect on local wages; newcomers took newly-created jobs.
The thousands of Tabascans who did participate helped increase 
labor scarcity within agriculture and were responsible for significant 
money transfers to rural areas. Most workers were involved only 
intermittently. This was in part due to the restrictiveness of the 
STPRM (the petroleum workers' union) which cost a small fortune to 
join. Most Tabascan workers were limited to "transitorio” positions 
with contracts of only weeks or months at a time.
Standard of Living of Landless Workers
A landless worker who was fully employed, working 250-280 days 
per year at $120 per day, earned $30,000-34,000 yearly in 1980. This 
income was considerably below that of all cacao farmers surveyed, as 
seen in Chart 25 in Chapter 4. Even adjusting for two full-time workers 
in the family, income barely reached that of the minifundistas. This 
resulted in a fairly precarious economic situation because of the 
rapid inflation in consumer goods prices, especially food. The value- 
added tax begun in the 1970's further decreased the buying power of 
the landless. Many landless families rent small maize plots, but rent 
for these has also gone up. The abundant fishing and hunting which 
was an important income supplement not long ago, has disappeared in 
all but a few areas of the cacao heartland.
There have been offsetting factors, however. Most important is 
the abundance of non-farm income supplements available, particularly 
related to construction. Also, about twenty per cent of women in 
landless households earned some income via formal jobs, trading, or 
provision of food, sewing, cleaning or laundry services.
Most children of the landless in the cacao areas now finish 
primary school. Though this still entails great sacrifice to the 
family, the result is a major shift in employment potential. Another
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sign of improved welfare is the reduction in female wage labor on the 
cacao plantations.
The increase in urban occupations and especially in work for 
PEMEX constructoras has led to life-style changes. Many construction 
workers are gone during the week and return on weekends. Where 
travels range farther, money is usually sent to the family at intervals. 
But there is a distressing incidence of family abandonment as well.
The daily schedules of jornaleros, factory workers and Villa- 
hermosa construction workers differ considerably. The jornalero wakes 
at 4:30 like the others, works from 6:00-9:00 and 9:30-11:00, lunches 
at noon, and then rests, visits or does household chores until supper 
at 7:00. The factory worker rises at the same time, but must spend 
more time traveling. He works from 7:00-12:00 and 12:30-3:00, taking 
lunch at noon, and supper after getting home at 4:00. When working 
overtime, he may not get home until 6:00-7:00 in the evening. The 
Villahermosa worker labors 7:00-9:00, 9:30-12:00 and 12:30-3:00, eating 
his big meal at 3:00 after getting home.
The physical demands of PEMEX-related jobs are often greater than 
the average day in field work, and because of longer hours, are more 
exhausting. Such jobs are also associated with the greater risks 
described in Chapter 2, such as explosions and chemical burns. Workers 
weigh these factors, and also lost transportation time, against the 
higher wages, overtime pay, occasional social security benefits and 
greater status of petroleum work, in choosing between such work and 
agricultural jobs.
Worker Organization
By far the vast majority of landless workers are unorganized; 
they seek work and arrange working conditions individually. There has 
been, however, a surge in unionization and worker organization in the 
past decade.
The League of Agrarian Communities, an off-shoot of the CNC, has 
been organizing workers, ejidatarios and employees to demand better 
wages and provision of benefits such as social security. Some ranchers 
and large cacao farmers do participate in such programs, but they are 
a minority. The focus of the n e w L e a g u e  program is on non-farm occu­
pations filled by campesinos. T h e y  w a n t  t o  strengthen their 
bargaining position to prevent transitorios being dismissed at the 
employers' will, and to lengthen Lheii contracts to permit payment of 
legal benefits.
All workers in civil construction belong to the CTM or CROC 
unions. Even when hired as libres they become union members auto­
matically. Only the PEMEX union requires workers to be members first. 
The constructoras do not have to use only union personnel. In Cunduacan 
in May 1980, of the 5000 "de planta" union members, 70 per cent 
were from the municipio and the rest from out of state.
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Finding Work
The process of finding work is itself quite time-consuming. For 
agricultural activities, workers often group together and go from farm 
to farm seeking work. In other communities, the farmer visits the 
neighboring ejido's main square announcing he has work and offering 
jobs. Where an individual has the custom of working with a particular 
patron, the two devise a system for communicating when work is avail­
able or required. Sometimes if the worker's family is in difficult 
economic straits, the patron may offer extra work. In general though, 
the practice of significant non-wage benefits or gifts for workers 
from long-time patrons is disappearing.
To find PEMEX or constructora work, workers listen for radio ads, 
for public and printed announcements, and visit the potential places 
of employment regularly to see if jobs are being filled. Very 
frequently, personal connections are required in order to be granted 
one of these jobs. Sometimes the job search involves repeated visits 
to Villahermosa or Cardenas.
STPRM operates offices in Cunduacan, Villahermosa and elsewhere. 
In Cunduacan, it provided ten drilling teams of thirty people each, 
plus about 450-500 other workers in May 1980. About 100 libres were 
also hired, for hauling chemical materials. They received minimum wage 
for that category of work, and were employed through contratistas.
Half the union members there were employed de planta; the rest were 
transitorios who were hired by the well or for 90 days.
The chief of personnel in Cunduacan believed that at most ten per 
cent of the petroleum work force was from Tabasco - perhaps as much as 
twenty per cent of transitorios.
About a fifth of the people working for PEMEX in 1980 were also 
working in 1970. Most of the rest were people whose relatives were 
former PEMEX workers in Veracruz. 1979/80 saw a big increase in new 
members from Tabasco.
For other types of jobs, specialized individuals arrange employ­
ment. The "enganchador" charges the hiring company payment for each 
qualified worker he brings in. This system is also used in cane­
cutting and some other agricultural activities.
The "contratista" arranges with the company to do a particular 
job, then is himself "patron" to the workers he hires, called "desta- 
jistas." There is no direct contact between company and workers.
Landless Family Strategies
The landless guarantee their subsistence and family well-being 
through multiple employment. The head of household has several sources 
of income and/or his wife and children, including schoolchildren, 
participate in economic activities. They rarely have savings 
accounts, their only economic back-up being the common raising of small
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livestock for sale when needed. They usually live on other people's 
land, except for a few who own their own solares.
The frequency of dual occupations (so commonly found in the 
regional survey) was often not picked up in the SST, because the 
survey's definition of an occupation was restricted to activities 
which took place at least thirty days in the year. In addition, appli­
cation of the question on secondary occupation was erratic in early 
interviews.
The non-farm families in the SST had nearly twice as high a 
frequency of two economically active members as did the over-all 
average. But there were fewer families with five or more active 
members (38 versus 51 per cent on average).
The dependency ratio tended to be much higher than for the aver­
age cacao farm family. This was because the predominant demographic 
stages were the young married and school-age child stages. In general, 
the population was younger, as evidenced by the age distribution of 
household heads. Nearly three quarters were under 40,versus about a 
third on average.
For the landless population as a whole, cacao work and agri­
cultural work in general has been declining in importance. This was 
particularly so for younger family members, whereas heads of households 
and workers over 30 tended to be involved in agriculture.
The SST showed that of the actual EAP in non-farm families, three 
quarters worked for a patron and ten per cent for the family. But only 
57 per cent were jornaleros and 12 per cent were themselves employers. 
Less than three per cent worked for PEMEX or a constructora. Although 
seventy per cent did work in agriculture in 1979, large proportions 
worked in skilled, unskilled and commercial sectors (15.5, 4.7 and 9.3 
per cent, respectively).
Of those who formerly worked in cacao plantations but did so no 
longer, a fifth were no longer working at all. Of the rest, only 18 
per cent still worked in agriculture; over half were in skilled trades 
(see charts in Chapter 4).
A career in a skilled trade is by far the most lucrative and 
stable of all the possibilities open to the landless worker. But the 
apprentice system is generally used and the master must be paid for 
the apprentices' training time. The financial resources and time 
required to develop these skills put the landless at a distinct disad­
vantage in comparison with the offspring of farmers.
Families seek work over a wide geographical area, if sufficient 
work is not found locally. This includes travel to far parts of Mexico 
and the U.S., although the latter was more common among older indivi­
duals. Migration statistics for the non-farm families showed very 
high levels of migration for the age group 16-40, and very low levels 
for those 51-80, substantiating the reported tendency of the young to 
migrate (often with their families) in search of better employment.
Employment opportunities for the landless were certainly available 
in the booming economy of Tabasco. But this did not negate the extreme 
precariousness of much of the employment and the vulnerability to slight 
swings in economic growth, particularly of the construction industry, 
and changes in agricultural price levels. The lack of organization and 
minimal job protection meant that much of the burden of economic dis­
location was borne by this group-L'
Role of the Landless in Tabasco State Development
Tabasco has enjoyed several decades of relative economic prosperity 
and political calm, largely because it was a zone of smallholders 
with ample land at their disposal and periodically reasonable crop 
prices. The Tabascan landscape is fundamentally changing now, in part 
due to demographic and geographic reasons, in part due to the changing 
economic structure toward petroleum activities.
Once the boom is over here - which should begin in the mid-1980's 
- labor demand from the petroleum sector is likely to shrink markedly. 
The effect which this will have on the landless population is not as 
negative as it might seem, because much of the labor force was imported. 
But the reduced construction which will occur, if the State Development 
Plan to strengthen other economic sectors does not take place, will have 
more serious consequences for the landless. These will be more or less 
severe depending upon demand for labor from the agricultural sector.
As Tabasco's economy acquires a more diversified structure, 
serious retraining programs for agricultural laborers must be 
established in the skills required for tourism, for agri­
cultural infrastructure maintenance, for housing construction, for 
commercial activities and in the professions. The state university was 
over-extended in 1980 and suffered both from a shortage of teaching 
personnel and from students ill-prepared in secondary school. Tabasco 
has succeeded in greatly increasing its number of students; it must 
now attract higher quality teachers who will provide them with accept­
able educational standards.
The state has several skilled-trade training centers, but they 
are still largely showpieces and do not produce enough trained people 
to make much of a dent. Subsidization of this type of training is 
essential, particularly to place landless young people in a competi­
tive position with those from the farms.
_1/ An excellent discussion of the nature of landless work 
opportunities can be found in the essays of CASUAL WORK AND 
POVERTY IN THIRD WORLD CITIES, edited by Bromely and Grey. 
Although oriented to urban situations, these are highly appli­
cable to employment in regions like Tabasco, where due to good 
transportation systems and geographic proximity, rural people 
form a large part of the work force for urban activities.
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Meanwhile, the potential for land reform in Tabasco is not 
exhausted. New lands should be settled by the truly landless, 
children of ejidatarios and minifundistas. Policies to counter mini- 
fundization - which is a less effective and productive system for 
increasing the labor intensity of land than is intensification on 
family-farm-size holdings - should be promoted.
Regulation regarding urban development should be loosened to 
promote a freer atmosphere for the casual and part-time economic 
employment which is so critical to the landless. Government con­
tracting should consider the possibility of providing certain types of 
urban services through small-scale local providers, rather than large- 
scale national companies which tend to be far more capital-intensive.
Landlessness is on the rise in Tabasco for the foreseeable 
future. Economic policy must take this into account, even though in 
many instances it will mean reduced political consideration for the 
farm-owning and ejidal sectors. Tabasco should aim to transform as 
many individuals as possible from the category of "landless rural 
laborer" to "skilled worker" in rural and urban areas. Due to the 
petroleum boom, this is starting to occur; the policy challenge is to 
see that the trend continues beyond the boom period.
CHAPTER 10. RESOLVING THE AGRICULTURE-PETROLEUM CONFLICT: 
LESSONS FROM TABASCO
The experience of Tabasco in the 1970's shows that the agri­
culture-petroleum conflict is not inevitable. Whether the negative 
effects of a petroleum boom or similar major industrial transition 
can be mitigated for the agricultural sector depends on a number of 
economic, political and social factors.
Demography and agricultural prices set the basic constraints on 
local response. The political strength of farmers determines the level 
of political activism by government to counter effects of the "boom." 
Finally, employment conditions and the basic structure of agriculture 
determine how well the agricultural economy will tolerate major 
economic disruption. Resilience in large part will depend on a strong 
smallholder or campesino sector.
Basic Development Constraints: Demography and Prices
Demographic conditions and agricultural prices critically influence 
the outcome of petroleum-agriculture interactions, though they are 
usually out of the control of policy makers.
Demographic Conditions
That the principal petroleum zone in Tabasco happened to coincide 
with the area of greatest population density in the state was a dis­
tinct disadvantage. Nevertheless, this kept the disruption of rural- 
urban migration to a minimum. Settlement patterns were such as to 
encourage continued residence on the farm rather than permanent resi­
dence change to the large towns.
Low traditional female participation in the Tabascan work force 
was a constraint on agricultural production where males chose to work 
in petroleum. But the principal age group of farm-related workers who 
did turn to petroleum was quite young, and the demographic cycle was 
such in this area that their absence was far less disruptive than 
would have been the case had chiefly older heads of household sought 
petroleum work.
In general, low population density areas (relative to agri­
cultural resources) will be in a more favorable position and adjust to 
petroleum-related problems more easily. Should large amounts of 
undeveloped land be available, these could be reserved for use by 
affected farmers, rather than speculators.
The rate of labor participation - working age, female participa­
tion, the demographic cycle as it relates to working life and local 
culture - affects the kinds of changes that a petroleum economy intro­
duces. Areas with high traditional female participation on the farm,
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for example, may prove more adaptive than zones where loss of the male 
head of household to petroleum employment leaves behind no one trained 
to run the farm.
Rates of immigration have a profound effect on petroleum- 
agriculture conflict, by exacerbating problems with inflation, wage 
rates, housing and other basic goods' scarcity, if poorly managed. If 
a government can restrict immigration to those with obviously needed 
and scarce skills, more individuals from the local agricultural 
population will be employed in petroleum work.
Settlement patterns of immigrants and their access to adequate 
social infrastructure will also affect the levels of social conflict 
between natives and immigrants. Settlement patterns of natives in the 
region of petroleum development is a crucial factor as well. Employ­
ment patterns will differ substantially between a zone located far 
from urban areas and one where farming communities are close by. 
Internal migration rates and flow patterns will affect the viability 
of an agriculture in transition.
Agricultural Prices
The greatest single boon to the Tabascan farm sector in the 
latter 1970's was the highly favorable price situation for major farm 
products, particularly cacao, cattle and coconut. The exception 
proving the rule was the dismal return to maize farming. The maize 
sector, in fact, conformed to the classically described negative farm 
response to a petroleum boom.
In order to assure continued agricultural production in a petro­
leum economy, product prices must cover the costs of at least enough 
production to support the farm family, even after a decline in 
(presumably now more expensive) input use. This level will depend on 
farm budget structures and sensitivities to items whose price and 
availability are affected by the boom. It will probably not be the 
same for all producers of a particular commodity.
High commodity prices encourage production not only for the obvious 
reasons of increased returns to family labor and resources, but also for 
their psychological impact on farmers. With high prices, farmers are 
likely to continue farm investment despite the boom, whereas low prices 
may hasten the disinvestment process.
Any price interventions should be designed to stabilize production 
for those farm groups whose stability most affects employment and 
welfare conditions in the area.
All the above suggest the difficulty of a positive petroleum- 
agriculture interaction in zones dominated by low-priced basic grains 
and subsistence production.
Political Support for Farmers
One of the factors which most encourages resolution of agri­
culture-petroleum conflicts is - perhaps obviously - a relatively strong 
political bargaining position for agriculture.
In the case of Tabasco, a combination of strong producer organiza­
tion for both political and economic goals, the simultaneity of 
interests of powerful largeholder cacaoteros with campesino interests, 
the importance of cacao to Tabasco, and national public sympathy for 
the threatened farmers combined to give the cacaoteros unusual political 
strength. The cacaoteros, who had long helped control the Tabascan 
state government, played a dominant role in designing state and 
federal government programs to stimulate the cacao economy and promote 
production advances.
Such political strength among agriculturalists is not common. Even 
where there is substantial local leverage, it is difficult to build a 
coalition sufficiently powerful to take on a giant multinational 
corporation or state-run monopoly.
Where political will does thus exist, the government can play a 
crucial role in carrying out general development policies, mitigating 
the inflationary impact on farmers, and encouraging petroleum company 
compromise.
Government Intervention
In general, government can play a leading role in managing 
internal terms of trade, limiting petroleum company prerogatives and 
providing needed services to the farming communities. Even under 
circumstances where the structure of agricultural production itself 
exacerbates the vulnerability of the farm sector, these latter factors 
can make an enormous difference in terms of the human cost of industrial 
transition. Such policies are critical in helping the farm sector 
weather an intense, but temporary "boom" so that agricultural produc­
tion can resume older patterns successfully when the boom is past.
Governmental intervention in the agriculture-petroleum conflict 
should have two parts: containing the negative impacts of petroleum
development and spreading the benefits of petroleum development as 
broadly as possible throughout the population.
In Tabasco, the state government contained many negative impacts 
through its inflation control programs, by supporting farmers in 
expropriation procedures, attempting to minimize conflicts between 
PEMEX activities and environmental safety, and strongly supporting 
agriculture to overcome farmer insecurity.
They spread the benefits chiefly through investment in wide­
spread education and health programs, COPLAMAR, PIDER sites, tourism 
development in outlying areas of the state and new agricultural pro­
jects. They were under no illusions that petroleum activity per se 
would result in trickle-down of benefits.
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for example, may prove more adaptive than zones where loss of the male 
head of household to petroleum employment leaves behind no one trained 
to run the farm.
Rates of immigration have a profound effect on petroleum- 
agriculture conflict, by exacerbating problems with inflation, wage 
rates, housing and other basic goods' scarcity, if poorly managed. If 
a government can restrict immigration to those with obviously needed 
and scarce skills, more individuals from the local agricultural 
population will be employed in petroleum work.
Settlement patterns of immigrants and their access to adequate 
social infrastructure will also affect the levels of social conflict 
between natives and immigrants. Settlement patterns of natives in the 
region of petroleum development is a crucial factor as well. Employ­
ment patterns will differ substantially between a zone located far 
from urban areas and one where farming communities are close by. 
Internal migration rates and flow patterns will affect the viability 
of an agriculture in transition.
Agricultural Prices
The greatest single boon to the Tabascan farm sector in the 
latter 1970's was the highly favorable price situation for major farm 
products, particularly cacao, cattle and coconut. The exception 
proving the rule was the dismal return to maize farming. The maize 
sector, in fact, conformed to the classically described negative farm 
response to a petroleum boom.
In order to assure continued agricultural production in a petro­
leum economy, product prices must cover the costs of at least enough 
production to support the farm family, even after a decline in 
(presumably now more expensive) input use. This level will depend on 
farm budget structures and sensitivities to items whose price and 
availability are affected by the boom. It will probably not be the 
same for all producers of a particular commodity.
High commodity prices encourage production not only for the obvious 
reasons of increased returns to family labor and resources, but also for 
their psychological impact on farmers. With high prices, farmers are 
likely to continue farm investment despite the boom, whereas low prices 
may hasten the disinvestment process.
Any price interventions should be designed to stabilize production 
for those farm groups whose stability most affects employment and 
welfare conditions in the area.
All the above suggest the difficulty of a positive petroleum- 
agriculture interaction in zones dominated by low-priced basic grains 
and subsistence production.
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Political Support for Farmers
One of the factors which most encourages resolution of agri­
culture-petroleum conflicts is - perhaps obviously - a relatively strong 
political bargaining position for agriculture.
In the case of Tabasco, a combination of strong producer organiza­
tion for both political and economic goals, the simultaneity of 
interests of powerful largeholder cacaoteros with campesino interests, 
the importance of cacao to Tabasco, and national public sympathy for 
the threatened farmers combined to give the cacaoteros unusual political 
strength. The cacaoteros, who had long helped control the Tabascan 
state government, played a dominant role in designing state and 
federal government programs to stimulate the cacao economy and promote 
production advances.
Such political strength among agriculturalists is not common. Even 
where there is substantial local leverage, it is difficult to build a 
coalition sufficiently powerful to take on a giant multinational 
corporation or state-run monopoly.
Where political will does thus exist, the government can play a 
crucial role in carrying out general development policies, mitigating 
the inflationary impact on farmers, and encouraging petroleum company 
compromise.
Government Intervention
In general, government can play a leading role in managing 
internal terms of trade, limiting petroleum company prerogatives and 
providing needed services to the farming communities. Even under 
circumstances where the structure of agricultural production itself 
exacerbates the vulnerability of the farm sector, these latter factors 
can make an enormous difference in terms of the human cost of industrial 
transition. Such policies are critical in helping the farm sector 
weather an intense, but temporary "boom" so that agricultural produc­
tion can resume older patterns successfully when the boom is past.
Governmental intervention in the agriculture-petroleum conflict 
should have two parts: containing the negative impacts of petroleum
development and spreading the benefits of petroleum development as 
broadly as possible throughout the population.
In Tabasco, the state government contained many negative impacts 
through its inflation control programs, by supporting farmers in 
expropriation procedures, attempting to minimize conflicts between 
PEMEX activities and environmental safety, and strongly supporting 
agriculture to overcome farmer insecurity.
They spread the benefits chiefly through investment in wide­
spread education and health programs, COPLAMAR, PIDER sites, tourism 
development In outlying areas of the state and new agricultural pro­
jects. They were under no illusions that petroleum activity per se 
would result in trickle-down of benefits.
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It is important to overcome the tendency to concentrate govern­
ment infrastructure investments during industrial transition completely 
in the towns, although this is where shortages appear most obvious. 
Under dynamic economic conditions, processes of marginalization tend 
to speed up, hence decisions to postpone investments in marginal areas 
by even a few years (e.g., to postpone construction of farm-to-market 
roads in favor of urban highways) can lead to severe economic 
stagnation in those areas bypassed.
Solid support for community and small town development in the 
agricultural regions - including housing, sanitary infrastructure, 
schools - can reduce internal migration and encourage agriculture.
Inflation Controls
Accelerated inflation nearly always accompanies a petroleum boom.
It plays havoc with the local economy, particularly those sectors not 
linked to the leading petroleum economy with its high wages. For 
farmers, increases in cost of living and production inputs are the 
leading causes of farm disinvestment and farmer migration to petroleum 
employment.
In Tabasco, inflationary pressures were by no means controlled, 
but they were mitigated substantially by, first of all, high farm 
prices which made farming relatively competitive with petroleum em­
ployment, and secondly by direct government action. The proliferation 
of government-sponsored rural stores, establishment of new transporta­
tion centers, opening of medical clinics, assistance to producer coops 
in acquiring production inputs, retail price controls, and government 
bus services competing with private companies were some of the methods 
tested to ease inflationary pressures. Their effectiveness was mixed 
at best, but in specific zones made a great deal of difference to farm 
families.
Initial analysis of any developing petroleum area should include 
farm budget checks for different farm types and different commodities 
to ascertain the inputs whose use is most sensitive to price 
increases. Early intervention in the farm economy could include market­
ing projects to offset price declines, such as cooperatives, special 
transport facilities, alternative sources of basic commodities.
Consumer cooperative organization in farm areas may be necessary both 
for farm production and family consumption, to keep living costs down 
and thereby enable farm incomes to satisfy family needs.
Petroleum Company Flexibility
One of the greatest political coups of the Tabascan state govern­
ment was the inclusion of PEMEX at state planning board meetings and 
federal guidelines to the organization to cooperate with the state 
when possible, and particularly to inform them in advance of where and
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how new developments would be established. The advantages were not all 
with the state. By sharing information with COPRODET and the Governor, 
PEMEX often passed to them responsibility for coordinating public 
relations.
The willingness of the petroleum companies involved to compro­
mise, consult with and consider the agricultural sector in its land 
use planning is of critical importance in resolving agriculture- 
petroleum conflicts. There is a broad range of issues on which the two 
sectors are by no means incompatible. Some adjustments would increase 
costs for the company, but would be outweighed in real economic terms 
by reduced losses and added production of the farming sector (not to 
mention reduced political conflict and litigation.)
Drainage system protection, pollution control, prior warning of 
changes and farmland utilization, adequate compensation for expro­
priated land and damages, mutually compatible road designs and 
location - these are items on which petroleum companies should 
reasonably be expected to consider agricultural interests.
Another factor dependent on the companies themselves is petroleum 
employment policy: transfer of personnel from other petroleum areas
versus local hiring; degree of technical skill required versus 
training availability; use of short-term or long-term labor contracts; 
educational and other requirements for jobs; unionization, membership 
rules and job protection; determination of pay levels.
In Tabasco, one of the most destabilizing factors for the land­
less workers and minifundistas was their inability to get contracts for 
over three months, intended so the companies need not pay social 
security. A lot of time was lost waiting for jobs and little forward 
planning was possible. On the other hand, the mass transfer of 
personnel from other states for particular jobs in Tabasco means that 
after the boom many new migrants will leave again, reducing the poten­
tial problem of mass unemployment.
Attributes of Local Agriculture
The agricultural system itself determines, to a large extent, the 
nature of its interaction with the petroleum economy. The pattern of 
labor requirements for principal farm products will conflict more or 
less with petroleum labor demand. Labor availability - the composition 
of the EAP - will either mitigate or exacerbate regional labor disrup­
tions. Finally, the economic characteristics and farm management pat­
terns of principal farmholding groups will determine the viability of 
farming for those groups in the new petroleum economy.
Employment Conditions
The flexibility of employment conditions in agriculture has an 
extremely important effect on the potential for compatibility between
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agriculture and petroleum. Agricultural labor cycles and seasonality, 
and the labor sensitivity of different crops are key variables.
Cacao production in Tabasco utilizes labor very abundantly but 
flexibly. There are few operations for which timeliness is critical, 
and the high labor use is spread throughout the year. Peaks occur at 
the height of the rainy season, which is the period when construction 
activities for PEMEX, the government and nearly everyone else comes to 
a halt. This permits an influx of multi-sector workers to cacao 
plantations during the most critical periods.
In general, perennial crops (such as cacao, coconut, oranges) with 
flexible labor requirements are the most conflict-free. Perennial crops 
such as avocado and sugar cane, which have definite timing requirements 
for inputs and extreme labor peaks, are less so. Production of some 
annual crops may fit easily within the periods of slack petroleum 
labor demand; others will directly conflict.
A final factor in determining labor demand,which is frequently 
overlooked,is the sensitivity of farm employment to agricultural 
product price. Labor requirements for a particular crop are not fixed 
over time; when prices are high, more labor will be required for more 
intensive production,and when prices are low, labor use will generally 
be reduced. Farms with different management objectives and constraints 
will respond differently to such price changes; but respond they will.
Labor Availability
Labor availability for agricultural production is dependent on a 
number of factors. The EAP occupied in farming and farm work is 
itself dependent on cultural characteristics such as the role of women 
and children, structural characteristics such as land tenure patterns, 
and demographic characteristics such as the age distribution.
Whether the EAP on farms and in rural areas will choose to work 
on farms depends on what their alternatives are, and on cultural work 
preferences. In a petroleum economy, the alternatives may be both 
financially and personally more rewarding. Regional unemployment 
levels, and a custom of off-farm employment will also affect these 
decisions.
Labor in Tabasco - Scarcity or Surplus?
To judge employment conditions, it is critical to look at what is 
happening endogenously within the agricultural sector, as well as to 
analyze general employment changes induced by the new petroleum (or 
other) investment. Failure to do this in the case of Tabasco led to 
mistaken interpretations of petroleum impact, and premature emphasis 
on employment-generating investment outside the petroleum sector 
(e.g., State Plan investments, intensification programs in agriculture.)
Short-term objectives of the State Agricultural Plan included 
generation of 15,000 permanent new jobs - an increase of over twelve 
per cent in the agricultural labor force, or three per cent per year 
(72, p.116). Most technical assistance programs relied on technology 
requiring heavy infusions of labor inputs. The Chontalpa Plan doubled 
the number of hours worked during the late 1970's.
For political reasons, this approach was quite understandable.
Had the government waited until the construction phase of the petro­
leum boom was over in order to initiate major state projects, it is 
possible that federal support would not have been forthcoming to the 
degree possible during the petroleum boom crisis.
Nonetheless, Tabasco was not experiencing a temporary labor 
scarcity in the midst of a long-term tendency to labor abundance. Data 
which are cited to support this position ignore secondary occupations, 
the role of family labor in production, seasonality, and volatility of 
employment with agricultural price changes*!/ In fact, Tabasco has 
traditionally been a labor-short area. The state experienced signifi­
cant unemployment mainly in areas newly switched from agriculture to 
livestock production, and during periods of depressed agricultural 
prices.
Agriculture would probably not even have been perceived as 
suffering from a labor scarcity at the peak of the petroleum boom 
were it not for high prices in labor-intensive crops. These produc­
tion incentives, combined with government incentives to utilize new, 
labor-intensive inputs, increased farm demand for labor markedly over 
the level required in the early 1970's.
Will a collapse of the boom change the countryside from labor­
scarce to labor-abundant? Perhaps; the determining variable will 
be changing conditions within the agricultural sector itself.
Smallholder Flexibility
Had Tabasco been a region dominated by capitalist largeholders on 
the one hand, and a pool of landless workers on the other, the employ­
ment situation would have been vastly simplified - and vastly more 
devastating to agricultural production. Relative price and wages 
would have mandated a move out of agricultural investment and employ­
ment. They key to the farming sector's continued dynamism was the 
small-scale producer.
Because of the abundance of smallholders in the cacao sector, 
most on-farm production activities could be carried out properly by 
family members, even when scheduled around PEMEX jobs. As a result of 
this flexibility and the farm management characteristics of campesino
—  An example is Allub and Michel (1980), who estimate agri­
cultural underemployment in 1970 at 45-59 per cent, depending 
on whether the Agricultural or Population Census figures are 
used. This is almost certainly an overestimation (1, Chart 7).
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farming, there was a much broader range of prices over which the 
campesinado could continue to produce cacao. Farm employment and 
rural incomes were significantly stabilized as a result.
Indeed, while high price and labor-intensity in the Tabascan 
cacao economy find limited duplication elsewhere, this campesino 
flexibility offers hope of stability during times of economic duress 
to many other farming areas in Mexico and throughout the world.
Role of the Peasantry in Economic Development
We have come quite a way in our thinking about the peasantry in 
the past thirty years. Some formerly accepted ideas have been almost 
completely debunked as the result of careful research: that peasant
attitude is the chief reason for backwardness; that traditional pea­
sant institutions usually serve as a brake on economic development; 
that peasants live in undifferentiated, egalitarian communities; that 
they do not base decision-making on principles of rationality.
As demonstrated in Tabasco, the peasantry can be a potentially 
dynamic economic sector within its own constraints. Peasant modes of 
production can be extremely complex; community social histories quite 
diverse. Production systems change over time with changing market 
conditions, changing role of non-agricultural income in family and 
community income, types of exploitation, intra-household tensions, 
changing means of production. These systems also change temporally 
within a single family over the life-cycle.
In addition, smallholders and peasants frequently play an impor­
tant role in the non-farm sector, through resource transfers and 
particularly through urban employment, as part of complex job-related 
migration cycles.
But the position of the campesinado is highly contradictory. Much 
of its stabilizing effect within the agricultural economy actually 
stems from poverty and the subordinate position of campesinos within 
the political and economic structure.
Tabascan family farmers and minifundistas are typical in that 
they act in part as a reserve labor force, which raises and supports 
individuals in a low-cost (relative to the broader economy) environ­
ment. Their support system acts for the family as nursery, sickroom 
and retirement home, relieving employers outside the campesino economy 
from having to meet these costs in the form of higher wages or other 
protections. To the extent that they produce their own food and other 
supplies, they reduce market demand for these products, which are 
frequently in short supply.
Under conditions of economic stress - such as take place during 
petroleum development - capitalist - based agriculture is put under 
tremendous strain. This is not experienced in the same way by 
campesinos, whose decision criteria is not profit maximization and who
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have limited flexibility in asset deployment - because the assets 
themselves are so limited. The campesinado thus has greater potential 
for production and employment stability, achievable at far less cost 
than comparable support of the capitalist sector.
Support for Peasant Farming
What would a commitment to foster peasant farming involve?
First, policies to support peasant agricultural production, then poli­
cies to ensure that increased production does not come at the price of 
greater exploitation.
It is important to keep in mind that a re-orientation of policy 
which focuses on the peasantry does not in itself imply improved 
conditions for the peasantry, if that policy is aimed entirely toward 
extracting more surplus production, rather than toward community de­
velopment as well.
During the recent period of high off-farm wages, when petroleum 
jobs were utilized to accumulate resources for the cacao farms, the 
relationship between the cacao farm sector and the general economy 
was not generally exploitative. This is in contrast to earlier periods 
when off-farm jobs paying wages insufficient to support a family were 
required to supplement earnings from poorly-paid farm products.
Support to ensure greater peasant prosperity would include not 
only general policies in favor of agriculture - high relative prices, 
low cost inputs, improved transportation - but also local level, 
smaller-scale interventions. These must be location-specific, decen­
tralized and developed via continuous farmer-institution interaction 
and experimentation.
Direct intervention in the form of technical programs, infra­
structure development, marketing organization, and so on may be an 
important form of support where they result in significant decreases 
in farm costs, increases in farm returns, or greater availability of 
scarce inputs. But large-scale programs involving disruption of on­
going economic patterns or significant changes in production systems 
should be avoided. The principal concern of policy-makers must be to 
maximize the stability and security of the farming sector, not to 
introduce still more uncertainty.
Any technical recommendations must be based on at least some 
minimal analysis of whole farm systems, not single crop budgets. This 
procedure need not entail complex computing or methodologies, but simple 
small-scale surveys which highlight potential conflict between input 
requirements for different products and reveal general farm expendi­
ture patterns and the relative importance to farm costs and family 
income of the crop in question. Such analysis would, as a matter of 
course, incorporate information on major non-agricultural income 
sources, expenditures and employment priorities.
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As this study illustrates, the farming population can clearly not 
be assumed to have homogeneous production characteristics. Policy 
recommendations must be oriented to specific groups of farmers, based 
on budget analyses of their economic conditions, capacities and 
special advantages.
In many societies, the peasantry will remain an integral part of 
the economic and social scene for the foreseeable future. The 
preservation of a sphere of family existence directed to subsistence 
is a stable form of organization in societies where instability and 
uncertainty are great, market circuits operate poorly, and industrial 
development generates little employment. The subsistence orientation 
is not necessarily "backward," but may be the most rational organiza­
tion possible, an adaptive mode of production.
Using Rural Economy Analysis for Development Theory and Policy
Peasant economies and their role in economic development are at 
the center of the great theoretical Issues of the field today: 
agrarian reformism, socialist versus capitalist paths of growth, rural 
underdevelopment, changing international division of labor, dualism in 
economic growth.
The unfolding of these debates, however, has proceeded at a 
rarefied level. While they help to alert the researcher or 
policy-maker to certain problems, they have not provided much 
guidance for the design of useful field research on the one hand, nor, 
on the other hand, the collection of key information to inform practical 
policy-making. To the extent that field research has even been carried 
out in relation to macro-theoretical issues, they are more often 
designed to validate rather than test or elucidate those theories.
The danger of such an approach was obvious in Tabasco. Its 
experience was not congruent with any of the principal paradigms of 
development, but research designed to collect only certain sorts of 
data could easily have led one to think so. (Review Chapter 4, and 
Appendix A of the Thesis.)
Micro-level research, by contrast, has tended to skirt the larger 
theoretical issues entirely, for lack of a method to link their 
research systematically to macro-theoretical and policy questions.
This thesis was a modest attempt to develop such a research 
method. It Is grounded in the detail of development - for the specifics 
of history, ecology, demography are critically important - but they 
are located in a much broader context. The details of interest were 
chosen in order to speak to those broader Issues.
The success or failure of agriculture in other petroleum regions 
cannot be ascertained without at least cursory review of the variables 
discussed in this chapter. But the result will vary - and it is this 
variation which needs to be described and analyzed, its heterogeneity 
appreciated. An emphasis on macro-level theory will otherwise result 
in excessive reductionism.
-217-
How Unique Was the Case of Tabasco?
Must the Mexican campesinado disappear In the face of modern 
Industrial development and Its chronic exploitation and displacement 
of campeslnos? In Tabasco, the peasant economy appears capable of 
long-term resilience, as a major economic sector, despite the 
Increased proletarianization of the minifundia and subsistence maize 
sectors. But since the latter forms the majority of Mexico's campesinado, 
Tabasco Is a less optimistic example than It may first appear to be, 
without more generous national support for the peasantry.
In Tabasco In the 1970's, many factors which mitigate the agri­
culture-petroleum conflict were operating simultaneously. The negative 
record reviewed In Chapter 1 suggests that It Is rare Indeed that 
demographic, political, structural and marketing forces coalesce In 
this way.
It Is Important to reiterate that most of the variables responsible 
for Tabasco's success In resolving agriculture-petroleum conflicts 
were historically determined and not amenable to Immediate 
policy Intervention - regardless of the political orientation of the 
government. But If political action Is to be taken, analysis of the 
above variables Is the first step In determining what policies are 
appropriate. Tabasco's policy experience (as opposed to Its historical 
characteristics) provide some ideas for what those policies could be, 
but are by no means a blueprint.
In Tabasco, powerful groups fought on behalf of the cacao 
producers. Will state or national governments take upon themselves 
this burden where target groups have little political power in their 
own right?
That they do will be critical in those areas of the world newly 
involved in petroleum development, such as the Mexican Southeast and 
West Africa, which are populated regions of settled agriculture 
dominated by smallholders. Despite the visibility of the petroleum 
sector in the regional economy, agriculture and non-petroleum economic 
activities will continue over the long term to provide the principle 
income and employment base and determine family income levels and 
distribution for the majority of people in these areas.
The potential resilience of the smallholder or peasant sector can 
be a critical factor in stabilizing such regions. Will these agrarian 
nations make the simultaneous commitment to peasant farming and large- 
scale industrial development necessary to reduce the inherent conflicts?
This will be their central development challenge during the 
coming decades. The history of the Tabascan cacao farmers in the 
1970's offers some hope of success.
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NOTES
CHART 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF 1970 EAP FOR TABASCO (p.39)
a./ The statistics given in the Census do not provide a very clear 
picture of the working situation of individuals or groups of individuals, 
as data on income, branch of work, position, etc. are presented sepa­
rately. This chart is my attempt to combine these variables to summa­
rize what is known about the various groups. It is by no means exact.
b/ Note that in the agricultural sector over-all, 14.9 per cent
of workers (17 ,208) had no income at all; 81.6 per cent (93,943) earned
under $1000 per month (of whom 17.8 per cent, or 10,833 earned $500-
1000) ; :3.5 per cent (4996 individuals) earned over $1000 •
c/ The fanners, including propietarios and ejidatarios, can be
differentiated as follows:
Per Cent Number of Per Cent of
of EAP Individuals Type All Farmers
6 12,000 Subsistence 20.7
7 34,000 Semi-commercial 58.6
2 4,000 Collective farmers 6.9
2 4,000 Medium-sized ranchers 6.9
2 4,000 Largeholders with over
50 hectares 6.9
d/ Note that 68 per cent of all construction workers earned under
$1000 per month.
e/ All large-scale transformation workers and 87 per cent of small- 
scale transformation workers earned over $1000 per month.
f/ There was no way to differentiate income levels for service 
workers outside Villahermosa. Within Villahermosa, "high income" workers 
over $1000 per month, and "low income" workers under $1000 per month.
CHART 22. PRIMARY OCCUPATION OF POTENTIAL EAP, BY AGE (p. 99)
a./ Note that of 646 individuals aged 8-15, only 57 were working, of 
whom only three were not agricultural workers.
b/ Of 234 individuals aged 61-99, 77 were not working: only ten of 
those were not working in agriculture.
c_/ The graphs in Chart 22 show that portion of the potential EAP 
which is in fact employed; those remaining include housewives, students, 
the sick and retired individuals.
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CHART 24. PER HECTARE COSTS OF CACAO PRODUCTION IN TABASCO, BY FARM 
TYPE (p. 102)
a/ "Imputed family labor" represents the value of family labor 
used on the farm, had it been remunerated at the going agricultural 
wage rate.
b/ "Other costs" include transport and vehicle use; depreciation 
on tools, equipment and other items; interest on debt.
c/ Cost data on the collective does not include any depreciation 
on equipment or buildings, which would be substantial.
d/ The "recommended" production system is taken from the SARH, 
Plan de Cacao, 1979. It does not include any estimates for deprecia­
tion, transport, or interest.
TABLE 8. COSTS OF CACAO PRODUCTION ON FAMILY CACAO FARMS (p. Ill)
These notes also cover TABLE 13 (p. 132) and TABLE 18 (p. 154)
a_/ SARH, Comision de Grijalva, Direccion de Estudios y Proyectos, 
"Rendimientos y Costos de Produccion de Cultivos Tropicales," August 
1979, pp. 10-16.
h j SARH, "Plan de Incremento de la Produccion de Cacao en el 
Estado de Tabasco," January 1979, Villahermosa, Tabasco, Cuadro 20.
This represents the supposed "typical" production system in Tabasco, 
before rehabilitation programs.
c j  Same source as above. This represents the production costs 
after farmers have instituted rehabilitative measures on their planta­
tions (see text) suggested by the Cacao Plan.
d/ A higher estimated value for land is shown in the first figure; 
a lower estimate in parentheses.
e/ The original figures valued a man-day of labor at $75 (Grijalva 
data) and $83 (Cacao Plan data). Here we have adjusted this to $100, 
the minimal going rate found in Tabasco during my field study.
f j  The family man-day of labor here is valued at the typical (not 
minimum) going rate of $120 per day.
j»/ Sr. Luna was uncertain about how much fertilizer was applied, 
but fertilization took place only once. The value of fertilizer applied 
was certainly under $1,500.
h/ These include imputed cost of family labor.
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TABLE 11. FAMILY AND FARM INCOME OF HIRED-LABOR-BASED CACAO FARM HOUSE­
HOLDS, 1979-80 (pp. 115-117)
These notes also cover TABLE 16 (pp. 136-138) and TABLE 21 (pp. 157-158)
*Source: Author, Cacao Farm Budget Analyses, 1979-80, Tabasco, Mexico.
Note that the costs, returns and labor use summarized here can be found In 
preceding chapter tables.
a/ The blank spaces below refer to the specific income measure used - 
cash, labor earnings with and without equity deduction; the figures are 
found in the appropriate column to the right.
b/ Cash income refers to costs and returns to the family only in
cash.
c/ "Labor Earnings"(without equity deduction) is a measure of income 
that includes several non-cash components such as: inventory changes,
family use of farm products, etc.
d./ "Labor Earnings"with equity deduction is similar to the simple 
labor earnings measure, but also adds the cost of tying up the family's 
capital in the farm enterprise. It enters, as a cost, the interest that 
could be paid to the family by a bank were all assets to be sold for cash 
and deposited, without the risks entailed in a farm enterprise. The very 
low rate of 7 per cent is used for our calculations.
e/ Total Income of whatever measure is the sum of farm income, off- 
farm agricultural income and off-farm non-agricultural income.
f j  Income per man-day is a rough measure of average labor produc­
tivity - not marginal product; including both hired and family labor use. 
To compute this, the wage bill is subtracted from total costs.
£/ This is the average value of a day of labor performed by family 
members. For this purpose, the wage bill included in costs.
h/ This does not include the imputed value of family labor.
i j  This pig budget is probably inaccurate. If we assume net returns 
at $1 million (based on unreported costs); and a doubling of the very low 
reported labor input to 800 man-days per year, then returns per man-day 
are reduced to $1250.
j_/ The value in parentheses represents the higher of two cost esti­
mates for cacao production.
k/ The value in parentheses represents costs (or returns) in the 
form of a changed animal inventory.
1/ Sr. Prado's reported activities almost certainly underestimate 
the number of man-days he works. If we increase this estimate to 200 days 
(a change of 54 days), then the value changes to $1200 per man-day.
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m/ Irregularities in the Prado budget include: a) unusual reduc­
tion in the cattle inventory this year; b) milk income estimates which 
seem too low; c) labor use in pig operation probably underestimated; 
d) no payments of principal on loans are included as costs; e) it is 
not certain whether the owner's son received cash income for work in 
the cattle operation; none is included here.
n/ Irregularities in the Ramirez budget include: a) underestima­
tion of fungicide applications; b) no payment of principal on loans is 
included as costs.
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